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foreword             
Editorial foreword
the Hungarian Philosophical Review’s current volume contains six essays. the 
essays, besides the fact that they all deal with current issues of metaphysics, are 
quite disparate.
as editors we would like to thank our authors for their contribution to our 
volume. We do hope that this supplementary volume of the Hungarian Philo-
sophical Review would further the international recognition of philosophy done 
in hungary.
Gábor Bács, Dávid Márk Kovács, János Tőzsér

currenT issues in MeTaphysics             
GÁBOR BÁCS – JÁNOS TŐZSÉR
Works of Art from the Philosophically
Innocent Point of View
IntroDuCtIon
the Mona Lisa, the Mondscheinsonate, the Chanson d’automne are works of art, the 
salt shaker on your table, the car in your garage, or the pijamas on your bed are 
not. the basic question of the metaphysics of works of art is this: what makes a 
thing a work of art? that is: what sort of property do works of art have in virtue 
of which they are works of art? or more simply: what sort of property being a work 
of art is?
In this paper we argue that things are works of art in virtue of what they are 
like, their intrinsic features, that is, in virtue of the fact that they have the per-
ceptual (auditory, visual, etc.) properties they have. In other words: being a work of 
art supervenes on perceptual-intrinsic features. Currently, this metaphysical view is 
extremely unpopular within the philosophy of art. It is unpopular because there 
allegedly exists a knock-down objection to it, the well-known argument from in-
discernible counterparts. our thesis implies, among other things, that every per-
ceptual duplicate of a work of art is also a work of art. according to the argument 
from indiscernible counterparts, however, there could be (or even: there are) in-
discernible counterparts such that one of them is a work of art while the other is 
not. hence things cannot be works of art solely in virtue of what they are like.
our paper divides into three parts. In the first part we state our views. In the 
second part we defend it against various versions of the argument from indis-
cernible counterparts. (In doing so our position will become more plausible, we 
hope). In the final part we provide some meta-reflections on the matter.
1. THe naTure oF arTWorks
1.1. What is our view exactly?
let’s begin with the notion of perceptual property. The perceptual properties 
of the Mona Lisa are those which are visually presented to us when we look at 
the painting. the perceptual properties of the Mondscheinsonate are those which 
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are auditively presented to us when we listen to the music. It is crucial that what 
we call the ‘perceptual properties’ of the Mona Lisa or the Mondscheinsonate are 
not the properties of our experiences of them (they are not qualia, or some such 
mental, phenomenal stuff), but the perceptually accessible intrinsic properties 
of the works of art themselves what we can see or hear. by definition: the per-
ceptual properties of work of art O are those intrinsic properties of O which are 
manifested to the perceiver during the perception of O.
someone might say that notions like ‘perception of a work of art’ and ‘per-
ceptual properties of a work of art’ are plausible in the case of fine arts and 
musical arts (we do perceive such works of art during which their perceptual 
properties are indeed manifested to us), but they are not plausible in the case 
of literature.
this isn’t so. to begin with, the perceptual properties of some literary art-
works are not the perceptual properties of its (printed) textual image. We ob-
viously do not say that the Chanson d’automne is a work of art in virtue of the 
fact that the image of its printed text has the perceptual properties that it has. 
Instead we say that when you read the Chanson d’automne, the work of art is 
presented to you. not visually, of course, and not auditively, but – to put it this 
way – imaginatively. that is, when you read the Chanson d’automne you perceive 
it imaginatively (with your ‘mind’s eye’, so to speak), and the perceptual prop-
erties of the Chanson d’automne are those which are imaginatively presented 
to you. 
the matter becomes clearer if we bring out a parallel between literary art-
works and musical artworks. suppose that you are a thoroughbred musician and 
before you lies a copy of the musical score sheet of the Mondscheinsonate. When 
you read the musical score sheet, to you, the qualified musician, the Mondschein-
sonate becomes imaginatively presented. you do hear the music, imaginatively. 
Its perceptual properties are manifested to you, imaginatively. We claim that 
something similar is the case when someone reads the Chanson d’automne. you do 
see what the poem says, imaginatively. Its perceptual properties are manifested 
to you, imaginatively. so the perceptual properties of the Chanson d’automne are 
like the imaginatively given perceptual properties of the Mondscheinsonate when 
a qualified musician is reading its score.
Furthermore, just as you can perceive the Mondscheinsonate not only imagina-
tively, by reading its musical score sheet, but auditively by hearing it, you can 
perceive the Chanson d’automne not only imaginatively, by reading its printed 
text, but auditively—by hearing its recitation. Just as one can play the Mond-
scheinsonate on a piano (it could be you), one can recite the Chanson d’automne (it 
could be you). now, it is plausible to think that we gain access to the very same 
Mondscheinsonate when we read its musical score sheet and when we hear it, and 
we gain access to the very same Chanson d’automne when we read its printed text 
and when we hear it. It is also plausible to think that when you hear the Mond-
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scheinsonate, and when you hear the Chanson d’automne, what you hear is their 
perceptual properties. hence we can rightly speak of the perceptual properties 
of the Chanson d’automne, or of any other literary work of art for that matter.
It’s by sheer historical coincidence that fewer people can perceive musical 
works of art by reading musical score sheets than can perceive literary works or 
art by reading printed texts. We can easily imagine a world at which the only 
mode of encounter with the Mondscheinsonate is by reading its score. It would be 
odd to say that in that world, the Mondscheinsonate has no perceptual properties.
so what we are saying is this: O is a work of art in virtue of what it is like, that 
is, in virtue of the fact that O has the perceptually accessible intrinsic features 
that it has, features that are manifested to us when we perceive O (visually, audi-
tively, or imaginatively). the properties manifested to us during perception are 
the perceptual properties which alone can make something a work of art.
notice that this is not a definition of the concept of work of art. the same way 
in which a physicalist theory of mind is not a definition of the concept of mind. 
We might ask: among the many perceptual properties a work of art has, which 
ones are those in virtue of which it is a work of art, and which ones can be used 
to define the notion of a work of art. answering such questions lie outside the 
metaphysician’s competence. It’s the art historian’s, the aesthete’s and the art 
critic’ job to provide such answers. Just as it’s not the physicalist’s task, but the 
neurophysiologist’s to spell out which neurophysiological state is responsible 
for which mental state. We only say that perceptual properties alone determine 
works of art, but we are silent about which perceptual properties we’re talking 
about, the same way in which the physicalist only says that physical proper-
ties alone determine mental states, but she remains silent about which physical 
properties she is talking about.
a further aspect of similarity. Just as neurophysiologists can be wrong about 
which neurophysiological state is responsible for which mental state, art histo-
rians, aesthetes and art critics can be wrong about which perceptual properties 
make something a work of art. so it can all too easily happen (as it did) that 
during some period of time, a work of art is mistakenly taken for something else 
before realizing that it is a work of art after all. Mind you, it was a work of art all 
along, it’s just that it wasn’t recognized as such.
1.2. What is our main motivation?
our main motivation is that only this view is in line with our most commonsen-
sical, philosophically innocent beliefs about works of art. From the philosophi-
cally innocent point of view, works of art are what they are because of what they 
are like. the Mondscheinsonate, for instance, is a work of art because of what it 
sounds like. 
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To us this much is clear. Take David lewis’ simple maxim of honesty: “nev-
er put forward a philosophical theory that you yourself cannot believe in your 
least philosophical and most commonsensical moments” (lewis 1986, 135). if 
we heed the maxim, we cannot put forward a theory according to which the per-
ception of the Mondscheinsonate gives us little clue as to whether it is a work of 
art or not, that what matters is not its perceptual likeness, but something else. 
We would surely dismiss any such view in our least philosophical and most com-
monsensical moments.
Why? Well, we usually buy tickets for music concerts to perceive the proper-
ties of musical works like the Mondscheinsonate, in order to be able to hear certain 
sounds following one another in a certain rythm, in a certain tempo, and with 
a certain dynamics. If you were trying to feed us with the idea that the Mond-
scheinsonate is a work of art not because of its perceptual features that you can 
hear in the concert hall, but because of something else (not perceptual, hence 
not manifested there and then), we would not buy into it: everything that counts 
is in the concert halls.
also, if the Mondscheinsonate were a work of art because of some non-per-
ceptual feature (like causal history, for instance) which is not manifest when 
listening to the music, then someone who knows the causal history of the Mond-
scheinsonate, but has never heard the musical work itself is in a better position 
to judge for himself whether it is a work of art, than someone who knows little 
about the origin but is thorougly acquainted with the music. this is counterin-
tuitive. anyway, whichever non-perceptualist account we end up with, none of 
them attributes importance to the perception of works of art, at least for judging 
their artwork status. and this we find extremely implausible—in our most com-
monsensical moments.
1.3. What views are we against?
so far we have stated our view which was: something is a work of art in virtue 
of what it’s like; and our primary motivation for it was: it accords with our most 
commonsensical beliefs about works of art. there are many alternative views, 
however, which are all non-perceptualist.
according to the institutional theory of art, something is a work of art in vir-
tue of the fact that some professional jury, or social institution has conferred the 
status of artwork upon it (for example, Dickie 1974, Fish 1980). this view is 
non-perceptualist: on this account, something is a work of art because of the way 
it is related to the decision of certain people, to some collective intentionality, 
and such things are obviously not manifest to us when we perceive the artwork 
itself. according to the mimetic theory of art, something is work of art in virtue 
of the fact that it mimics a portion of reality (for example, plato in The Republic). 
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this view is non-perceptualist: a work of art is that which stands in a similar-
ity relation to a portion of reality, which is, again, not manifest to us when we 
perceive the artwork itself. according to a third theory, something is a work of 
art in virtue of the fact that we relate to them in a special (aesthetic) way. to 
use kant’s bon mot, with disinterested contemplation (kant 1790/1997). This 
view is non-perceptualist: a work of art is that which stands in some relation to a 
contemplative mode, which is not manifest to us when we perceive the artwork 
itself. Finally, according to a fourth theory, something is a work of art in virtue 
of the fact that it has resulted from some deliberate creative artistic intention 
(for example, Danto 1981). this view is non-perceptualist: a work of art is that 
which stands in some causal or ancestral relation to a certain artistic intention, 
not manifest to us when we perceive the artwork itself.
It is quite clear that our view is the opposite of all these relationist accounts 
which claim that works of art are what they are because of the way they are re-
lated to other things, where the relation in question (any one of the four) cannot 
be manifested to us in the perception of the artworks themselves. We hold that 
works of art are what they are because of what they themselves are like, because 
of their intrinsic nature so to speak, and which can be manifested to us in the 
perception of the artworks.
We have already remarked in the introduction that a view like ours is ex-
tremely unpopular these days in the philosophy of art, and not only because of 
the indiscernible counterparts objection.
this unpopularity is also due in part to considerations like the following. It is 
not uncommon that certain works of art refer to other works of art and as such are 
interrelated. For instance, in the Don Giovanni, Mozart makes explicit reference 
to a well-known part of The Marriage of Figaro. or to use a literary example, in 
the Cantos, Ezra pound quotes a part from the Iliad. since such references are 
constituent parts of the works of art in question, their presence indicates that 
factors like the interrelation between works of art also matters in their artwork 
status, yet this interrelatedness is beyond the perceptually accessible intrinsic 
features of any given artwork. this might give a further incentive to the idea 
that any perceptual–intrinsic account of artworks is doomed to failure.
We think that this consideration concerns the interpretation of works of art. 
We do not deny that the interpretation of a work of art requires much more than 
taking into account what it is like. In the course of interpreting the Don Gio-
vanni, we must take into consideration, among other things, its reference to The 
Marriage of Figaro, and in interpreting the Cantos, its quotation from the Iliad. 
no quarrel there. What we do deny, however, is that the ontology of artworks 
depends in any way on their interpretation, on what we take them to be about.
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2. arGumenTs From inDiscernible counTerParTs
2.1. The perfect forgery
the argument from perfect forgery runs as follows. It could have been the case 
that a perfect forgery of the Mona Lisa was created. In this counterfactual sce-
nario, the original and the fake are indiscernible counterparts, they have the exact 
same perceptual properties. but alas, while the Mona Lisa is a work of art, the 
perfect replica is not. For the Mona Lisa is the original made by leonardo, the 
perfect replica is just a forgery. therefore, it is not true that every (possible) 
duplicate of a work of art is also a work of art. Consequently, it is not true that a 
work of art is what it is in virtue of its perceptually accessible intrinsic features.
the argument from perfect forgery is certainly not conclusive. It is no more 
plausible to maintain that while the original painting is a work of art the perfect 
forgery is not, than to say that the perfect forgery is also a work of art, what’s 
more, the same work of art as the original. It is no more plausible, for us at any 
rate, because we hold that the Mona Lisa is a universal. not platonic, not some 
abstract stuff lying outside the spatiotemporal realm, but an aristotelian imma-
nent universal which can be perceived. such an entity, which admits of multi-
ple instances, would be a multi-located entity wholly present at numerous non-
overlapping places at the same time. and it would not be a simple immanent 
universal like whiteness or roundness, but a structural universal, an entity that 
is constituted by all the perceptual properties of all the parts of the particular 
instantiating it.
taking the Mona Lisa and other works of fine arts as universals offers us the 
chance to give a simple and uniform answer to the ontological question: what 
kind of things are works of art. In the case of musical works and literary works, 
universals seem the natural choice. the same Mondscheinsonate is played by Evg-
eny kissin in budapest at the Palace of arts, and played by yundi li in london 
at the royal albert hall. the same Chanson d’automne is read by kids in the 
schools from paris to Marseille. this sameness can simply be accounted for in 
terms of the Mondscheinsonate and the Chanson d’automne as two universals each 
wholly present at several places (potentially) at the same time. We do not shun 
a similar explanation of the sameness of the Mona Lisa and its perfect forgery. 
When you stand before the Mona Lisa in the louvre, and when someone else 
stands before its perfect forgery some place else, the two of you are standing 
before the very same work of art, because the two paintings are one and the same 
universal wholly present in the louvre and some place else at once.
there are, of course, many alternative ontologies of art (see thomasson 
2004), but none of them is prima facie better than our universalism. to mention 
but a few. If works of art were mental entities, as Collingwood had suggested 
(Collingwood 1938), then the Mona Lisa would be a shadowy private picture, 
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everyone having her own in her head, each private picture closely matching the 
distribution of color patches on the public canvass without being identical to 
the public picture. this is no less counterintuitive than what we say. nor are we 
better off with the suggestion made by Currie (1989) that works of art are event 
types or action types, because in our commonsensical moments we would surely 
resist the thought that the Mona Lisa is the sort of thing like getting on a bus 
or taking a sip from a cup of coffee. and finally, we find no less odd the widely 
shared view that works of art are abstract entities, which implies, among other 
things, that the Mona Lisa is like the number π or the square root of 2.
anyway, the argument from perfect forgery is based on the contentious as-
sumption that a thing cannot be a work of art if it is not original but fake. this is 
also reflected in the near zero market value of fakes (once the forgery is discov-
ered) and the big money market of originals. but it is just a contingent fact that 
our culture is so obsessed with originality and assumes that what is not original is 
not art. things could have obviously gone differently. What is more to the point, 
however, is that originality is not an ontological category, but a historical one. It 
has nothing to do with the metaphysics of artworks. originality is the business of 
art historians, gallery owners and art dealers, not metaphysicians.
2.2. The gorilla’s painting
the argument from the gorilla’s painting runs as follows. It is possible, no matter 
how improbable, that a gorilla in the zoo has inadvertently made an exact replica 
of the Mona Lisa. in this counterfactual scenario, the mona lisa and the gorilla’s 
painting are indiscernible counterparts, they have the exact same perceptual prop-
erties. but while the Mona Lisa is a work of art, the gorilla’s painting is not. For 
the Mona Lisa has resulted from a deliberate creative artistic intention whereas the 
gorilla’s painting surely did not. therefore, it is not true that every (possible) du-
plicate of an artwork is also an artwork. Consequently, it is not true that a work of 
art is what it is in virtue of its perceptually accessible intrinsic features.
the argument is based on the assumption that only such things can be works 
of art that have resulted from some deliberate creative artistic intention. that is, 
that the extrinsic property of being created by deliberate creative artistic inten-
tion is a necessary condition for being a work of art. We think that this assumption 
is false or at least questionable.
let’s use intuition pumps. What would you say if it turned out that leon-
ardo made the Mona Lisa while he was dreaming? or in some other incontrol-
lable state, under hypnosis or under the influence of some drugs? It is uncertain 
whether we can still speak about a deliberate creative artistic intention in these 
cases. yet would you hesitate to say that the Mona Lisa is a work of art? What if 
it turned out that leonardo made the Mona Lisa in pitch dark or in a temporally 
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blind state? in that case, the mona lisa would have been created randomly, 
much the same way as if the brushes fell on the canvass randomly during an 
earthquake, miraculously creating a painting just like the Mona Lisa.
take now a case where there is definitely no deliberate creative artistic in-
tention. suppose that it turns out that one of your favorite readings (say, Maya-
kovsky’s poem, the Ленин – жил, Ленин – жив, Ленин – будет жить) was 
not written by Mayakovsky, but was typed accidentally by a young chimp who 
sneaked into his room. Would you now say that the Ленин – жил, Ленин – жив, 
Ленин – будет жить is not a work of art, and has no place in the anthologies of 
soviet literature?
Forget the monkeys. Imagine a russell-world, indiscernible from our own, in 
which everything has come into existence five minutes ago (russell 1921: 159-
160), whereby none of the works of art thought to be older than five minutes 
have resulted from deliberate creative artistic intention. Would you dispute that 
in the russell-world the paintings and sculptures in the art museums, the musi-
cal works performed in the concert halls are works of art?
our intuition tells us that we are dealing with genuine works of art in these 
counterfactual scenarios despite the fact that the deliberate creative artistic in-
tention is clearly missing. but even if your intuitions about these cases were 
different, you cannot deny the following. the rain dance of the hopi Indians, 
the paintings of altamira, the diary of István széchenyi, or the letters of st. paul 
are these days seen as works of art. they are the results of deliberate creative 
intentions, to be sure. but they are certainly not the results of deliberate creative 
artistic intentions. so either art historians are wrong, or else a deliberate creative 
artistic intention is not a necessary condition for artwork status.
2.3 Duchamp’s readymade
Duchamp’s readymade, the Fountain is an indiscernible counterpart of an or-
dinary porcelain urinal in some public toilet, they have the exact same per-
ceptual properties. agnes Martin’s painting the The Desert is an indiscernible 
counterpart of a sand-colored plain canvass, they have the exact same percep-
tual properties (a few years back, The Desert cost around 4-6 million dollars, no 
kidding). John Cage’s musical work, the 4’33’’ is an indiscernible counterpart of 
a pianist’s elongated preparation prior to playing her instrument—they have 
the exact same perceptual properties. the art world deems the Fountain, the 
The Desert and the 4’33’’ works of art, but their indiscernible counterparts are 
clearly not works of art. therefore, it is untrue that no (possible) duplicate of a 
non-artwork is an artwork. Consequently, it is untrue that a work of art is what 
it is in virtue of its perceptually accessible intrinsic features.
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the argument from Duchamp’s readymade (and similar artworks) is the in-
verse of the previous ones. those arguments took some par excellence work of 
art and have assumed that it could have had an indiscernible counterpart which 
is not an artwork. by contrast, the present argument takes some par excellence 
non-artworks (an ordinary urinal, a plain canvass, silence for about 4 minutes 
and 33 seconds) and points out that they have indiscernible counterparts which 
in fact are works of art. Furthermore, this argument relies on hard facts, not on 
farfetched possibilities. 
now in response to the previous arguments, we have claimed that both the 
Mona Lisa and its possible indiscernible counterpart are works of art. In the 
present case, we say that neither the Fountain installed in alfred stieglitz’s stu-
dio, nor its indiscernible counterpart, the ordinary urinal in a public toilet is a 
work of art (the same goes for the The Desert and the 4’33’’—none of them is a 
work of art). We claim that the Fountain and the likes are not genuine works of 
art. We don’t deny the obvious, of course, that the art world treats them as works 
of art, but we think that all these people are wrong.
our main reason is the following. If you hold that some works of art are in-
discernible counterparts of things that are not works of art, then you must also 
hold that the object’s likeness plays no role at all in whether something is a work 
of art or not. that is, the object itself plays no role at all. We do not even have to 
perceive it to recognize that it is a work of art! now while this may be true of 
Duchamp’s readymade, it is certainly not true of the Mona Lisa.
Imagine the following ‘work of art’ called the Knight. take an orchestra con-
sisting of an oboe player, a trombone player, a clarinet player, a violinist, a bas-
soon player, a celesta player and an organist. In front of each musician there 
is a board (similar to a chess board) of eight by eight squares, and each square 
contains the name of a tone: one-lined C, contra F, great G, four-lined gis, small 
Ces etc.. the orchestra has a conductor who stands blindfolded before the musi-
cians and points randomly to one or another musician. the musician then has to 
play the note in the square which is in ’l-shape’ distance from the square whose 
note was last played. suppose, the concert goes well (the audience endures it in 
silence) and the music is played for 60 minutes.
let us ask of you. Did you have to be at that concert? Did you have to hear 
what the music sounded like? or is it merely enough that we told you the punch 
line of this ’work of art’? We think that the essential feature of such ‘works of art’ 
is that knowing their punch line substitutes for their perception. Just as we do not 
need to hear the Knight, we do not need to see Duchamp’ readymade. It is quite 
enough to know their punch line.
but this obviously isn’t true of genuine works of art. no narrative can sub-
stitute the perception of the Mona Lisa, the Mondscheinsonate, or the Chanson 
d’automne. and the simple reason is that they are works of art in their own right, 
that is, they are works of art in virtue of what they are like.
16 CurrEnt IssuEs In MEtaphysICs 
We could go even further, and say that ’works of art’ like Duchamp’s ready-
made, not only do not have to be perceived, but do not even have to exist! Fic-
tional paintings in fictional art galleries, fictional musical plays performed in 
fictional concert halls, or fictional literary works read in fictional literary saloons. 
they could be subjected to interpretation, they could be talked about, they 
could be analyzed, in general they could function as if they were real.
Imagine the following non-existent ’work of art’. In an exhibition room there 
is a table (which resembles to a kitchen table) and on it there is a meat grinder 
which grinds little yellow rubber duckies one after the other. Its title is the 
Fukuyama’s Mistake.
an art critic, for instance, could write the following upon hearing of it: „ac-
cording to Fukuyama history has ended, because everywhere in the world liberal 
democracy has prevailed. of course this claim is contestable, but the Fukuyama’s 
Mistake clearly shows that history is not over yet, because animals are massacred 
scot-free by the human race. the Fukuyama’s Mistake draws attention to the 
fact that history will end only when animal rights are fully acknowledged and 
respected world-wide.”
3. some meTa-reFlecTions
It is usually said that what makes it so difficult to give a philosophical account of 
artworks is the fact that certain artists (indeed the greatest ones) create works of 
art with the express intent to blow up the actual conceptual framework within 
which we think of artworks. We are not denying that. Impressionism blew up 
the confines of realism, dodecaphony blew up the confines of classical harmo-
ny theory, and so on. nonetheless what they have created were such that no 
amount of punch line-knowing could substitute their perception. With Duch-
amp’s readymade, however, it is not only the case that it blows up the way we 
traditionally think about artworks, but it is passed as a work of art which is sui 
generis not.
In our paper we have expounded and defended a theory of artworks which 
takes at face value our philosophically innocent, commonsensical beliefs about 
artworks. namely, that works of art are what they are because of what they are 
like. In this respect what we do is very similar to what the disjunctive theorist 
does who defends our naive convictions about perception (see Martin 2004). 
Instead of saying that there must be some common factor between Duchamp’ 
readymade and the Mona Lisa in virtue of which they both are works of art, which 
has nothing to do with perceptual-intrinsic features, we said that they belong to 
different ontological types (as according to the disjunctive theory hallucinations 
are a different type of mental event than the appropriate veridic perceptions 
which are indiscernible from them). We think that the acceptance of any view 
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opposite to our’s means the renounciation of our commonsensical beliefs about 
artworks, and so all such views are error-theories.
to wit: we have tried to do justice to the layman’s intuition, who when con-
fronted by a readymade in a musem, groaned so – this ain’t no work of art.
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THOMAS M. CRISP
Temporal Passage: A Shape-Dynamic 
Account
1. IntroDuCtIon
time passes: one of the many banal facts about time which turns out to be ex-
tremely unfriendly to philosophical analysis. time passes, but what that comes 
to, no one can say. and why time passes, that’s even harder.
I’ll do three things in this essay. First, I’ll try to shed some light on what the 
passage of time is (which should not be confused with the project of spelling 
out what the expression ‘time passes’ means; I don’t know what the expression 
means, but I have a favorite theory about what underlying reality makes true our 
talk about temporal passage). second, I want to say something about why time 
passes: how the passage of time works. here I’ll draw on recent work by Julian 
barbour on shape-dynamic approaches to general relativity. and third, I want 
to briefly examine J.J.C. smart’s well-known objection to the idea of temporal 
passage from the perspective afforded by my theory.
a disclaimer: these are tall aims for a short essay. What temporal passage is, 
why it happens, etc.: these are topics for a book or two. how to say something 
substantive about them in the space of an essay? by painting in broad strokes, 
being somewhat impressionistic. that’s what I propose to do here: to sketch out 
in a broad, impressionistic way how to think about these things, leaving the task 
of filling in the details for another time.
2. TemPoral PassaGe: WHaT iT is
Everyone believes in temporal passage: it’s a datum; one of those features of ex-
perience every temporal ontology has to account for. there’s a divide among tem-
poral ontologies as to how to characterize it. those committed to the so-called 
a-theory—sometimes also called the dynamic view of time—hold that tempo-
ral passage is in some sense fundamental, incapable of explanation in more basic 
terms. those committed to the so-called b-theory—sometimes called static views 
of time—hold that temporal passage is not fundamental, that it is explainable in 
more basic terms that make no mention of any sort of temporal passage.
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that’s a rough way of characterizing the divide, anyway. Characterizing the 
divide less roughly turns out to be extremely difficult, as Dean zimmerman 
showed in his, “the a-theory of time, the b-theory of time, and ‘tak-
ing tense seriously’” (2005). you might have thought you could characterize 
the difference between the views in terms of tense: the a-theorists are those 
who “take tense seriously” and the b-theorists don’t. but if by that you mean 
that the a-theorists are those who think that the objects of propositional at-
titudes—the propositions—are things that change their truth value over time 
and are governed by the logic of a prior-style tense logic, and the b-theorists 
are those who deny this, holding that all propositions have their truth values 
eternally, you’ve this problem: David lewis held the former view, but he most 
certainly wouldn’t be one you would associate with an a-theory of time.
some try to characterize the difference in terms of a special property of pre-
sentness, a property which is both fundamental—perfectly natural, “carving at 
the joints”—and also moves successively through the b-series, where its passage 
across the series comprises temporal passage. a-theorists are those who think 
there is such a property as this fundamental presentness; b-theorists think not. 
the trouble with this way of carving the territory is two-fold. 
First, as zimmerman shows, b-theorists à la lewis can accept the existence 
of a primitive property that is very difficult to distinguish from the a-theorist’s 
presentness. the property being self-simultaneous—the property had by some-
thing x iff x is simultaneous with itself—the b-theorist might argue, is both fun-
damental, and such that only one time has, in the present tensed sense of ‘has’, 
the property. a-theorists fond of characterizing their theory in terms of funda-
mental presentness will likely object that presentness is not the same thing as 
self-simultaneity, but saying exactly what the difference comes to turns out to 
be extremely difficult.
second, the view I’ll endorse below eschews any appeal to fundamental pre-
sentness; I don’t believe in such a property. but, since, so I think, my view 
deserves the label ‘a-theoretic’ as well as any, characterizing the a-/b-theory 
divide in terms of fundamental presentness is an infelicitous way of character-
izing the divide.
zimmerman thinks the best way of characterizing the a-/b-theory distinction 
is in terms of the notion of truth simpliciter. a-theorists are those who think that 
what is true simpliciter changes over time; b-theorists deny this: though some—
the serious tensing b-theorists—hold that the objects of our propositional atti-
tudes change truth value over time, they’ll analyze this in terms of dyadic truth-
at-a-time, a two-term connection between proposition and time. My belief that 
I am standing, they’ll say, expresses a proposition that is true relative to some 
times but not to others, where this is a matter of bearing the truth-at relation 
to some times but not others. not so, says the a-theorist: my belief that I am 
standing expresses a proposition that is true simpliciter—that I am standing is true 
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relative to various times, to be sure, but is also true simpliciter, true period, true 
full stop. since it was false simpliciter, it’s an example of a proposition which is 
true simpliciter but not immutably so. such, then, is the difference between a- 
and b-theorists: the former accept and the latter deny that what is true simpliciter 
varies over time.
so far, we have seen zimmerman’s preferred way of characterizing the a-/b-
theory divide. two potential costs for this way of characterizing it, the first of 
which zimmerman mentions: First, if you’re attracted to a deflationary view of 
truth, you won’t much like this way of characterizing the divide. If there is no 
such property as truth simpliciter, this way of spelling it out is a non-starter. sec-
ond, if you’re skeptical, as I am, about the existence of propositions—abstract 
pieces of information encoded or expressed by beliefs, sentences, etc.—then, 
here again, you won’t much like the proposal.
a related suggestion which gets around these two worries postulates the ex-
istence of events or states of affairs of the armstrong/later-chisholm sort. on 
this view, necessarily, for any x and y and relation R, x bears R to y iff there is the 
event (or in armstrong’s language, “state affairs”, but I’ll stick with event talk 
for concision) x-bearing-R-to-y, a non-mereological fusion of x, y and R, whose 
existence depends on the existence of x and y and the instantiation of R by x 
and y. 
that there are such things as these events is contentious. a reason for think-
ing there are, alongside the usual ones put forward by armstrong, Chisholm et 
al. is their usefulness in characterizing the dispute between a- and b-theorists 
of time, a dispute which intuitively makes sense but is extremely difficult to 
characterize without adverting to events.
With events in hand, though, the dispute is easily described. above we saw 
the a-theorist holding that what is true simpliciter changes over time. here is 
a variation on that theme: what exists changes over time. More exactly: which 
events exist changes over time. or, in terms of quantifiers and tense operators—
reading the quantifiers here as unrestricted, ranging over everything whatsoever, 
ignoring nothing—we may understand a-theorists as those committed to this:
Thesis of Temporal Passage: It is always the case that, for some event x, either Was(for 
every y, y is, was and will be numerically distinct from x) or Will(for every event 
y, y is, was and will be numerically distinct from x). 
b-theorists deny the thesis of temporal passage. they’ll think it always the 
case that, for any event x you pick, Was(something will be identical with x), or 
Will(something was identical with x).
so the distinction between a- and b-theories of time may be thought of thus: 
the a-theorist accepts whereas the b-theorist denies the thesis of temporal pas-
sage. since commitment one way or the other on the thesis of temporal pas-
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sage is compatible with any number of views about truth and propositions, we 
have a way, then, of characterizing the a-/b-theory divide that swings free of 
deflationism about truth and propositions. 
all to the good. We’ve also a way, then, of answering our question: what tem-
poral passage is. at least, we have a way of answering that question from the 
perspective of the a-theory, which is the perspective I shall presuppose in this 
essay.
What is temporal passage, then? It is the coming into being or ceasing to be of 
events. (It’s something like C.D. broad’s becoming (e.g., 1923: 66-67), though not 
exactly that since he thought of the passage of time as involving the coming into 
being of events, not the ceasing to exist of any events.) In terms of quantifiers 
and tense operators, taking our quantifiers as unrestricted, temporal passage is 
a matter of there being some event x such that Was(for no y is it the case that y 
is, was or will be identical with x) or Will(for no y is it the case that y is, was or 
will be identical with x). 
3. TemPoral PassaGe: HoW iT Works
next I want to consider the question how temporal passage works. Why does it 
happen? Why do events come into being and cease to be?  
here is an attractive, if uninformative, picture. 
things have powers. a bit of copper has the power to expand when heated, a 
stick of dynamite has the power to explode when put into the right conditions, 
and so forth. 
It is an attractive thesis, so I think, that to have a power is to stand in a fun-
damental, multigrade relation of things to universals. so suppose we have some 
object o with the power to instantiate a property A on the condition that it in-
stantiate the property B. this, I propose, is a matter of o’s bearing a fundamental 
power relation to the universals A and B. using a property abstraction operator 
similar to those deployed variously by george bealer (e.g. 1982), we can put it 
like this: o’s having the power to instantiate A on the condition that it instantiate 
B is a matter of its being the case that [Bx ⇒ Ax]o, where we read this as ‘o is an 
x such that x has the power to instantiate A on the condition that it instantiates 
B, and ‘[__⇒__]__’ expresses our fundamental power relation. (Why complicate 
things thus with property abstraction? It’ll aid concision below.) 
or: suppose o has the power to instantiate A on the condition that it instanti-
ate B and C. this iff [Bx & Cx ⇒ Ax]o. 
or: suppose o1 and o2 jointly have the power to instantiate a relation A on the 
condition that they instantiate the relation B. this iff [Bxy ⇒ Axy]o1,o2. and so 
forth. 
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this, I say, is an attractive if uninformative picture. It’s attractive because it 
construes power talk as fundamental, as carving at nature’s joints. It’s uninforma-
tive for the same reason: explanation of the fundamental is perforce limited. 
grant me the picture and let us see what it suggests about temporal passage. 
suppose there is an x such that (a) x lacks the property A, (b) x has the power to 
instantiate A on the condition that it instantiate B, and (c) x instantiates B. then 
by dint of its having this power and being in what we might call the “triggering 
condition” of the power, x will exercise its power and jump to a state in which it 
instantiates A. likewise with relational powers: suppose there is an x and y such 
that (a) x does not bear A to y, (b) [Bxy ⇒ Axy]x,y, and (c) x bears B to y. then by 
dint of x and y jointly possessing this power and being in the power’s triggering 
condition, x and y will exercise their power and jump to a state in which x bears 
A to y.
When x exercises a power and jumps to a state in which it comes to possess 
a property A it didn’t previously possess, a new event, x-being-A, comes into 
existence. When that happens, there is an event x-being-A such that, it was the 
case that, quantifying unrestrictedly, nothing is, was or will be identical with x-
being-A. When that happens, time passes. 
When x and y jointly exercise their power to jump to a state in which x bears 
A to y, a relation they didn’t previously bear to one another, a new event, x-
bearing-A-to-y, comes into existence. When that happens, there is an event x-
bearing-A-to-y such that, it was the case that, quantifying unrestrictedly, for no 
y is it the case that y is, was or will be identical with x-bearing-A-to-y. When that 
happens, time passes.
so we get this picture of time’s passage: at present, reality comprises a large 
number of particulars, universals, and the events they constitute. Many, many of 
the particulars comprising reality have powers to jump to new states and are in 
states sufficient to trigger those powers. as those powers are triggered, the par-
ticulars possessing those powers jump to new states, thereby bringing into being 
new events. at this point, new powers are triggered, resulting in a jump to new 
states yet, which give rise to further triggering of powers, and so on. such jump-
ing of things from state to state, thereby successively bringing into being new 
events, followed by further new events, and so forth, all driven by the exercise 
of the powers of things, we call the flow or passage of time. 
It’s a helpful bit of picture thinking to conceive of the phenomenon of tempo-
ral passage as something akin to the popping of popcorn. the popcorn kernels 
each have the power to pop at thus-and-such triggering temperature. a kernel 
hits its triggering temperature, exercises its power to pop, and jumps to a new 
state. another hits its triggering temperature, exercises its power, and jumps 
to a new state. another, and another, and another, …. such is the flow of time: 
the constant popping of things (points of space, perhaps, or their point-sized 
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matter/energy constituents) from one state to another as power after power is 
triggered.
so far, then, a powers account of temporal passage, painting in very broad 
strokes. let me next try to fill the picture in some by describing a way of think-
ing about relativistic physics that fits nicely with the picture.
4. TemPoral PassaGe anD “sHaPe Dynamics”
Julian barbour and collaborators have been working on a Machian view of parti-
cle and geometry dynamics for the last decade or so. Ernst Mach was famously 
suspicious of newton’s absolute space and time on epistemological grounds: 
they can’t be observed, so we have no good reason to postulate them. a major 
difficulty in realizing Mach’s empiricist scruples in our physical theorizing was 
that it turned out to be extremely difficult to recast newtonian particle dynamics 
in a form that makes no appeal to absolute space and time. newtonian dynamics 
was eventually superseded by general relativistic dynamics, much of it inspired 
by Machian ideals, but even here, Einstein ends up postulating an unobservable 
background space (spacetime) and a fundamental temporal metric (proper time 
along timelike trajectories), neither of which fits well with Machian scruples.
barbour (together with his collaborator, bruno bertotti) has the distinction of 
being the first in the history of physics to show how to reconstrue newtonian 
particle dynamics in fully Machian form: no appeal to an invisible newtonian 
container space (to define inertial motion) or invisibly flowing newtonian time 
(to define a temporal metric) (1982). the temporal metric postulated as prim-
itive in newton’s dynamics turns out on barbour and bertotti’s dynamics to 
be definable from more fundamental quantities in the theory, as a measure of 
change in those quantities over time (a useful measure of that change, it turns 
out, because it yields the simplest mathematical description of the dynamics of 
that change). time, in aristotle’s famous phrase, is just a measure of change.
In more recent papers (e.g., 2010), barbour and collaborators show how to 
extend the approach to general relativity (gr). on the standard formulation 
of gr, the basic equations of the theory are Einstein’s field equations, which 
describe the distribution of metric and matter fields across a four-dimension-
al spacetime. a non-standard way of thinking of gr is “geometrodynamics”, 
where this is a matter of reconstruing gr as a dynamical theory describing the 
evolution of three-dimensional geometry over time. 
barbour et al. develop a version of geometrodynamics on which the funda-
mental law governing the evolution of 3-space over time is an action principle 
determining geodesics through a configuration space, each point of which cor-
responds to a possible conformal 3-geometry of a closed 3-space, and geodesics 
through the configuration space corresponds to dynamically possible histories of 
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an evolving 3-space. the resulting theory corresponds closely to general rela-
tivity (but isn’t general relativity: possible histories in barbour’s theory corre-
spond to only the CMC-foliable models of gr, a subset of the full set of general 
relativistic spacetime models). so far anyway, it corresponds closely enough to 
general relativity as to satisfy all current experimental verifications of gr.
It’s an extremely interesting theory of gravity, for several reasons. First, lo-
cal lorentz invariance of non-gravitational interactions turns out to be a con-
sequence of the action principle at the heart of the theory (as opposed to the 
usual approach to gr, according to which the validity of special relativity in 
local inertial frames is an independent assumption). second, as with barbour’s 
Machian newtonian dynamics, temporal metric (in this case, infinitely many lo-
cal temporal metrics along timelike trajectories) turns out to be non-fundamen-
tal, definable from more fundamental quantities in the theory. and third, spatial 
metric—the measure of spatial distance—also turns out to be non-fundamental, 
definable from the dynamics of the theory. (the fundamental geometrical facts, 
on the theory, are conformal: facts having to do with angles between trajectories 
in space. It’s a theory, then, about the evolution of conformal 3-geometry over 
time. hence the name he gives it: shape dynamics.) 
there’s much to like about the theory in terms of unity and economy: for 
minimal cost in ontology (no primitive temporal or spatial metric), you get local 
lorentz invariance and all known experimental consequences of general relativ-
ity. It’s a neat theory. 
assume for discussion that it’s true and let us consider what it suggests about 
the picture of temporal passage I have been sketching. the picture, again: the 
many, many particulars comprising reality have powers to jump to new states and 
are in states sufficient to trigger those powers. as those powers are triggered, 
the particulars possessing those powers jump to new states. at this point, new 
powers are triggered, resulting in a jump to new states yet, which gives rise 
to further triggering of powers, and on and on. such constant change—such 
constant jumping from state to state owing to the exercises of the powers of 
things—we call the flow or passage of time.
reflection on barbour’s shape dynamics suggests an interesting development 
of the account. at the heart of barbour’s shape dynamics is an action principle 
describing dynamically possible histories of an evolving 3-space. now, propo-
nents of powers theories of causation will sometimes say that laws of nature 
should be thought of as descriptions of powers. let me suggest that that’s how 
we think of the action principle at the heart of barbour’s shape dynamics: as a 
compendious mathematical description of the powers possessed by space and 
its constituent points. (space: the three-dimensional, enduring container of all 
mass/energy, whose constituent points are linked by spatial distance relations, 
whose geometry is variably curved depending on the distribution of mass/en-
ergy, and whose geometry changes over time as it lapses through successive 
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jumps in state. I am assuming, notice, a three-dimensional, as opposed to a four-
dimensional, view of the spatiotemporal world. I assume that all mass/energy, 
quantifying unrestrictedly, is housed in an enduring 3-manifold structured by 
relations of spatial distance as opposed to the usual 4-manifold structured by 
the spacetime interval. In a word, I assume presentism. see, e.g., my 2003 for 
further explanation and defense of presentism.)
Perhaps it works like this. let the xs be all and only the points of space. then 
perhaps the xs jointly instantiate various power relations: [R1xs ⇒ R2xs]xs, [R2xs 
⇒ R3xs]xs, [R3xs ⇒ R4xs]xs, and so forth, where R1, R2, ..., we may suppose, 
are conformal geometrical properties like those described by barbour’s theory. 
these powers specify that when the xs comprising space are such that R1xs, 
they’ll jump to a state in which R2xs, and that when in that state, they’ll jump 
to a state in which R3xs, and so forth, with the upshot that these powers specify 
that space will traverse some one of the extremal curves through a configuration 
space of shape Dynamics. barbour’s action principle is just a handy mathemati-
cal description of how space behaves under the action of these powers.
suppose so. then two interesting consequences. First, as space jumps from 
state to state under the guiding influence of these powers, it successively lapses 
along a geodesic of a configuration space of shape Dynamics, and thus succes-
sively lapses along a CMC-slicing of some general relativistic spacetime model. 
all that to say: as space and its contents lapse from state to state, they behave 
just as general relativity predicts: clocks move slower near massive objects; 
clocks move at different rates in relative motion; massive objects curve the 
space around them; gravity waves propagate through space; and so forth.
secondly, as space lapses from state to state under the guiding influence of 
these powers, there is no fundamental temporal metric measuring its lapse. gen-
eral relativity’s local proper time emerges from more fundamental quantities in 
the theory as a useful measure of changes in the conformal geometry of space 
over time, useful because it yields the simplest mathematical description of that 
change. but the trajectory-relative temporal metrics of general relativity aren’t 
fundamental: they don’t carve nature at its joints. they’re one among infinitely 
ways to parameterize changes in space over time, distinguished only in that they 
enable us to formulate the laws governing the evolution of space over time more 
simply than alternatives. 
other ways of parameterizing are, from the standpoint of metaphysics and 
its attempt to describe fundamental structure, just as correct—and more useful 
in everyday life to boot. so there’s measuring change by solar time, assigning a 
measure of one solar day to the quantity of change transpiring in some system 
per rotation of the earth around its axis. there’s measuring change over time 
by ephemeris time, where this is the timescale such that the laws of motion de-
scribing the sun and planets in our solar system are approximately those given 
by newton. there’s reference-frame dependent timescales: time as measured 
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by a cesium-133 clock in thus-and-such state of motion. all are equally correct 
ways of measuring cosmic and local change over time. none is fundamental; 
none carves at the joints. some make for simpler mathematical description of the 
change of physical quantities over time, but all are simply measures of change. 
5. summarizinG
taking barbour’s shape dynamics on board, then, here, I want to suggest, is an 
attractive account of temporal passage:
(1)  Individual objects have powers to jump to new states when in certain mo-
nadic triggering conditions. Multiple objects jointly have powers to jump to 
new states in certain polyadic triggering conditions. 
(2)  having such monadic and polyadic powers is a matter of entering into a fun-
damental, multigrade power relation between things and universals. 
(3)  things exercise their powers in their triggering conditions, thereby jumping 
to new states and bringing into being new events: events such that, quan-
tifying unrestrictedly, it was the case that nothing was identical with that 
event. these new events put their subjects into new triggering conditions, 
which gives rise to further exercise of powers, which brings into being furt-
her new events, which puts their subjects into new triggering conditions, 
yields further exercise of powers, further new events, and so forth. We call 
this successive coming into being of events, resulting from successive exer-
cise of powers, the flow or passage of time.
(4)  there is such a thing as space—the manifold of points-at-a-time in which all 
matter/energy is housed. it is an enduring, three-dimensional space whose 
curvature varies with distribution of mass/energy and over time. The totality 
of its constituent points are linked by polyadic power relations which specify 
certain conformal geometric properties as triggering and manifestation con-
ditions. these power relations are elegantly described by the action princip-
le at the heart of barbour’s shape dynamics.
(5)  as the points of space jointly exercise these powers, they lapse successi-
vely through the configuration space of shape dynamics, which corresponds 
to a CMC-slicing of some general relativistic spacetime model. Wherefore 
matter and energy behave in accord with the dynamics predicted by general 
relativity: local lorentz invariance, gravitational time and length dilation, 
bending of light, etc.
(6)  there is no fundamental temporal measure of this lapse. the usual, tra-
jectory-dependent, relativistic temporal metric emerges from more funda-
mental quantities in shape dynamics as the simplest way of representing its 
laws. 
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such, in short, is my shape-dynamical account of temporal passage. I close with 
a brief discussion of its bearing on a classic objection to a-theoretic accounts of 
temporal passage. 
6. sMart on thE rIVEr oF tIME
a classic objection to a-theoretic ways of thinking about temporal passage was 
first introduced into the philosophical literature by C.D. broad, and was famous-
ly defended by J.J.C. smart in his 1949 paper, “the river of time.” the heart 
of the argument is contained in this passage:
If time is a flowing river we must think of events taking time to float down this 
stream, and if we say ‘time has flowed faster to-day than yesterday’ we are saying 
that the stream flowed a greater distance to-day than it did in the same time yes-
terday. that is, we are postulating a second time-scale with respect to which the 
flow of events along the first time-dimension is measured. ‘to-day’, ‘to-morrow’, 
‘yesterday’, become systematically ambiguous. they may represent positions in 
the first time-dimension, as in ‘to-day I played cricket and to-morrow I shall do so 
again’, or they may represent positions in the second time-dimension, as in ‘to-day 
time flowed faster than it did yesterday’. nor will it help matters to say that time 
always flows at the same rate. Furthermore, just as we thought of the first time-
dimension as a stream, so will we want to think of the second time-dimension as 
a stream also; now the speed of flow of the second stream is a rate of change with 
respect to a third time-dimension, and so we can go on indefinitely postulating 
fresh streams without being any better satisfied. (1949: 484)
how shall we think about this argument? how does it go exactly?
I think the idea is something like this. a river flows through a given area, you 
might think, only if there is some rate at which the water of the river is passing. 
likewise, smart seems to be thinking, with time: if it flows or passes, there must 
be some rate at which it flows or passes. as a first premise for the argument, 
then, we have something like
(1) time flows or passes only if there is some rate at which it flows or passes. 
suppose this is so; suppose time passes only if there is some rate at which it 
passes. What rate might that be? at what rate would time pass? ordinarily, we 
think of rate as the ratio between some bit of change and a period of time over 
which that change occurs. so there is the ratio between the change in someone’s 
heart over a period of time (measured in number of beats, say) to some period 
of time over which that change occurs (measured in minutes, say), arriving at 
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a heart rate of x beats per minute. or, there is the ratio between the change in 
someone’s position over a period of time (measured in meters, say) to the period 
of time over which that change occurs (measured in seconds, say), arriving at a 
rate of x meters per second.
the rate at which time passes, then, would be a ratio between the change in 
time over some period of time to the period of time over which that change oc-
curs. here one begins to see the problem, for the change in time over a period 
of one second, say, is one second, and the period over which that change takes 
place is, well, one second, arriving at a rate of change for time of one second per 
second. there is something odd about that rate, to be sure. at the very least, it’s 
uninformative to be told that time advances at a rate of one second per second. 
smart seems to be thinking there is something nonsensical about it, something 
incoherent:
a connected point is this: with respect to motion in space it is always possible to 
ask ‘how fast is it?’ an express train, for example, may be moving at 88 feet per 
second. the question, ‘how fast is it moving?’ is a sensible question with a definite 
answer: ‘88 feet per second’. We may not in fact know the answer, but we do at any 
rate know what sort of answer is required. Contrast the pseudo-question ‘how fast 
am I advancing through time?’ or ‘how fast did time flow yesterday?’ We do not 
know how we ought to set about answering it. What sort of measurements ought 
we to make? We do not even know the sort of units in which our answer should be 
expressed. ‘I am advancing through time at how many seconds per ____?’ we might 
begin, and then we should have to stop. What could possibly fill in the blank? not 
‘seconds’ surely. In that case the most we could hope for would be the not very il-
luminating remark that there is just one second in every second. (1949: 485)
smart is thinking, then, that there is something unhappy about the suggestion 
that time passes at a rate of one second per second: it’s a “not very illuminating” 
answer to the “pseudo-question” ‘how fast does time pass?’. 
Well, to be sure, it’s not a terribly illuminating answer to this question, but 
why is that a strike against it? What’s wrong with the answer (and with the ques-
tion)? I’m not sure. peter van Inwagen (2009) and Eric olson (2009) have argued 
that what’s wrong with it is that one second per second is not a genuine rate, since 
one second divided by one second is just one, which isn’t a rate. I’m not sure this 
argument works, but grant it for now; as we’ll see, not much hangs on it.
supposing, then, that it is somehow objectionable to think of time as passing 
at a rate of a second per second, if you’re committed to the idea that time passes 
and to (1), the idea that it passes only if there is some rate at which it passes, you 
might think the only coherent way to talk about the rate at which time passes is 
to postulate some second time scale in terms of which one can describe change 
in time as featured in the original scale. Were there some such second time 
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scale, one could say that the rate at which time passes is the ratio between the 
amount of first-time-scale time over some period to the amount of second-time-
scale time over that same period. If you thought all this made sense, you might 
accept something like
(2) there is a rate at which time flows or passes only if there is a second time scale 
(distinct from the first time scale we normally use), in terms of which the rate of 
time measured by the first scale can be described. 
next, smart suggests that if we think of some period of temporal passage as 
measured by our newly introduced second time-scale, the question arises afresh: 
how fast did that period of second-time-scale time pass? there’ll be some rate 
at which it passed. so:
(3) If there is a second time scale measuring temporal passage, then there is some 
rate at which periods of time as measured by our second time scale pass. 
but if so, then, says smart, we’ll need some third time scale (distinct from the 
first- and second- time scales) in terms of which to describe that rate, which sets 
up a regress:
(4) If there is a rate at which periods of time as measured by our second time scale 
pass, there is a third time scale in terms of which the rate of time measured by 
the second scale can be described, and a fourth in terms of which the rate of time 
measured by the third can be described, and so forth. 
and finally, smart thinks this regress vicious (“and so we can go on indefinitely 
postulating fresh streams without being any better satisfied”), suggesting as the 
final step in the argument something like
(5) the regress in (4) is impossible, 
and the conclusion that
(6) It is not the case that time flows or passes. 
such, I think, is the gist of smart’s argument that time does not flow or pass. 
If it’s right, my above-adumbrated account of temporal passage is wrong, since, 
says my account, time flows or passes. What’s to say?
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6.1 Smart’s Argument Examined
to start with, as we have seen, smart presupposes it nonsensical or incoherent to 
suppose that time flows at a rate of one second per second. but it’s exceedingly 
difficult to see why that would be. other than that it’s trivial or uninformative, 
there is nothing incoherent or nonsensical about the suggestion that time flows 
at a rate of one second per second, as has been nicely argued in a recent paper 
on this point by hud hudson, ned Markosian, ryan Wasserman and Dennis 
Whitcomb (2009). that being so, one could resist smart’s argument by rejecting 
premise (2) on grounds that we needn’t appeal to multiple time scales to make 
sense of the idea that there is rate at which time flows. 
but I’m inclined to accept premise (2), much as I agree with hudson et al. 
that there is nothing problematic about time’s flowing at a rate of one second 
per second. according to my above-adumbrated account, recall, there is no fun-
damental temporal metric, no fundamental measure of temporal duration. say 
I: there are as many measures of temporal duration as there are measures of 
change. there are measures of temporal duration associated with sidereal time-
keeping; measures associated with ephemeris timekeeping; general relativistic, 
trajectory-dependent measures of duration; and infinitely more besides. no one 
way of measuring temporal duration is fundamental; all are equally correct.
that being so, premise (2)’s claim that there is a rate at which time passes only 
if there is a second time scale (distinct from the first-order time scale) in terms of 
which the rate of time’s flow on the first scale may be measured is perfectly cor-
rect. suppose space evolves through a sequence of changes during which the earth 
turns on its axis by exactly 15°. Measured in terms of a sidereal timescale, we’d say 
that period of time lasted an hour. In terms of newtonian time, that same sequence 
of changes will have lasted an ephemeris hour, something just shy of a sidereal hour 
(or just over; I’m not sure which). temporal flow, during that period, would be 
moving, then, at a rate of 1 sidereal hour per 1.01 (let us suppose) ephemeris hours.
this will hold for any period of temporal evolution you pick: for any timescale 
t1 you pick, you’ll be able to find some distinct timescale t2 such that temporal 
passage flows during that period at a rate of t1 units of time per t2 units of time. 
premise (2) is correct.
premise (3) looks good, too: true enough, if there is a second time scale 
measuring temporal passage, then there is some rate at which periods of time as 
measured by our second time scale pass. 
premise (4) likewise seems fine. again:
(4) If there is a rate at which periods of time as measured by our second time scale 
pass, there is a third time scale in terms of which the rate of time measured by 
the second scale can be described, and a fourth in terms of which the rate of time 
measured by the third can be described, and so forth. 
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this is plausible. a temporal metric, from our present perspective, is a conven-
tional measure of change. since there are infinitely many ways of measuring 
change, it’s plausible that there’ll be a well-ordering of temporal metrics of the 
sort envisaged by smart. take, for example, the metric you’d measure with a ce-
sium-133 clock in orbit around the sun at a distance of 1 million miles, the metric 
you’d measure with a cesium-133 clock in orbit around the sun at a distance of 
1 half million miles, the metric you’d measure with a cesium-133 clock in orbit 
around the sun at one-half that distance, and so forth. given general relativity 
(and shape dynamics too), these yield smart’s well-ordering.  
so (1) through (4) of smart’s argument look pretty good. not so with (5). (5) 
says that the regress suggested by (4) is vicious. but, manifestly, it isn’t. the 
regress follows from the fact that duration is a conventional measure of change, 
of which there are infinitely many. nothing vicious about that. and if so, smart’s 
argument, interesting and important as it is, makes no trouble for my suggested 
account of temporal passage.1
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We often say that persons had, have, or will have the power to do certain things. 
but do we have reasons to ascribe powers to inanimate objects as well? and if 
we do, is there any difference between ascribing a power and understanding 
what an object is disposed to do? are objects’ powers dispositions in this sense? 
In this paper I shall argue that we need to distinguish powers from dispositions 
for certain theoretical purposes. Most ‘disposition terms’ in ordinary language 
do not express causal powers; and many powers cannot be expressed by a con-
ventional disposition term. It is true that when we say that objects are disposed 
to do this or that, powers are involved. but the converse does not hold because 
having a power does not entail that objects are disposed to do or to act upon oth-
ers in certain ways. 
the expression ‘disposition term’ as it is used in contemporary philosophy 
was introduced by Carnap in the early 20th century. statements that contain 
such terms do not describe what is directly observable and hence, according 
to Carnap, they can have meaning only if they are logically equivalent to other 
statements which report observable episodes (Carnap 1936, 440). subsequently, 
nelson goodman went on to argue that, from a logical empiricist point of view, 
every predicate which refers to enduring properties of objects must be disposi-
tional. thus all statements that ascribe non-occurrent properties to objects must 
contain dispositional terms like being fragile, soluble, poisonous, inflammable 
or soporific. and the meaning of these sentences can be understood only with 
reference to observable episodes which are the manifestations of these disposi-
tions like breaking, dissolving, poisoning, burning or falling asleep (goodman 
1954, 40).
Most contemporary accounts of powers understand them as dispositions. oth-
erwise put, they take it that what Carnap and goodman called disposition terms 
express what objects are disposed to do; and if objects have powers at all, they 
are none other than their dispositions. however, I shall argue that the ascription 
of powers and the ascription of dispositions have distinct theoretical roles. both 
dispositions and powers are modal concepts. but whereas the ascription of dis-
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positions presupposes some modal truth, the main function of ascribing powers 
is to ground such truth. Following hume, many philosophers think that if pow-
ers do indeed have this grounding role then we ascribe them in order to ground 
natural necessities.1 I shall argue, however, that the main role of properties that 
are powers is to identify natural possibilities.2 We ascribe a power in order to 
identify what a person or an object can do; by contrast, we ascribe a disposition 
in order to express what objects or persons tend to do.
Further, I shall also argue that the ascription of powers grounds such possi-
bilities through entailing the truth of certain counterfactuals; for it is with help 
of such counterfactuals that we can specify powers and hence identify natural 
possibilities. propositions that ascribe powers or dispositions to objects are often 
analyzed with the help of counterfactual conditionals; I shall argue that the main 
theoretical function of the so-called conditional analysis is different in its appli-
cation to context in which we aim to understand what objects are disposed to do 
and in context’s in which we ascribe powers. 
traditionally, the conditional analysis is understood as an attempt to provide 
a semantic analysis of the meaning of disposition terms. and often, the aim of 
such a semantic analysis is to explain the use of disposition predicates without 
assuming that objects in fact have non-reducible dispositional properties. as far 
as the analysis of powers is concerned, however, we rely on counterfactual con-
ditionals in order to explain the link between ascriptions of specific powers and 
our commitments about what can happen instead of what is going to happen. I 
shall show that if we understand the aim of the analysis in this way, we can de-
fend a revised, non-reductive, but still relatively simple conditional analysis of 
powers. relatedly, I shall also argue that powers are abundant in the sense that 
objects can have not only intrinsic and generic powers, but also extrinsic and 
maximally specific ones. 
In one respect I propose to follow Carnap’s project, even though I do not 
share his (anti-)metaphysical convictions, and I’m skeptical about his account 
of the meaning of ‘theoretical terms’. When Carnap discusses the problem of 
disposition terms he does indeed rely on examples borrowed from ordinary 
language. but it is clear that he is not interested in the semantics of ordinary 
language. rather, he wants to explain how we can introduce certain terms into 
our language in order to provide scientific explanation of certain observable 
1  the subtitle of harré’s and Madden’s classic work on causal powers is ‘a theory of 
natural necessity’. later dispositional essentialists like ellis 2001 and bird 2007 also argue 
that powers can make the occurrence of certain events metaphysically necessary.
2  although he does not use the concept of power, goodman seems to hold a similar view 
(goodman 1954, 50–54). Closer to the present paper’s claim, rom harré writes that ‘to say 
that a thing has a power is to say what is possible for it, for that is what it is talk of its disposi-
tions’ (harré 1970, 101). I shall challenge the second part of this claim while fully grant the 
first.
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phenomena. analogously, the analysis of powers need not be understood as an 
exercise in the semantics of ordinary disposition terms. like carnap, i believe 
that we use power terms for theoretical purposes. since my main interest here 
is metaphysics and not philosophy of science, I shall argue that the theoretical 
role of powers as properties is to ground natural possibilities. but metaphysics 
is complementary, and not contradictory, to science. powers are needed for sci-
ence as much as they are important for metaphysics.
1. DIsposItIons, poWErs, anD tEnDEnCIEs
In this section I aim to show why ascribing powers and ascribing dispositions 
might play distinct theoretical roles. I shall argue that what philosophers since 
Carnap call ‘disposition terms’ can, but needn’t, express objects’ powers. af-
terwards, I shall also argue that there are far more properties which are powers 
than what conventional disposition terms can express. the problem of powers 
has often been discussed by using conventional disposition predicates as exam-
ples. this strategy can easily blur the distinction between the role of power-like 
properties and the role of dispositions in our ontology. For even if some conven-
tional terms can express both dispositions and powers, they do so in different 
contexts. thus, as far as the metaphysics of properties is concerned, the distinc-
tion between powers and dispositions can become crucial. 
according to the now standard approach to the use conventional disposition 
terms, ascribing a disposition is to say something about what objects having the 
disposition are disposed to do in certain circumstances. Consequently, as David 
lewis suggests (and as most subsequent analyses agree) in order to understand 
ordinary disposition predicates like being fragile or being poisonous, we first 
need to specify their meaning by a paraphrase. For instance, to say that arsenic 
is poisonous is to claim that that it is disposed to poison upon ingestion and 
when no antidote is taken (lewis 1997, 153). let us call these paraphrases of 
conventional disposition terms explicitly dispositional locutions.3 an explicitly 
dispositional locution specifies the meaning of a statement ascribing a conven-
tional disposition term D in the sense that an object has D iff it is disposed to M 
in response to some stimulus S. I shall argue that to the extent that statements 
containing conventional disposition terms can indeed be so paraphrased, such 
statements follow a logic distinct from that behind statements that ascribe 
powers. 
this is, I shall argue, the consequence of the fact that having a power to M 
is not the same property as being disposed to display behavior M in response to 
stimulus S in circumstances C. properties as powers and properties as objects’ 
3  Following Choi 2008.
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dispositions to do certain things in various circumstances fulfill distinct theo-
retical roles. tautologically, if an object or a person is disposed to M, it has the 
disposition to M. but it is exactly in this context in which the assumption that 
powers and dispositions fulfill distinct theoretical roles can become significant. 
For having a power to M does not invariably imply that something or someone is 
disposed to M. there is an important theoretical difference between the ascrip-
tion of powers and claims about what things are disposed to do.
Consider amy, who learned how to swim, and then visits the swimming pool 
regularly. she has also experienced and enjoyed smoking tobacco. but she has nev-
er smoked regularly. her friend, bob is a different character. not only has he tried 
cigarettes, but he has also become a smoker. as a child, he learned how to swim 
and to this day, he can swim fairly well. but he cannot recall the last time he swam. 
the two people’s behavior is apparently different, and the difference is very well 
captured by the fact that amy, being a swimmer, is disposed to swim, but not being 
a smoker, she is not disposed to smoke. bob, on the other hand, being a smoker, is 
disposed to smoke, but he is not at all disposed to swim. however, both of them 
have the same powers: both of them can swim and can smoke; and hence both of 
them have the power to swim and the power to smoke. the difference between 
them is that amy is not disposed to smoke, while bob is not disposed to swim.
Why is a difference? as ryle has already observed, we can use dispositional 
predicates for many different purposes. sentences containing such predicates 
can ascribe certain abilities, capacities or liabilities to certain objects or to cer-
tain kinds of objects. thus, we often use such terms in order to ascribe active or 
‘passive’ (i.e. reactive) powers to objects. but disposition terms can also express 
tendencies, habits or proneness to do certain kind of things (ryle 1949, 131). 
there is an important logical relation between the ascription of powers and be-
havioral tendencies. a behavioral tendency presupposes some relevant power or 
ability. no one who is averse to cigarettes because, for instance, she is allergic 
to cigarette smoke can be a smoker. and no one who is unable to swim can be a 
swimmer. but many people who do not swim regularly can swim, and at least as 
many who can smoke or are capable of enjoying smoking, do not smoke. thus, 
the ascription of powers does not involve any truth about habits, tendencies or 
behavioral regularities (huoranszki 2011, 59).
one might object that the difference disappears if we take the proper specifi-
cation of dispositions into account, according to which ‘has the power to M at t’ 
is to be specified as ‘disposed to M at t in response to S’. When we say that amy 
is disposed to swim whereas bob is not, and this is understood as a tendency or 
habit, we do not mention a particular type of stimulus to which the manifesta-
tion is a response. but the dispositional property that we want to express is more 
specific than what the conventional use of the term suggests. this might be so, 
but it does not show that such a paraphrase can express the object’s power. If 
being disposed to M in response to S is a specification of a power of the person 
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or the object, then it must entail the more generic power of being disposed to M. 
however, it can be true of bob that he is disposed to swim when he accidentally 
falls in deep water, but false nevertheless that he is disposed to swim. 
thus, the power to M at t does not entail being disposed to M at t even as a 
response to S. powers might be called dispositions; but if we do so regard them 
as such, then we must keep in mind that having a disposition, in the sense of 
having a power to M at t, does not entail being disposed to M at t. this can be 
seen clearly if we consider that even if it seems natural to specify a disposition 
D as being disposed to M in response to S, it is not true that having a power P 
can also be specified as being disposed to M in response to S. If an object has 
the power to M in response to S then it must also have the power to M because 
the possession of more specific, i.e. more determinate properties entail the less 
determinate ones. but as we have seen, if an object is disposed to M in response 
to S, it is still not necessarily disposed to M. Consequently, it is certainly false 
that having a power to M is the same as being disposed to M.
More importantly, however, the distinction between being disposed to M and 
having the power to M shall not disappear even if we include ‘stimulus condi-
tion’ in the specifications of habits and tendencies. tendencies and habits can 
be conditioned just as powers can be. bob might be disposed to smoke only if he 
is in a stressful situation, or when he drinks too much, or to whichever specific 
kind of ‘stimulus’ he is exposed. some habitual behavior might be condition-
less, but some others might not be. Conversely, amy can—or has the power 
to—smoke in the very same sort of circumstances as bob can, but she does not 
precisely because she is not disposed to.  
My examples above about drawing a distinction between having a power to 
M and being disposed to M involved intentional human behavior. however, I 
used those examples only to make the distinction as vivid as I could in order to 
show that there is no natural move from ‘having the power to M’, and hence from 
‘can M’, to ‘being disposed to M’. but the problem is more general: if an object 
has a causal power (or liability) to M which is manifested only in exceptional 
circumstances, it is misleading to claim that it is disposed to M. Medications do 
have the power to kill someone in certain circumstances; for instance, if they are 
overdosed or if they are taken by someone who is allergic to them. but medica-
tions are not ‘disposed to kill people as a response to being ingested’; just as 
some poisonous material that can cure people in certain special circumstances is 
not ‘disposed to heal’. they are medications, or poisons, after all. thus, as ryle 
indicated, conventional disposition terms can be used for different theoretical 
purposes. For him, it might be only a question of meaning. but for those who 
take metaphysics seriously this difference in meaning indicates an important 
theoretical difference. It shows that properties that are powers and properties 
that can be expressed with the help of explicitly dispositional locutions play dif-
ferent theoretical roles in our ontology. 
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2. thE sIgnIFICanCE oF spECIFIC poWErs
alexander bird has argued that the explicitly dispositional locutions which 
lewis introduces in order to specify the meaning of ordinary power terms are 
ambiguous. such specifications must exclude the presence of counteracting fac-
tors like antidotes, but it seems that any interpretation of ‘disposed to M in the 
absence of antidotes’ is either incompatible with what we ordinarily mean by a 
disposition, or takes dispositions to be extrinsic properties (bird 1998, 231). ac-
cording to one interpretation, we should not ascribe, for instance, the property 
‘being poisonous’ to arsenic if it is taken in conjunction with an antidote. this 
makes the disposition extrinsic since whether or not we can correctly ascribe it 
depends on features of the environment in which arsenic is taken as well as on 
arsenic’s intrinsic property. according to the other interpretation, arsenic itself is 
poisonous even when it is taken together with antidotes. but then, the absence 
of antidotes must be included in the circumstances of manifestation, and this 
seems to be in conflict with how we ordinarily understand disposition terms. We 
understand such terms with reference to the typical ‘stimulus conditions’, like 
ingesting arsenic, and not as ‘ingesting arsenic in the absence of counteracting 
factors’. 
if lewis’s ‘explicitly dispositional locutions’ are indeed unavoidably ambigu-
ous, then I take this as an additional reason for not using them for specifying 
powers. however, bird’s objection might be interpreted as showing that dispo-
sition terms as used in ordinary language can express properties with radically 
different theoretical roles. so interpreted, the objection shows that by specify-
ing the conditions under which a power is manifested we can identify differ-
ent, but not distinct powers. Further, it also shows that the difference cannot be 
understood by the paraphrase ‘being disposed to M as a response to S’ precisely 
because the ascription of power-like properties plays a different role in our on-
tology than the ascription of dispositions does. by specifying the conditions of 
manifestation, we can capture a more determinate property, which is different, 
even if not distinct, from the corresponding determinable one.
powers, like any other properties, can be more or less generic. When we as-
cribe a specific power, we can simply deny that in the presence of counteracting 
powers the object has that specific property to M. as I shall argue below, in certain 
contexts it is natural to ascribe such powers to objects and persons. our ordinary 
disposition terms do not express specific powers, and they are probably not fine-
grained enough to identify generic ones. but if we are interested in the nature of 
properties rather than in the semantics of conventional disposition terms, then 
this fact should not particularly disturb us. We can refer to any of these pow-
ers by means of demonstrative expressions. For instance, we can say this bit of 
arsenic material does not have the specific property to poison these people (because 
they have taken antidotes). or, perhaps closer to standard ordinary usage, we 
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can say that this bit of arsenic has the generic property of being poisonous which 
entails that someone would be poisoned by ingesting it if it were taken and anti-
dotes were not taken, and several other unmentioned conditions were met. 
thus the problem of the explicit specification of all relevant factors that are 
necessary for the power to become manifest arises only when we want to iden-
tify generic powers. Consider a particular glass that had just fallen and then 
broke. since it did break, there must be a sense in which it could break; hence, 
since it broke it must have had the property being such that it would break if 
it were stuck by a hard object at that particular time in those particular circum-
stances.4 thus when we ascribe a power that is maximally specific, the problem 
of how to identify every relevant condition of the power’s manifestation does 
not arise. We could say then that in any situation which differs from the one 
in which the object actually broke when it was dropped only in that it was not 
dropped, the object must have the specific power that it would break if it were 
dropped. hence we can identify a natural possibility, i.e. what can happen in 
particular circumstances by ascribing a maximally specific power-like property 
to an object.
Why should we deny that objects have such properties? It seems that some 
may want to deny this for three reasons. First, it may be said that our ordinary 
disposition terms never ascribe such powers to objects. second, such powers are 
obviously extrinsic: change the environment and you might change the object’s 
power as well. and third, such properties are extremely abundant. but some 
would say that if powers are properties at all, they should be sparse rather than 
abundant.
as to the first reason: what it shows (yet again) is only that the study of dispo-
sition terms of ordinary language may not be a good guide to understanding the 
theoretical role of power-ascriptions. bird mentions the case in which a sneeze, 
through ‘butterfly effect’, can cause a glass breaking (bird 1998, 231). but he says 
we would not say that we have the disposition to break windows by a sneeze. 
this is certainly right; but only because the circumstances in which sneezes can 
cause the breaking of glasses are ‘abnormal’ or exceptional. the point about 
‘butterfly effect’ is, however, exactly that there could be specific circumstances 
in which one does have the power to break windows by sneezing. that power 
might be ‘strange’ because it seems to be no more than a theoretical possibility 
that such circumstances actually arise. and that’s why it is certainly false that we 
4  If we like reasoning with the metaphor of ‘closeness of worlds’, we can say that, from the 
perspective of the world in which the glass is not dropped and does not break, (one of) the 
closest one(s) is ours, i.e. the world in which it is dropped and then breaks. this follows from 
the fact that even if similarity is not transitive, it is certainly symmetric. thus if we alter the 
circumstances minimally, so that the only difference between the actual and the counterfac-
tual situation is that in the latter, luckily, the vase does not fall down, then the vase must, in 
both cases, have the power to break when dropped.
40 CurrEnt IssuEs In MEtaphysICs 
are disposed to break windows in this way if the specific circumstances rarely or 
never actually arise.
as to the second reason: specific powers are indeed extrinsic, but this does 
not seem to be a serious problem. Why should we insist that every power is an 
intrinsic property of the object that has it? Certainly, in some cases whether or 
not we can correctly ascribe some powers can depend on the actual presence or 
absence of some factors which are, according to some standard account of intrin-
sicness, extrinsic to objects (mckitrick 2003). but further, it is unclear how these 
standard accounts are applicable to properties that are powers. some would say, 
for instance, that a power is intrinsic if any nomic duplicate of the object has it.5 
but this helps only if we can decide whether or not two objects are nomic dupli-
cates independently of what powers they have. What counts as a nomic property 
depends on which laws there are. but, as humeans would have it, what laws 
there are depends on world-wide regularities that cannot be intrinsic to a par-
ticular object. More importantly, it is arguable that nomic relations presuppose 
powers, and so we cannot characterize powers’ features by reference to laws.6 
hence the notion of extrinsicness as applied to powers is more of a problem than 
an independent argument for anything. 
as to the third reason: one might worry that maximally specific powers can-
not be ‘real properties’ of objects. real properties are ‘sparse’; but maximally 
specific powers are obviously abundant.7 but what is exactly the reason to think 
that properties must be sparse? For the purpose of explanations that aim at uni-
fication, the ascription of abundant properties seems idle indeed. but it is one 
thing to say that for certain theoretical purposes it would be wrong to invoke a 
certain kind of property, and it is quite another to deny that objects can have 
such a property. the ascription of specific powers can play an important theo-
retical role in many contexts. Most importantly, if we want to understand natural 
possibilities as a consequence of objects possessing certain properties, we have 
good reasons to assume that properties are also abundant. For a certain type of 
event can occur or cannot occur in one or another specific circumstances, and not 
just ‘in general’, without further qualifications.
this does not mean that specific powers cannot play any role in the explana-
tion of what has actually happened. they are often presupposed, for instance, in 
contrastive explanations of singular events. such explanations mark out an event 
C in the causal history of explanandum event E, the absence of which would be 
5  Choi 2008.
6  see also mckitrick 2009, though mckitrick’s main concern is causation and not laws.
7  about the concept and issue of sparseness and abundance of properties see lewis 1983. 
as i understand him, lewis does not deny the existence of abundant properties; he only says 
that they are not ‘natural’. In my view, however, naturalness itself has little to do with parsi-
mony. For an argument that dispositional properties are not sparse (one that is different from 
mine), see mckitrick 2003a.
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sufficient for E’s failing to occur. but such explanations work only if we assume 
that the presence or absence of C does not change the powers of objects that 
participate in the causal interaction within those particular circumstances. the 
contrast between the two cases is brought out precisely by the fact that the pow-
ers in the specific situations are the same so that the only distinction relevant to 
the occurrence of E is the presence or absence of C.
We also ascribe powers in order to identify what things can do and, pragmati-
cally, what we can do with them. thus, maximally specific powers find a natural 
place in practical reasoning. When we need to decide what to do, first we want to 
know what our real options are, i.e. what we can do or what is in our power to do in 
the specific circumstances in which we must make a choice. To use the old lockean 
example, when I sit in a firmly locked room without keys and other exit etc., I 
cannot, i.e. I’m not able to, leave it. this means that I do not have the specific 
power to leave that room at that time even if I do have some generic power to 
leave rooms in the sense that I can move my limbs, see the exit etc. thus when 
the question is whether or not I can do something in a particular situation, and 
I think that I can—I have the power to—do this or that, what I am assuming is 
that at that moment and in those circumstances no intervening factor is active. Even 
if I cannot explicitly specify all the conditions, I assume that, for all I know, in 
the specific situation, I have the power to act in the way I choose.8 and if I’m 
lucky, I do indeed have that property there and then.
Consequently, some of the powers are objects’ or persons’ specific properties 
that ground certain possibilities even if the possibilities are never actualized. 
and objects can have determinate powers in specific situations even if we do 
not actually use them with the purpose to make their powers manifest. that 
objects, or rather certain kinds of objects, may not be disposed to M, not even in 
response to some type of stimulus S, unless they do display M with some statisti-
cally relevant regularity, does not show that they cannot have the power to M in 
certain specific circumstances.
3.  PoWers anD reDucTive analyses
as I have mentioned at the beginning, according to the humean tradition, the 
ascription of powers entails modalities in the sense that if objects could have 
powers, having such powers would entail necessary connections between dis-
tinct events. traditionally, it is the rejection of necessary connections which 
is the main reason why humeans have denied that power concepts can refer 
to genuine properties of objects. however, if I’m right, the theoretical role of 
8  I say more on this and on its implications for the ascription of responsibility in huoranszki 
2011.
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ascribing powers is that they ground natural possibilities, not necessities. thus, 
someone who holds that many properties are powers can—though needn’t—
agree with hume that no event is such that its occurrence can make the occur-
rence of another distinct event necessary.9 
above I argued that we often ascribe a power to persons or objects in order to 
identify what they can do or what we can do with them. thus the ascription of 
powers entails some potentialities or possibilities. this does not mean, as some 
have complained, that the ascription of powers is only talk about objects’ rela-
tion to possible events. powers are not ‘occult relations to possible events’; they 
are actual properties of objects that explain why there are certain possibilities. 
Even if there might be unrealized powers, many powers are more or less specific 
properties that objects actually have.
but hume’s followers insist that power concepts do not refer to properties, 
or they refer to properties only because they can be reductively analyzed.10 re-
duction usually requires that the instantiation of one (sort of) property depend 
asymmetrically on the instantiation of some other (sort of) property. In the case 
of powers, reductive analyses usually assume that statements that ascribe pow-
ers express nomologically grounded actual and possible causal connections. the 
first step of the reductive analyses is to paraphrase statements ascribing powers 
in terms of what objects are disposed to do. then it is claimed that such state-
ments are conceptually equivalent to some counterfactuals that express contin-
gent connections between distinct events. and finally, the truth-conditions of 
counterfactuals should be given purely in non-dispositional terms relying ex-
plicitly or implicitly on the concept of laws. 
Critics of the humean approach deny the possibility of such reduction. Inter-
estingly, they do not seem to object to the very first step of the analysis, which I 
challenged in the earlier section; perhaps because they do not distinguish prop-
erties that are powers from those of dispositions. but even setting the issue of 
explicitly dispositional locutions aside, the possibility of reduction can be de-
nied in two different ways. one way is to deny that the truth-conditions of the 
counterfactual conditional entailed by the ascription of a power can or should be 
understood purely in terms of causation, laws and non-dispositional properties. 
the other is to reject the earlier step of the reductive project, by arguing that the 
ascription of powers is not logically connected to the truth of any counterfactual 
conditionals. Many realists about powers, i.e. philosophers who reject reduction 
and take powers to be genuine properties of objects, believe that there is no 
9  In fact, so formulated, the claim is trivial. the question is whether causally connected 
events are ontologically distinct.
10  this view has been endorsed in different forms, for instance, by armstrong 1997, Mack-
ie 1973 and 1977, and lewis 1997.
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interesting logical connection between the ascription of powers and the truth of 
certain counterfactual conditionals.11 
some of them suggest that to individuate a power it is enough to single out 
the type of events that is its typical manifestation.12 george Molnar, for instance, 
argues that having some powers is like being in an intentional state in the sense 
that powers are directed at their manifestations even when the manifestation 
does not occur (2003).13 but even if the parallel with intentional states is ad-
equate, this does not prove that identifying a type of manifestation is sufficient 
for identifying powers. For intentional states can differ from each other even if 
they are directed at the same type of intentional object.14 In fact, the attempt to 
understand causal powers without using conditionals must face a similar difficul-
ty. the types of manifestations are not fine grained enough to identify distinct 
powers, unless we already understand them as manifestations of those powers.
thus I’m going to argue for a third possibility. I accept, along with humeans, 
that there must be a conceptual connection between the ascription of powers 
and the truth of certain counterfactual conditionals. however, the conditional 
analysis of dispositions can serve different purposes. It may be the case that 
originally it was introduced as a step towards reduction. the idea was that prop-
ositions that ascribe powers, if true at all, can be replaced by talk about actual 
or potential causal relations between events. but an analysis, even a conceptual 
analysis, can serve purposes other than conceptual reduction. In fact, very few 
analyses, if any, have ever provided conceptual reduction of one kind of en-
tity to some other. the conceptual link between powers and counterfactuals 
can elucidate the relation between properties and natural possibilities without 
‘reducing’ powers or denying that they are genuine properties. so understood, 
the conditional analysis of powers can play a significant role in our ontology: it 
is through such an analysis that we can specify powers and hence explain, with 
reference to objects’ properties, which natural possibilities exist. 
the non-reductivists’ rejection of the conceptual connection between the 
ascriptions of powers and the truth of certain counterfactuals is based on coun-
terexamples to what is called the ‘simple conditional analysis of powers’. ac-
cording to such an analysis, the ascription of powers entails the truth of some 
counterfactual conditional. now, I agree that the instantiation of a property can-
not depend on whether or not we happen to hold a counterfactual true. but the 
11  see Martin 1994, Molnar 2003, and bird 2007, Chapter 2.
12  see for instance lowe 2010. interestingly, most realists say surprisingly little about the 
way we should individuate powers. 
13  In fact, Molnar—assuming that there are further similarities between powers and in-
tentional states—argues that to have a power is to be in an intentional state. this is a more 
contentious claim, which has been severely criticized by other realists. see for instance bird 
2007, 114–129.
14  thus, in order to identify an intentional state, we also need to identify the intentional 
mode. see Crane 2001, 32.
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power that may or may not be instantiated by an object is nevertheless identifi-
able only by linking its ascription to the truth of some such counterfactual con-
ditionals. For it is with the help of such counterfactuals that we can individuate 
the relevant possibilities. 
4. Finks, reDucTion, anD conDiTionals 
alvin goldman considers—though immediately rejects—an objection to the 
conditional analysis in one of the footnotes to his book on intentional action. 
according to the conditional analysis something is soluble iff it would dissolve 
if it were immersed in water. but imagine that someone has a magical power to 
make an object soluble whenever it is about to be immersed in water. then it is 
true that it would dissolve if it were immersed in water. nevertheless, the object 
is insoluble (goldman 1970, 199–200). Many philosophers thought—perhaps 
goldman included—that such examples speak more against the possibility of 
magic than against the conditional analysis of dispositions. later, however, in 
a highly influential article, Charles Martin argued that there are cases logically 
analogous to the one described by goldman that do not involve the use of super-
natural capacities (Martin 1994).
Martin presents a scenario in which an electro-fink is attached to a wire. an 
electro-fink is a device that can make a wire live when it is touched by a con-
ductor. suppose we hold that a wire is live at t iff an electric current would flow 
through it, if it were touched by a conductor at t. but in the presence of an elec-
tro-fink, the conditional is true even if the wire is dead. Finks can work in the 
opposite way as well. It is possible that a wire is live, but, thanks to the presence 
of a ‘reverse-fink’, no electric current would run through it if it were touched by 
a conductor. In this case, we can correctly ascribe a power to an object even if 
the conditional is false. thus, the possibility of finks and ‘reverse-finks’ raises 
an obvious difficulty for the simple conditional analysis.
as I noted earlier, in view of such counterexamples, some philosophers want 
to conclude that there is no interesting conceptual connection between the as-
cription of powers and the truth of the corresponding counterfactual conditional. 
Martin himself concludes that counterfactual conditionals in general are ‘only 
clumsy and inexact linguistic gestures to dispositions’ (Martin 1994, 8). perhaps 
we can use such conditionals to characterize vaguely some causal powers; but 
the ascription of powers is logically independent of the truth of any counterfac-
tual conditionals. 
What Martin and many other realists about powers are supposing is that the 
simple conditional analysis’ failure to accommodate the possibility of finks 
proves certain metaphysical consequences. they assume that if our ordinary 
disposition terms cannot be analyzed by means of counterfactual conditionals, 
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then powers cannot be reduced to non-powers, and hence they cannot be elimi-
nated from our ontology.15 In fact, I doubt that any such consequence follows. 
More importantly, however, one can draw such conclusions only if one assumes 
that the purpose of the conditional analysis must be reduction. accordingly, if 
the analysis fails, reduction is rejected. but I shall argue for the contrary view: if 
reduction is rejected, the analysis can be saved and can play an important role in 
our understanding of powers. 
having said this, it remains true that many philosophers who aim at some re-
ductive account of powers do rely on the conditional analysis. and it is generally 
agreed that for the purpose of reduction, propositions which ascribe powers must 
be logically or conceptually equivalent to certain counterfactual conditionals. 
the possibility of finks does indeed raise a difficulty for the reductive project. 
therefore the reductionist needs a more complicated conditional analysis which 
is immune to such counterexamples. 
David lewis’s reformed conditional analysis—perhaps the most influential 
attempt to amend the original analysis—was conceived exactly in this spirit 
(lewis 1997). as lewis observes, the examples of finks and reverse finks are 
based on the possibility that the bearer of a power can change during the proc-
ess of manifestation, and that such change can result in the acquisition or loss of 
the power to be analyzed. thus in order to answer the difficulty raised by the 
possibility of finks, we need to include among the conditions of manifestation 
that some property is retained until the power’s manifestation occurs. but what is 
that property exactly?
since lewis rejects what he—following martin—calls ‘irreducible disposi-
tionality’, his purpose is to offer a reductive analysis of powers (lewis 1997, 
148). thus, taking his cue from earlier reductive analyses, he assumes that every 
disposition must have a causal basis—‘some intrinsic property B’—the presence 
of which together with the stimulus event would be causally sufficient for the 
occurrence of the manifestation event.16 he then suggests completing the ante-
cedent of the conditional with the condition that in the circumstances of mani-
festation, the object’s relevant intrinsic property B would be retained. 
however, the postulation of such intrinsic property gives rise to a number of 
difficulties. reduction seems to require that the relevant intrinsic property be 
non-dispositional; and that it be distinct from the power itself. but it is unclear 
why every power needs to have a distinct ground or causal base. It has been 
argued persuasively that many fundamental physical powers do not have such 
ground (ellis and lierse 1994; mckitrick 2003b; molnar 2003). Further, even 
15  this is, for instance, Molnar’s view; see Molnar 2003, 82–98. this view is often identi-
fied with realism about powers. For important exceptions see Mellor 1974, Mumford 1998 
and Mellor 2000.
16  For earlier analyses relying on the same assumption, see armstrong 1973, Mackie 1977, 
prior et al. 1982. 
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if we assume that they do, we must explain how dispositions, understood as 
objects’ properties, are related to their ground. If the ground is some non-dispo-
sitional property or property-complex, dispositions cannot be identical with it. 
but if they are distinct, why is the causal basis not sufficient for the occurrence 
of the manifestation events? Why do we need dispositional properties at all?
lewis himself, seeing the difficulties with cashing out the nature of the rela-
tionship between dispositional properties and the non-dispositional base, tries 
to be as non-committal as possible about this question (lewis 1997, 151–152). 
he insists only that the relevant property must be intrinsic. but even this is 
contentious. according to lewis, the ground or basis of dispositions must be 
intrinsic because dispositions themselves are always intrinsic to their objects. 
however, our earlier considerations have shown that we have good reason to 
ascribe specific powers to objects that are extrinsic. and it would be hard to 
make sense of the claim that such power’s ground is intrinsic. Further, some 
finks may be intrinsic to the object.17 and if such finks can be removed only 
together with the intrinsic causal base, lewis’s analysis fails. Hence a large 
number of philosophers are in no position to agree with lewis’s analysis: on 
the one hand, philosophers who think that objects can have powers without 
having distinct non-powers as their grounds; on the other hand, philosophers 
who think that objects’ powers can change without a change in their intrinsic 
non-dispositional properties (because, they hold, for instance, that some powers 
are not intrinsic). 
lewis’s analysis assumes, of course, that there is no difference between the 
ascription of a power and the ascription of a disposition. both are claims about 
what objects are disposed to do. but if I am right that powers as properties ful-
fill a different theoretical role than dispositions do, then we can avoid the dif-
ficulties and complications induced by the introduction of a non-dispositional 
causal base. as far as powers are concerned, we can propose a relatively simple 
non-reductive analysis. and as far as dispositions are concerned, we can rely on 
some statistical interpretation of the relevant counterfactual that can make the 
analysis immune to the problem of finks. 
5. a non-reDucTive conDiTional analysis oF PoWers
When Martin introduced the example of a fink, he meant it as a criticism of 
reductive analyses of dispositions. but Martin has not shown why, if we reject 
reduction, some version of the conditional analysis cannot be correct. In fact, 
before he draws his conclusion (cited in the previous section) about the useless-
17  about the first possibility, see mckitrick 2003; about the second, smith 1977. about 
intrinsic finks, see Clark 2008, Clark 2010 and Choi 2012.
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ness of counterfactuals in the analysis of powers, he suggests that ‘there can be 
no conditional which is both logically equivalent to a categorical ascription and 
such as to support the elimination of power or dispositional predicates’ (Martin 
1994, 6, emphasis in the original). but this is not the same as to claim that coun-
terfactual conditionals are only ‘clumsy gestures’ towards powers.
since realists about powers do not aim at a reductive analysis of powers, they 
can include in the circumstances of manifestation that the object does not change 
with respect to the power to be analyzed until the manifestation event occurs. of 
course, in case of powers that can be manifested only once by a particular object, 
the power must be lost by the end of its manifestation, often together with its 
bearer. no vase can remain fragile after it has been broken; and no sugar cube 
is soluble after it has been dissolved. but objects can retain a power until its 
manifestation occurs. 
thus the problem of finks can be avoided if we use a slightly reformed con-
ditional analysis suggested by hugh Mellor as an improvement on Carnap’s ac-
count of reduction sentences (Mellor 2000, 7–8). this requires the following 
minimally revised version of the original formulation of the counterfactual con-
ditional: 
For any object o and times t, t+δt, o has the power P to M at t iff the manifestation 
event of type M would occur no later than t+δt, if o were in circumstances of type C 
as characterized by conditions {c1…cn} at t and it retained P at t– t+δt. 
For instance, a sugar cube is (water-)soluble if and only if it would dissolve with-
in a certain period of time if it were immersed in some not already saturated, not 
very cold etc. water and it retained its solubility until it dissolves. 
this version of the conditional analysis has several advantages relative to 
lewis’s. First, it is much simpler. Truth, of course, should not be compromised 
because of our desire for simplicity, but simplicity without compromise might 
count as a virtue of an analysis nonetheless. second, the analysis is compatible 
with powers being extrinsic. For some, this is perhaps more of a vice than a vir-
tue. however, as I have argued earlier, if we ascribe powers to objects in order 
to ground natural possibilities, we had better make room for extrinsic powers. 
and third, this version of the conditional analysis does not assume that every 
power must have an intrinsic base that would make it nomologically impossible 
for the object to change its power while it does not change intrinsically; mean-
while, there is nothing in the analysis that would make it incompatible with the 
assumption that some powers do have intrinsic ground.
Despite such virtues, one might object that the analysis is circular and hence 
less informative than lewis’s analysis. However, we need to be careful about 
what we mean by circularity here. If it means that we refer to the yet unanalyzed 
property in the analysans, then the proposed analysis is certainly ‘ontologically’ 
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circular. but that circularity is unavoidable since the analysis can be correct only 
if it involves reference to the same property in the analysandum and in the ana-
lysans.18 If, however, circularity means that the analysis does not provide any 
semantic information that can elucidate the content of the analysandum because 
of the reference to the power to be analyzed, then the analysis does not seem 
circular to me. at the very least, it is unclear why reference to the power in the 
analyzans would make the analysis uninformative. 
certainly, the analysis is not reductive, and this contradicts lewis’s assump-
tion that we do not need properties that are irreducibly powers in our ontology. 
however, such convictions about whether every genuine property must be pure-
ly ‘qualitative’, or whether the ascription of properties must entail what objects 
possessing them can do, are independent of the question which counterfactual 
conditionals are entailed by their correct ascription. but more importantly, if the 
reference to the power to be analyzed in the anlysans is an objection to this ver-
sion of the conditional analysis, then lewis’s analysis is not in better shape since 
that analysis also contains tacit reference to the power to be analyzed. 
according to lewis’s analysis, one of the conditions of manifestation is that 
the object retain ‘some intrinsic property B’ until the manifestation occurs. What 
is that property? obviously, it must be the property that grounds the power. 
now ordinary objects have many powers at the same time. a knife made of 
stainless steel, for example, can have the power to conduct electricity, to resist 
rusting, as well as the power to cut bread (or the more generic power to cut or 
scratch objects made of material less hard than steel). these are obviously not 
the same powers, since certain kinds of objects can have one of them without 
having the other. soft objects can be good conductors, and hard objects can be 
very bad ones. 
so how can we single out the ‘intrinsic property b’ the retention of which is 
necessary in order for the power to become manifest? the only way I see is to 
say that whatever property is the ground of the power must be retained. of course, if 
we assume that that property is distinct from the power itself, then there might 
be ways to detect it independently of the power. but the relevant question is 
whether or not we can identify it as the ground of the power without some 
implicit reference to the power itself. If our metaphysical conviction is that no 
property is irreducibly a power, and hence objects’ powers must have some non-
dispositional ground, then reference to the intrinsic non-dispositional property 
seems natural, quite independently of the issue of finks or any other objection 
to the simple conditional analysis. but this is not an issue about how powers are 
18  as Michael Jubien says ‘if the concept under analysis has a certain characteristic feature, 
[…] then one would think that feature must also somehow be present in the analysans, or else 
the analysis could not be correct. From this perspective [seeking a ‘reductive’ analysis] looks 
like the pursuit of magic.’ (Jubien 2009, 95).
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connected to conditionals. and certainly, it is hard to see why an analysis that 
includes the condition ‘the power to M is retained’ is less informative than the 
one with the condition ‘whatever property is the ground of the power to M, it is 
retained’. If there is a difference between the two in terms of their informative-
ness, it is certainly the second, with its reference to a further unknown property, 
which is the less informative.
6. DisPosiTions, Generic PoWers, anD sTaTisTical reGulariTies 
When lewis introduced explicitly dispositional locutions he meant to speci-
fy the meaning of conventional disposition terms so that they fit his reformed 
conditional analysis. but the introduction of the explicitly dispositional locu-
tion can also be interpreted as the first step in a statistical interpretation of the 
truth-conditions of the corresponding counterfactual conditionals. according to 
the statistical interpretation, the ascription of dispositions entails counterfactual 
conditionals that can tolerate exceptions. this means, roughly, that [1] a (kind 
of) object has the disposition D iff it is disposed to M in circumstances C; and [2] 
it is disposed to M in circumstances C iff in the statistically relevant reference 
class of cases, it would M more often than not, were it placed in a circumstance 
of the same type as C.19 For instance, an object is fragile iff it would break more 
often than not in the counterfactual circumstances in which it is dropped from 
an appropriate distance on a hard surface.
It has been argued that the statistical interpretation of the counterfactuals can 
answer the challenge from finks as well as several other possible counterexam-
ples to the conditional analysis of dispositions.20 Indeed, this analysis can pro-
vide an intuitively adequate account of the connection between the ascription 
of dispositions and the sort of conditionals that are entailed by their ascription. 
but the statistical analysis explains this connection so well precisely because dis-
positions are understood here as behavioral tendencies. It is for this reason that 
the ascription of dispositions can be shown to entail certain counterfactuals the 
truth conditions of which can be interpreted in statistical terms. If it is true of an 
object that it is disposed to behave in certain ways in response to some stimulus, 
then it must be true as well that in the counterfactual circumstances in which 
the stimulus event occurs, the difference between the object’s displaying and 
not displaying the behavior would be statistically relevant. 
Dispositions the ascription of which involves such statistical regularities play 
an important explanatory role both in science and in ordinary discourse. but it 
plays a fundamentally different theoretical role than the ascription of powers. 
19  this is a variation of the theory proposed by Manley and Wasserman 2008, 75–76.
20  see Manley and Wasserman 2008, 76–81.
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to recall my earlier example, even if bob has the power to, i.e. can swim, or can 
steal, can hurt other people’s feelings etc., this needn’t explain what he actually 
does, and it does not help predict what he is ever going to do. his having those 
powers is presupposed when we explain his behavior by his being a smoker, a 
thief, by his being callous, etc.; but ascribing them does not entail any such be-
havior. In contrast, when we say that amy is a swimmer it does tell us something 
about her actual behavior because it explains what she occasionally does, even if 
the explanation is not particularly interesting or informative. 
of course, we can ascribe a disposition to a particular object even if the ob-
ject does not actually display the relevant sort of behavioral tendency; if not for 
other reasons, just because many dispositions are such that particular objects 
can manifest them only once. For instance, no fragile object can break regularly. 
however, in most such cases, what grounds the truth of the statistical counter-
factual is some actual regularity which is characteristic of the natural kind the 
particular object instantiates. things made of a kind of glass are fragile because 
things made of that kind of glass break more often than not when dropped from 
a particular distance and when they fall on a hard surface etc. It is this actual reg-
ularity which can ground our belief that any particular object made of that kind 
of glass would break more often than not in the counterfactual circumstances in 
which it is dropped. 
but even if the statistical interpretation of the counterfactuals explains well 
what it means for an object to be disposed to do certain things, it is ill-suited for 
the analysis of statements that ascribe powers to objects. For, as we have seen 
from bird’s sneezing–window-breaking example, if the circumstances in which 
an object would M more often than not are, statistically speaking, uncharacter-
istic, then the object is not disposed to M. similarly, a poisonous material can 
cure someone in certain special circumstances and a medication can kill. but a 
poisonous material is not disposed to cure, and a medication is not disposed to 
kill. thus, if powers fulfill the theoretical role in our ontology which they do ac-
cording to my proposal, then the statistical interpretation of the counterfactuals 
should be understood as an account of objects’ dispositions rather than that of 
their powers.
Despite this, there is an important metaphysical and an important epistemic 
connection between objects’ having powers and their being disposed to behave 
in certain ways. as mentioned earlier, it is unlikely that every power has a dis-
tinct ground. however, it seems extremely plausible that dispositions as behav-
ioral tendencies must have some ground. and their ground is exactly the object’s 
generic power which specifies in which kind of interactions the object can par-
ticipate in which kind of circumstances. thus, metaphysically, the possession 
of generic powers grounds objects’ dispositions. Epistemically, however, it is on 
the basis of observed regularities that we ascribe a disposition to certain objects 
or, more frequently, to certain kinds of objects. and it is through ascribing such 
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dispositions that we can infer the possession of generic powers. so understood, 
the ascription of dispositions provides a link between statistical regularities and 
the ascription of generic powers.
7. conclusion
as I mentioned at the beginning, the concept of a disposition as it is used in con-
temporary philosophy was introduced as a technical term. as such, any theory of 
dispositions should be evaluated with reference to the theoretical role that the 
properties represented by such concepts play in science and philosophy. I tried 
to show that many analyses of disposition terms hide an important difference 
between two fundamentally different roles which such terms can play in meta-
physics. one of these roles can be well captured by understanding statements of 
dispositions as expressing what objects are disposed to do in response to certain 
stimuli. but dispositions understood in this way should be distinguished from 
powers as properties of objects. For even if dispositions presuppose powers, the 
ascription of a power does not entail that objects are disposed to behave or in-
teract in certain ways. the ascription of powers has a distinct role in metaphys-
ics. and that role will not be adequately captured by a semantic analysis of the 
meaning of conventional disposition terms. 
the ascription of powers is not constrained in any way by the use of disposi-
tional predicates. It has been observed already in early discussions of dispositions 
that English has certain grammatical devices with which we can easily generate 
new disposition terms.21 some philosophers have worried that this makes it too 
easy to introduce new powers into our ontology.22 this may be a justified worry 
as far as generic powers are concerned. but the role of specific powers cannot be 
understood through an analysis of conventional disposition terms for a different 
reason. not because we can generate terms for powers too easily; rather, because 
some powers are so specific that it would be impossible to introduce separate 
terms for each. this does not mean that we cannot express specific powers, 
since it is possible to identify them with the help of demonstratives. but the 
main purpose of the conditional analysis of powers is not to provide an account 
of the use of conventional disposition terms, but rather to identify powers of 
varying specificity. 
ascribing such powers to objects serves a special theoretical purpose. such 
specific powers are properties that ground natural possibilities. according to 
many contemporary accounts, properties should be understood in terms of pos-
sibilities. My account agrees with this to the extent that properties are not in-
21  see goodman 1954, 40.
22  Molnar expresses this worry, which he shares with Quine. see Molnar 2003, 27–28.
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dependent of possibilities. however, if I’m right, the order of ontological de-
pendence should be the reverse. since many properties are powers, it is these 
properties that ground natural possibilities.23
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HOWARD ROBINSON
“Are There Any Fs?”: How We Should 
Understand This Question
1.thE optIons
In this paper I will present an approach to ontology which combines realism 
and conceptualism in what, I hope, is an intuitively acceptable way. In order to 
illustrate the advantages of this approach, I shall have to deal somewhat swiftly 
with a number of hot topics, but my objective is not so much to force conclusions 
about those topics as to illustrate the virtues of my fundamental approach to the 
‘are there any Fs?’ question.
I think the question ‘are there Fs?’ can properly be interpreted in either of 
two ways, depending on the F in question. one I call the conceptualist interpre-
tation (CI), and it can be read roughly as follows:
(CI) We have the concept F. Is the world so organized that it satisfies this concept 
in the way that is necessary for the utility of that concept?
If the answer to this is affirmative, then there are Fs, in the conceptualist 
sense.
the other interpretation is realist (rI), and goes roughly as follows.
(rI) Forget about us and our concepts. If there were no conceptualizers around 
(putting god or Divine minds aside) would there be Fs?
If the answer to this is affirmative, then there are Fs in the realist sense.
Common sense does not make this distinction, but I do not think that it finds it 
rebarbative. Why I think this will, I hope, become clear in what follows. nomi-
nalists will find rI objectionable because they will not find the realist view of 
properties and universals entailed by it acceptable. I will not be concerned here 
to engage with nominalism of this sort, for I think that, if there is a world, it 
must be thus and so, and, therefore, it must be characterized by some properties 
independently of our conceptual practices. the nearest I can come to nominal-
ism is (iv) below.
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there are the following positions one might take on adopting the conceptual-
ist and realist positions. .
(i) realism for all standard concepts, including those for natural objects and those 
for artifacts.
(ii) realism applying to natural objects, but not to artifacts, which are treated con-
ceptually.
(iii) realism for objects at the fundamental level but conceptualism for the rest.
(iv) Conceptualism for everything we know and possibly for everything we are 
ever likely to know, or even are capable of knowing. how the world is in itself will 
always evade our grasp: we can only approximate its actual properties.
Most discussion of these issues in modern analytic metaphysics is in what one 
might describe as a ‘mad dog realist‘ spirit, as in (i), and is only interested in rI. 
to say with peter van Inwagen (1990, 109), for example, that there are no tables, 
but only table-shaped arrangements of simples is to ignore CI as a candidate for 
answering the ‘are there any Fs?’ question. Van Inwagen’s position assumes that 
the only interpretation of this question is the strict realist one. If one took CI se-
riously, then it is clear that, in that sense, there are tables, for the world is clearly 
so constructed as to make the application of this concept fruitful. 
2. THe useFulness oF ci For analyTic meTaPHysics
there is a lot to be said for taking CI seriously, for if it were applicable, one 
might solve a whole series of problems that worry modern metaphysicians. 
these problems arise from applying rI across the board. I have already tried 
to show (robinson 2008-9) that CI can be used to deal with vagueness and as-
sociated sorites problems. Many, if not most, concepts outside the most exact 
sciences (which means, I think, outside physics and, possibly, chemistry) are 
subject to such vagueness. In brief, I argued the following. Vagueness (at least 
of the sorites-generating kind) is a property of concepts, not of reality. the re-
sponse to the paradoxes and conflicts with classical logic that vagueness gener-
ates should not be to try to develop a logic for those concepts that produces 
a formally valid natural language, incorporating all its idiosyncrasies, as in a 
three-valued logic, nor to impute to vague concepts a hidden precision, as does 
epistemicism, but to use or refrain from using those concepts according to their 
usefulness, consistent with classical logic. so, for example, when a raised piece 
of earth is neither clearly a hill nor a mountain, one drops these terms and speaks 
in terms of particular heights. I argued that one should think of such concepts as 
belonging to representational ontologies use of which can be dropped when cases 
do not fit their paradigms. the relationship of different ontologies to each other 
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is not random—there is what I called a harmonization requirement between the 
various ontologies we apply that is weaker than a formal logical compatibility. 
For example, newtonian theory and quantum theory are strictly incompatible, 
but one can show how an essentially quantum world can sustain the application 
of newtonian principles at most normal magnitudes. similarly, one can see how 
strictly continuous heights can make useful the categories of hill and mountain 
for many straightforward cases, without needing to define the terms ‘hill’ and 
‘mountain’ strictly in terms of exact heights. Where these categories do not fit, 
the practice of using them is suspended. this can only be done if one treats the 
relevant concepts in a conceptualist way, for the conceptualist holds that the 
‘are there Fs?’ question depends, in part, on whether the world will cooperate 
in the practice of using these concepts, and, where vagueness comes into play, 
it won’t. If one believed these concepts to pick out fundamental constituents of 
the world, then one would not be free simply to drop them out of convenience 
and the full rigours of logical consistency would be brought to bear. some kinds 
of discourse—such as that of bald-not bald, or hill and mountain—were never 
intended as basic, but the newtonian ontology was. to apply it now, it must be 
downgraded to CI.
Vagueness is not the only problem which CI is helpful in handling. here are 
two further examples.
The ‘many Fs’ problem
the ‘many Fs’ problem has two versions, one essentially involving vague-
ness, one not. the vagueness version—in which the F in question is typically 
‘cloud’—concerns objects with indeterminate borders. peter unger (1980) ar-
gues that, in these cases, one can draw the border in many different places, 
thus individuating many overlapping objects. the non-vagueness- involving 
case goes as follows. suppose that a complex physical object—a table, an oak 
tree or a cat - is made of a million atomic parts. there are almost indefinitely 
many sub-groups of those atoms which would be—or are—sufficient to consti-
tute an object of the relevant kind. so, in the case of the table, imagine all its 
atoms minus two which are presently integral to the table—these atoms still 
constitute a table. If pursued, this line of thought leads to the idea that there 
are a vast number of actual tables contained within this one table, though they 
massively overlap. or imagine the tree minus a branch. that would still be 
an oak tree. but that tree-minus-the-branch is present within the actual tree. 
similarly for the cat without one of its paws—or simply without a few hairs or 
the odd atom. there are a tremendous number of proper part combinations suf-
ficient to be an F within the actual F, and, as each of these is sufficient to be an 
F, all those Fs are there and real. 
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the realist has to struggle with the fact that there are many well qualified can-
didates for being an F of the kind in question.  now I am not entirely convinced 
that a realist cannot cope with the non-vague cases, but the conceptualist has an 
easy route. he can simply say that this is not the way we deploy this concept: 
we deem there to be only one F whenever there is an F present and the only 
practical way of treating it is as a single object. this ‘deeming‘ is not a conscious 
choice. given our perceptual system, the table presents itself as unitary and we 
interact with it as one thing. For example, even if there are indefinite number 
of tables present, you cannot do an indefinite number of different things with 
them. so our conceptualization is practical as well as—or, perhaps, rather than—
intellectual. It is a matter of how we interact with the object.
The ‘clay and the statue’ problem
a lump of clay is moulded into a statue of a man. the lump of clay and the 
statue seem to be, in an obvious intuitive sense, the same thing. they occupy 
exactly the same place and two different physical objects cannot occupy the 
same place; they each weigh, say, ten pounds, but their combined weight is only 
ten pounds. nevertheless, they have different identity conditions. the clay can 
be remoulded into something else, and, if this happens, it continues to exist but 
the statue is destroyed.
the realist has a problem with all such relations of constitution, whether or 
not he treats constitution as a form of identity. If only the base is treated in a 
fully realist way, then one can treat the composite object as a convenient way of 
conceptualizing some of what is out there, rather than a further entity.
a natural response to this strategy is to say that, in the case of artifacts, per-
haps we manufacture and control the concept as well as the object, but this is not 
so for natural objects. Maybe there is only one table there because that is how our 
concept of ‘table’ works, and statues only exist, perhaps, because we make them 
and interpret certain lumps of stone as statues, but the situation is different for 
natural objects. there is not only one oak tree or one cat there (if there is only 
one) because of our concepts: we control the reality of tables and statues on all 
levels, but not the reality of trees and cats. 
3. onToloGy anD THe sPecial sciences
Coping with this challenge obliges us to face the question of the ontological sta-
tus of entities dealt with in the special sciences. these seem to be real because 
they seem to cut nature at its joints, even if not at its most microscopic ones. on 
the other hand, if we treat them in a strictly realist way, many of the problems 
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which I have claimed CI solves will appear in their case, for vagueness, constitu-
tion and ‘many Fs’ problems arise for many natural objects.
Considering the ontological status of the “levels” represented by the differ-
ent special sciences, the following seem to be the options.
(1a) all levels are equally real.
(2a) all levels are real, but only the lowest one is fundamental: this does not im-
pune the reality of the others. (If you construct something out of real elements, it 
is real itself, even though derivatively.)
(3a) only the fundamental level is strictly real, the others are to be understood 
conceptually.
these options concern the existence of entities, but similar distinctions might 
be made concerning the genuineness of the causal powers of the different lev-
els. then it would run
(1b) all levels are equally causally efficacious.
(2b) all levels are causally efficacious, but they all draw their efficacy from the laws 
operating at the fundamental level.
(3b) only the fundamental level has any real efficacy; the rest are a mere by-prod-
uct or appearance of effectiveness.
It is natural to pair these two series off together, especially if one thinks that 
causal efficacy is a criterion for being physically real. but if one does not hold 
the latter it is at least possible to claim that all levels are real but that the ener-
gies are all micro-physical. my reason for distinguishing them is that kim states 
his Causal Exclusion principle in terms of causal efficacy; but, as we shall see, it 
is salient for the further question of ontological status. For present purposes, I 
shall be assuming that reality and efficacy stand or fall together.
For present purposes, I shall not distinguish between (1) and (2). Jonathan 
schaffer (2003) has argued that there need not be a basic level and, in that case, 
all are equally real. I shall not pursue that issue here.
two influential figures whose positions naturally favour (3) are armstrong 
and kim. David armstrong (1978) believes that the only real universals are those 
needed for basic science, the rest are downgraded to the status of “predicates”. 
this means that anything except the scientifically fundamental properties are 
the creatures of human thought and language. (It does not seem to be generally 
realized that this has serious consequences for armstrong’s theory of mind; for 
psychological properties will not be basic, and hence will themselves have the 
status of predicates, thus relying for their reification on activities of the human 
mind. this looks like a vicious regress.)
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kim (1998, 2005), too, propounds a principle which can be deployed to sug-
gest that the ontologies of the special sciences have no independent efficacy, 
and this at least prepares the way for denying that they have an independent real 
existence. this principle is the causal exclusion principle, which goes as follows.
If an event e has a sufficient cause c at t, no event at t distinct from c can be a cause 
of e (unless this is a case of genuine causal overdetermination). (kim, 2005, 17)
kim initially uses this to argue that a weak definition of physicalism in terms of 
supervenience cannot avoid epiphenomenalism, but he then considers the gen-
eralization argument, which extends it, given closure under physics, to the special 
sciences. kim rejects this argument, in effect because he does not think that 
different ontological levels are in competition with each other. this is a major 
theme to which we shall return.
4. non-reDucTive PHysicalism METAPHySICAL anD LIGHT
the ontological status of the special sciences can be approached via barry 
loewer‘s discussion of Jerry Fodor’s seemingly extreme realism about the spe-
cial sciences.
in controversy with Jerry Fodor, barry loewer distinguishes between what 
he calls Non-Reductive Physicalism, Metaphysical (NRPM) and Non-Reductive Physi-
calism, Light (NRPL). the latter corresponds to position (3) and the former to the 
stronger realism expressed in (1) and in (2).
NRPM and NRPL agree that the special sciences are conceptually, epistemologi-
cally, and methodologically autonomous/irreducible to physics but disagree about 
what autonomy/irreducibility consists in and how it is to be explained. NRPM says 
that the autonomy/irreducibility is metaphysical and seeks to explain the concep-
tual and epistemological autonomy in terms of the existence of metaphysically ba-
sic special science kinds and laws. on the other hand, NRPL attempts to account 
for the conceptual/methodological irreducibility of the special sciences in terms of 
facts and laws of microphysics and our conceptual endowment and epistemological 
situation in the world...
loewer then raises the question of what the difference would be between a 
world, w1, in which NRPL held and another,w2, in which NRPM obtained. giv-
en closure under physics, everything would behave in exactly the same way, 
so the addition of the further entities and their concomitant laws appears to 
be vacuous.
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Fodor appears to leave himself open to this argument by seeming to concede 
that the existence of two such distinct worlds is possible. taking psychology as 
a case of a special science, he says:
only god gets to decide whether there is anything, and likewise only god gets to 
decide whether there are laws about pains; or whether, if there are, the pains that 
the laws are about are Mr [‘Metaphysically real’].
Fodor here seems to be denying the standard physicalist maxim that once god 
had created all the facts of physics, he had nothing more to do, and this does 
place him in the bizarre situation that loewer points out. it is more natural for 
the realist about the special sciences to deny that w1 is possible, on the grounds 
that, once it has been created, the higher order entities and concomitant laws 
are, eo ipso present too. It is a case of what has been called an ‘ontological free 
lunch’.
this last phrase might still leave one puzzled over what the difference be-
tween the “light” and the “metaphysical” consists in. asserting that it means 
that a further set of entities exist, without any consequences, makes the asser-
tion look suspiciously empty. the expression ‘ontological free lunch’ itself sug-
gests something very dubious, namely that there both is, and is not, something 
more.
the idea that there is something more might be summed up by the idea that 
Fs are wholly constituted by atoms, but that they are not nothing but atoms. What 
then, is the “more” of their nature, over and above how they are constituted?
5. aTTemPTs To DeFenD THe realiTy oF orGanisms.
I can think of two answers to the question with which the last section ended. 
one is that the identity conditions of the higher order entities are missing from 
facts about constitution. but the ontological status of identity conditions, con-
sidered as real entities “out there” seems very dubious. such conditions are 
most naturally seen as conditions for the application of a concept, and, as such, play 
into the hands of the conceptualist and position (3).
another, more prima facie realist option, is what has been called a modern 
version of hylomorphism. the core of this idea is to take structure or organization 
as ontologically basic. the term hylomorphism of course originates with aristotle, 
but the modern theory is simply about taking macro organization at face value 
and so treating it as being real and efficacious as the microscopic features. noth-
ing exclusively aristotelian or scholastic need be invoked.
this idea is very clearly articulated in Jaworski (2010): 
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Hylomorphism claims …[t]hat structure is a basic ontological and explanatory prin-
ciple. (269)
structure is also a basic explanatory principle in the sense that it explains why 
members of this or that kind are able to engage in the behaviors they do. It is be-
cause humans are organized as they are, for instance, that they are able to speak, 
to learn, and to engage in the range of activities that distinguish them from other 
living things and from non-living ones. (272)
Hylomorphism implies…that there are two distinct kinds of properties: proper-
ties due to something’s structure and properties things possess independently of a 
broader structure.
the properties of these structures are not idle, according to Jaworski:
emergent properties are not epiphenomenal…but make a distinctive causal or ex-
planatory contribution to a system’s behavior…
he emphasizes this point: 
Emergent [hylomorphic] properties are not logical constructions out of lower-level 
properties; they do not represent abstract ways of describing lower-level occur-
rences or processes. (274)
according to Jaworski, from this follows what might seem to be a direct denial of 
the causal exclusion principle:
hylomorphists endorse causal pluralism. they claim that there are causal proper-
ties and relations that do not fit the mold set by physics…[this] view is compatible 
with all forces operating at a fundamental physical level [i.e., none at other levels] 
and is therefore immune to the empirical objections raised against emergentism. 
(290-1)
this last quotation is particularly important. In ascribing to causal pluralism, 
the hylomorphist appears to be denying kim’s causal exclusion principle. but 
notice that the avowal of causal pluralism is immediately followed by the asser-
tion that “all forces are operating at a fundamental physical level”(italics added). 
What one has, in fact, is an explanatory pluralism, with causation adopted into the 
domain of explanation; the wholly external, mind-free element is force and this 
is exclusively at the micro level. Causal exclusion has been replaced by force 
exclusion, and explanatory pluralism is now characterized as, or as including, 
plural causal explanation. but no-one thought that explanations, of all levels, 
excluded an appeal to causation. Jaworski is really only claiming that, once one 
realizes that most explanations are causal explanations, explanatory pluralism is 
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pluralism enough to constitute or ground a full realism about all levels. this sits 
well with kim’s belief that different ontological levels are not in competition 
with each other. 
nevertheless, this position might be defended. the truth makers for higher-
level explanations are just as real as those for physics. If bricks are real, then so 
is a house made of bricks. and if bricks have causal powers, so does the house, in 
virtue of the bricks’ powers. so if atoms have real force, combinations of atoms 
can constitute a real object which has real causal efficacy compounded from the 
real forces of the atoms of which it is made. this seems to be common sense. 
kim states the commonsensical nature of this position emphatically:
the errant baseball didn’t after all break the window, and the earthquake did not 
cause the buildings to collapse! this strikes us as intolerable. (1998, 81)
this much is true, but the impression that it assists the realist is an illusion, for 
these truths are neutral between conceptualist and realist interpretations. the 
same argument could be brought for realism about vague concepts—house and 
heap are probably both examples—and vagueness is certainly best handled by 
treating the concepts in a conceptualist manner. the baseball broke the win-
dow, but both ‘baseball’ and ‘window’ are to be understood in the conceptualist 
sense. so if one adopts CI as appropriate for such concepts, there are baseballs 
etc., but in the conceptualist sense. similarly for the earthquake and the build-
ings. only an extreme realist would feel that common sense was threatened by 
this reading. kim’s earthquake and van inwagen’s table both exist, but on the 
conceptualist interpretation of what it is to exist. What is at stake is whether the 
human perspective has a certain role in reifying what is in fact the micro world 
in the way we do. there is a sense in which any mereological combination of at-
oms could be treated as an entity and so could the combined sum of their forces. 
Which are chosen are a matter of human interest and perspective—not arbitrary, 
of course, but well-groundedness of conceptual practice does not entail a strict 
realism. talk of “human interests” might make it seem too intellectual. one 
of the most important things is the grain of human perception—what is salient 
to us and how it manifests itself in our senses. If we can see the independent 
constituents of an entity, we are less likely to think of that entity as basic. We 
can see the elements in a crowd, in a swarm of bees or in a weather system, and 
so are less likely to think of these things as fundamental, even if they seem to 
have a dynamic of their own. We are generally happy to make a conceptualist in-
terpretation of them. but for most organisms, we see them only whole, for such 
parts as we do see are essentially parts of the thing—branches, leaves, limbs, 
teeth etc.—not independent parts. If we saw a plant as a swirling mass of par-
ticles passing in and out of an organizational vortex, like a rioting crowd, then, 
once we came to believe that the organization was a product of the interaction 
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of the particles following only the laws of physics and not an extraneous imposi-
tion, we would probably find it natural to make a conceptualist interpretation of 
plants. as it is, the nature of our perception seems to endow them with a greater 
degree of natural integrity than they would seem to possess from a more micro-
scopic viewpoint. 
both as entities and as causal agents, macroscopic objects seem to be by-
products of their micro constituents. What does it mean to call the higher order 
processes ‘by-products’? It rests on the premise that everything that happens, 
happens because of the micro-dynamics. apparent higher laws, though useful 
generalizations from our standpoint, do not give the real reason why anything 
happened. It is like the case of the plant “turning towards the light”. Common 
experience leads us to say that it does so in order to gain more light, because it 
needs light to survive and replicate. but science tells us that this turning hap-
pens because of the chemical reactions involved, without any fundamental tel-
eology. but were not these chemical processes “selected” because they allowed 
the plant to get the light and thus teleology is restored at the level of biology? 
yes, in a sense, but only in the sense that certain micro-processes, from their 
own dynamics, repeat themselves in a certain way. the micro- processes do not 
get repeated because they lead to the replication of the organism, their repeating 
themselves is the replication. Dawkins’ expression “the blind watchmaker” as 
a label for nature is illuminating. the “blindness” in question is not primarily 
cognitive, it is volitional. nature does not intend to produce watches—or eyes or 
organisms in general—the developing of the quantum field, which is “blind to” 
its by-products, merely produces things which can be usefully so classified from 
the perspective of a macroscopic rational animal.
Davidson (2003) rejects kim’s exclusion principle, but, rather ironically, we 
can draw on a legitimate point of Davidson’s in its support. Davidson claims, 
very plausibly, that it is only at the fundamental level that there are what he calls 
strict laws. laws at other levels involve ceteris paribus clauses and a certain degree 
of approximation. this strongly suggests that, though they are useful explanato-
ry tools, formulated on the basis of more exact processes that underlie them, the 
laws of the special sciences are not entities in their own right. It would be natural 
to argue the same way for the entities to which those laws attach. Davidson’s 
reason for rejecting the exclusion principle rests on some very controversial fea-
tures of his position. he claims that causal relations are entirely extensional and 
so events are not efficacious in virtue of any of the properties involved in them, 
so you cannot claim that some of them are active and others idle. the motive 
behind this is some kind of nominalism that wishes to treat properties as simply 
“descriptions” under which events fall, and, as such, not agents in the world. 
at the same time, he wants to treat the mental as “purely conceptual”, and the 
basic physical as, in some sense, more real. For further discussion of Davidson’s 
confusions, see robinson (2003).
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6. concePTualism anD relaTive iDenTiTy
David Wiggins has demonstrated, in a masterfully developed series of mono-
graphs (Wiggins 1967, 1980, 2001) that the logic of identity, with leibniz’s law, 
rules out the possibility of relative identity. the doctrine of conceptualism for 
all ordinary entities that I have defended seems likely to leave open the possi-
bility of relative identity, because the same piece of the material world might be 
conceptualized in different ways for different purposes. but what Wiggins actu-
ally shows is that the relativity of identity is impossible within any given repre-
sentational ontology, but if the concepts in question are ones the use of which 
one can suspend, they need not be made formally consistent with other repre-
sentational ontologies that one might choose to employ. one always has the op-
tion to withdraw the conceptualization that is leading to trouble and adopt one 
that is more appropriate or basic. on the other hand, if the entities in question are 
taken in a strictly realist sense then one is bound by Wiggins’s argument. so what 
Wiggins says must be applied if you think that the entities under discussion are 
fundamental and interpreted according to rI. Wiggins, as a good aristotelian, 
thinks that ordinary macroscopic objects—especially biological organisms—are 
paradigms of fundamental substances and so his logical constraints must apply 
to them. I have been arguing that they are not, in the appropriate sense, funda-
mental and that that is why Wiggins’s logical discipline does not apply.1 (I shall 
suggest at the end that there may not be in the physical world anything of the 
kind on which Wiggins’s arguments can get a substantial grip. as (iv) above sug-
gests, perhaps it is the case that everything on which we can get a grip must be 
understood according to CI.)
7. concePTualism anD THe minD.
Does this solve the problem of organisms—oak trees, cats, and, worse, other 
human beings? 
Maybe what I have said so far is satisfactory for vegetable organisms, but what 
about animals, like cats, that are normally thought of as conscious, and what 
about human beings?
the answer to this will depend to a great extent on whether one is a physi-
calist. Considered as a nonconscious organism, an animal would be in the same 
category as a plant, namely a vortex of changing atoms formed entirely in ac-
1  i say ‘in the appropriate sense’, because, as i argue in robinson 2004/9, i think that there 
are two essential components to the traditional conception of substance, one that I call ‘de-
scriptive’ and the other ‘teleological’. Wiggins wishes aristotle had ignored the latter, whereas 
what he tried to do was to give it dominance. It is to the descriptive conception, when taken 
realistically, that Wiggins’s arguments most certainly apply.
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cord with the laws of microphysics. seeing this as an entity which is more than 
a highly organized cloud of particles would depend on our finding ourselves 
conceptualizing it as such, as with the oak tree. but isn’t the cat’s conscious-
ness real in a way that is independent of our conceptualization? the correct 
answer is, I think, ‘yes’, but it is difficult to see how this could be the case if 
the cat’s subjectivity were not something over and above the organization of 
elementary particles in its brain. It is not my purpose here to engage deeply 
with the philosophy of mind, but I shall briefly give reasons for this claim. If it is 
right that, in general, organic life is to be interpreted conceptually, as our way of 
making sense of certain patterns which are a by-product of development at the 
micro level—say in the quantum field—as presented through our senses, then 
the same will apply to subsystems within organic life. thus it applies to neural 
processes, especially as functionally understood. this leads us to the self-under-
mining position to which (as I said earlier) armstrong is committed. the very 
engine that is responsible for conceptualization—the human mind—is itself a 
unit only within the light of conceptual activity. this is the same problem as the 
one that faces Dennett’s interpretationalist stance, and I have argued against it 
elsewhere (robinson 1993: 6 and, in more detail, 2010), as have others (hornsby 
1997, 181-2). so here I shall simply assume that conscious states are fundamen-
tal in at least a property dualist sense. these mental states will be “out there” 
in a fully realist sense, in the same way as whatever constitutes the fundamental 
level of matter. but will the cat’s mind, considered as a complex entity, also 
be real or will it depend on our reifying it by one of our concepts? Is there, for 
example, a ‘many minds’ problem corresponding to the ‘many bodies’ problem, 
if one tries to be a realist about minds? remember that the ‘many Fs’ problem 
has two forms. one of them depends on the vagueness of the boundaries of 
most bodies. It is plausible to deny that minds are vague in this sense. If M is a 
mental state, then there must be some mind to which it belongs. this will not 
be true for a pure humean, for on that theory, an impression can exist independ-
ently, detached from any mind and, therefore, presumably, in an indeterminate 
relation to a given mind—half attached, like a hair that is falling out or a water 
droplet at the margins of a cloud. I shall simply assume that this cannot be true 
of mental states. one may be only vaguely aware of some states, but, insofar 
as it counts as mental, it belongs to some particular mind. this still leaves the 
non-vague version of the ‘many Fs’ problem. after all, if you take all the cat’s 
mental states and think away one sensation, you still have a feline mind, so are 
there not many cat-minds present? I had said when introducing this problem in 
section 2 that I was not certain that there might not be a realist solution to it. In 
the case of minds, I think there certainly is. Insofar as it is determinate whether 
a certain mental state belongs to a given mind, then one can insist on a maximal 
criterion for the identity of a mind: it consists of all the mental states that are co-
conscious. that very mind could have contained one mental state less, but it does 
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contain all the actually co-conscious ones. (see kovacs 2010 for an argument that 
this is inconsistent with the supervenience of the mental on the physical.)
so the answer is that the mind as a whole will be real and unitary provided 
that the co-consciousness relation and its scope are real independently of our 
conceptualization. the cat will then have only one body not—or not primarily—
because of the way we conceptualize it, but because the one consciousness of 
the cat acts upon it as a single object. the cat does not have to manoeuvre a set 
of bodies, as if it were herding sheep. so the cat’s agency does for it something 
parallel to what our intelligent interaction with the world does for us. the same 
line of argument as the one applied to cats, applies to humans. and the individu-
ality or uniqueness of one’s body is the result of the fact that one thinks of it and 
acts upon it as a unity.
8. conclusion - anD beyonD.
We have seen that taking a conceptualist stand to most if not all non-basic on-
tologies makes intuitive sense and contributes towards solving several of the 
problems that worry contemporary analytic metaphysicians. but it comes at a 
cost, namely that the mind or mental states must be counted amongst the things 
that are basic and so this approach is not open to a standard physicalist. the 
thinking, conceptualizing subject must be amongst those things that are real in 
the strongest sense.
as a final thought I want to return to the final option that I offered above 
concerning degrees of realism, which was:
(iv) Conceptualism for everything we know and possibly for everything we are 
ever likely to know, or even are capable of knowing. how the world is in itself will 
always evade our grasp: we can only approximate its actual properties.
the discussion so far has been conducted within the scope of the assumption 
that we can be realists about the basic physical level. this idea is encouraged 
by our anachronistic but almost automatic assumption that classical atomism of 
some sort provides the model for the basic level. but we know that this is not re-
alistic and our failure to be able to model intuitively quantum reality—the best 
we can manage is as a blur of wave and particle—means that our strictly realistic 
representational ontology of the basic level is purely formal and mathematical. all 
the conceptual categories of our normal ontology, such as that of objects and 
even of discrete events, may be conceptual impositions on a reality that does not 
quite fit any of them in itself. the logical discipline of a strict realism may be 
attenuated for all the categories that we can apply to the external world.
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PETER VAN INWAGEN
“Who Sees Not that All the Dispute 
is About a Word?”: Some Thoughts 
on Bennett’s “Proxy ‘Actualism’”
this note is a defense of alvin plantinga’s “actualist” modal ontology against 
the criticisms brought against it by karen bennett in her (2006) paper “Proxy 
‘actualism’”1 (Familiarlity with both bennett’s paper and chapters IV-VIII of 
plantinga’s (1974) The Nature of Necessity is assumed.) 
What I will say in response to bennett’s criticisms of plantinga’s actualism is 
almost entirely a gloss on the following thesis: It is not essential to plantinga’s 
philosophy of modality that the word ‘actual’ (or any word formed from ‘actu-
al’—‘actually’, ‘actuality’ and so on) occur in its statement. I will defend this 
thesis in part I. having established that thesis (at least to my own satisfaction), 
I will, in part II, consider its consequences for bennett’s criticism of plantinga’s 
actualism. My conclusion will be that these criticisms fail, owing to the fact that 
they depend on the historical accident that the customary designation for plant-
inga’s position is “actualism”—that if this position had been given a name that 
did not contain ‘actual’ or any word formed from ‘actual’, the criticisms of the 
position that are presented in “proxy ‘actualism’” could not even be stated. Fi-
nally, in an appendix, I will discuss a puzzling statement that bennett has made 
about the properties plantinga calls individual essences.
I
I begin with a précis of plantinga’s modal ontology. this précis will be, I concede, 
terminologically tendentious in that it will contain no occurrences of the word ‘actu-
al’ (or of any word “based on” ‘actual’—‘actually’, ‘actuality’, etc.2). My position 
1  bennett also criticizes a version of actualism defended by bernard linsky and edward 
zalta. The present paper is a reply only to her criticisms of Plantinga.
2  In order to avoid using the adverb ‘actually’ in the précis of plantinga’s views that follows, 
I will use the adverbial phrase ‘in fact’ to perform a certain important function often per-
formed by that adverb. the function of ‘actually’ to which I allude is illustrated by the result 
of inserting the word into a famous sentence of russell’s: ‘I thought your yacht was longer 
70 CurrEnt IssuEs In MEtaphysICs 
is that this précis, tendentious though it may be, is an exact expression (in broad 
outline: much is left out) of the modal ontology presented in chapters IV-VIII of 
The Nature of Necessity. It is an exact statement of the core of plantinga’s modal 
ontology in an alternative vocabulary. It differs only verbally from plantinga’s own 
statement of his ontology in The Nature of Necessity. It presents the same ontology 
in (slightly) different words.
The Précis
there are states of affairs. 
states of affairs are abstract objects, like propositions. states of affairs and propo-
sitions are in fact closely connected. For each state of affairs there is a unique 
proposition that we may call its propositional analogue—and every proposition 
is the propositional analogue of one and only one state of affairs. For example, 
the propositional analogue of the state of affairs Napoleon’s having lost the Battle 
of Waterloo is the proposition that napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo. Indeed, 
the connection between a state of affairs and its propositional analogue is so inti-
mate that some—Chisholm (1970) among them—have identified them. (Every-
thing said in the present paper is consistent with the thesis that a state of affairs 
is identical with its propositional analogue.)
a state of affairs obtains just in the case that its propositional analogue is true. 
(and, therefore, some states of affairs obtain and some don’t—for, as I once 
heard plantinga remark, “some propositions are false. roughly half of them.”)
say that a state of affairs that obtains is obtentional and one that does not ob-
tain is non-obtentional.3 note that ‘obtentional’ applies only to states of affairs. 
Whatever may be the case with ‘actual’, there can no more be an obtentional 
human being or pig or neutron star than there can be a human being or pig or 
neutron star that has a cube root—or is true or false, in the sense in which propo-
sitions are true or false.
than it actually is’. the best explanation of this function is probably that in such cases ‘actu-
ally’ is being used as a scope-indicator. For example, we might paraphrase ‘I thought your 
yacht was longer than it actually is’ in this way: ‘Consider the length of your yacht; I thought 
your yacht had a length longer than that length’. (this use of the adverb ‘actually’ has a paral-
lel adjectival use: ‘I thought the length of your yacht was longer than its actual length’. the 
adjective can, however, be eliminated in favor of the adverb: ‘its actual length’ =df ‘the length 
it actually has’.) so instead of saying, e.g., ‘there could be things that do not actually exist,” I 
will say “there could be things that do not in fact exist” (that is: “Consider all the things that 
exist; there could be things other than those things”).
3  there really is such a word as ‘obtention’; the oED defines it as ‘the act of obtaining’. 
If a state of affairs is identical with its propositional analogue, obtentionality is just truth and 
non-obtentionality is just falsity.
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a state of affairs is possible just in the case that it is possible for it to obtain.
a state of affairs is impossible just in the case that it is impossible for it to obtain.
a state of affairs x includes a state of affairs y just in the case that it is impossible for 
x to obtain and y not to obtain. 
a state of affairs x precludes a state of affairs y just in the case that it is impossible 
for both x and y to obtain. 
a state of affairs is maximal just in the case that, for every state of affairs, it either 
includes or precludes that state of affairs.
a possible world (or simply a world) is a state of affairs that is both possible and 
maximal. 
We assume without argument that there are worlds—that there are states of 
affairs that are both possible and maximal. We further assume that at least one 
world obtains. since it is impossible for two maximal states of affairs to obtain, 
exactly one world obtains;4 we will call it the obtentional world. 
a thing exists in a world just in the case that it would exist5 if that world obtained. 
a thing has a property in a world just in the case that it would have that property if 
that world obtained.
a thing that does not exist is a contradiction in terms. (and so it is and must 
be, given the “account” of existence presented in footnote 5: since ‘x exists’ is 
equivalent to ‘something is identical with x’, a thing that does not exist would 
be a thing such that nothing was identical with that thing, and it is an easily 
proved theorem of standard quantifier logic with identity that there is nothing 
with which nothing is identical. and it is easy to see why: everything is identical 
with itself.) It follows immediately that a thing that could exist but does not exist—a 
“modal alien”, so to call it—is a contradiction in terms. 
4  Well, that’s not strictly true—not if there can be necessarily equivalent but distinct prop-
ositions, and hence necessarily equivalent but distinct states of affairs (as it may be, There being 
eight solar planets and The number of solar planets being the cube of the least prime). I owe this nice 
point to kenneth boyce—and propose churlishly to ignore it and to speak as if there were 
only one obtentional world. the nice point could be accommodated by replacing phrases 
like ‘in the obtentional world’ with universal quantifications; ‘in all obtentional worlds’, for 
example.
5  We understand ‘exist’ in the following way: ‘x exists’ is equivalent to ‘something is (iden-
tical with) x’ (and, therefore, ‘Fs exist’ is equivalent to ‘something is an F’). We assume that 
it follows from this definition of ‘exists’ that the word be applied univocally to things in any 
logical category or of any sort: to states of affairs, propositions, properties, human beings, pigs, 
neutron stars…
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let us give the name existentialism to the thesis that “modal alien” is a self-
contradictory concept6.
Existentialists do not, of course, deny that there could be things that do not 
in fact exist. as things stand, for example, there are no million-carat diamonds; 
there nevertheless could be or could have been million-carat diamonds. but that 
modal truth does not imply the falsity of existentialism, since it is (loosely 
speaking) equivalent to the statement that the properties “being a diamond” 
and “weighing 200 kilos” are mutually consistent, and that statement obviously 
does not imply that there are nonexistent things: it refers only to two existent 
things (two properties) and asserts that these two existent properties stand in 
a certain relation, to wit, mutual consistency. and statements “about possible 
existents” can always be paraphrased as statements about the relations that hold 
among existent properties. In some cases, however, such a paraphrase would 
have to appeal to some rather special properties. Imagine that someone issues 
this challenge to the existentialists:
It seems that if socrates had not existed, it would nevertheless have been true 
that it was possible for him to have existed. If that’s indeed the case, then there 
is a world w in which (a) socrates does not exist, and (b) socrates could have ex-
isted. granted: that there is such a world—such a possible state of affairs—does 
not follow from existentialism. but it does follow from the contingent existence of 
socrates and the symmetry of the accessibility relation. (If a world w in which soc-
rates does not exist is accessible from the obtentional world, then, by symmetry, a 
world in which socrates does exist—the obtentional world—is accessible from w. 
It follows that it’s true in w that socrates could have existed.) and the symmetry of 
the accessibility relation is a pretty intuitive thesis—certainly not a thesis that the 
existentialist is going to want to rule out by definition. but how will speakers in w 
say that socrates could have existed if in their world there’s no socrates for them to 
predicate possible existence of? 
one way for existentialists to meet this challenge would be by appeal to a spe-
cial property, a property that exists in all possible worlds and can be instantiated 
by and only by socrates. (We platonists say that every property exists in all pos-
sible worlds—including, of course, those in which it’s uninstantiated—and a fol-
lower of plantinga must be a platonist.) and there is at least one such property. 
(Depending on how one individuates properties, one may affirm the existence 
6  this is not what Plantinga means by ‘existentialism’—he in fact uses ‘existentialism’ as 
a name for a certain thesis he rejects—, much less what sartre meant by it. Call the thesis 
plantinga in fact called ‘existentialism’ (and which we shall not discuss) something else; ‘de-
pendentism’, perhaps. let ‘serious existentialism’ be the thesis that nothing is true of a thing 
x in worlds in which x does not exist—not even that it does not exist. (It is a matter of debate 
whether serious existentialism follows from existentialism.) 
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of one such property or of infinitely many such properties.) there is at least 
this property: the property of being socrates—socrateity for short7. (If plato and 
Crito see a figure coming through the mist on a foggy morning in athens, and 
Crito says, “Who’s that?” and plato replies, “that’s socrates,” plato ascribes 
socrateity to the figure coming through the mist. or so it seems reasonable to 
suppose.) 
this property, socrateity, is an individual essence (or simply an essence). “In-
dividual essence” may be defined as follows. We begin with two preliminary 
definitions:
The primary individual essence of a thing x (or simply the primary essence of x) is the 
property of being identical with x8.
a property is an individual essence of a thing x if and only if it is necessarily coexten-
sive with the primary essence of x.
and we define ‘individual essence’ in terms of ‘individual essence of’:
a property is an individual essence (simpliciter, full stop, period) if and only if it is 
possibly an individual essence of something.9
If the inhabitants of a world in which socrates does not exist want to say that 
socrates could have existed, they cannot, as we have said, do it by saying of him 
that he could have existed, since he’s not “there” to have that (or anything else) 
7  socrateity is indeed a property that could be instantiated by and only by socrates, but it 
has the property “could be instantiated by and only by socrates” only in worlds in which so-
crates exists. In a world in which socrates does not exist, socrateity and “could be instantiated 
by and only by socrates” are related as follows: the former does not have the latter, but it could 
have it—and only those properties with which it is necessarily coextensive could have it.
8  the phrase ‘the property of being identical with x’ is an open term, like ‘the mother of 
x’. It is, however, an intensional open term (unlike ‘the mother of x’). phrases of the form ‘the 
property of being identical with…’ are thus intensional contexts. if, therefore, we wish to 
apply universal or existential instantiation to a sentence containing, e.g. the open term ‘the 
property of being identical with z’, any singular term that replaces the variable z must be a 
proper name. thus, for example, ‘∃y y = the property of being identical with socrates’ comes 
from ‘∀x ∃y y = the property of being identical with x’ by uI, but ‘∃y y = the property of being 
identical with the inventor of bifocals’ does not come from ‘∀x ∃y y = the property of being 
identical with x’ by uI. and, of course, ‘∃y y = the property of being identical with the hus-
band of Xanthippe’ does not follow from ‘∃y y = the property of being identical with socrates’ 
and ‘socrates = the husband of Xanthippe’ by either leibniz’s law (the principle of the in-
discernibility of identicals) or euclid’s law (the principle of the substitutivity of identicals).
9  plantinga (1974, 72–77) gives several equivalent definitions of ‘individual essence’. the 
definition in the text is not one of plantinga’s definitions, but it is equivalent to each of 
them—and is much simpler than any of them.
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said of him. but socrateity is there to have things said of it, and they can say of 
it that it could have been instantiated.10
that is one way for existentialists to meet the challenge imagined above: by 
affirming the existence of individual essences. but there are other ways. the 
challenge can be met by affirming the existence of appropriate abstract objects 
of other sorts than properties. It can, for example, be met by an appeal to propo-
sitions like the proposition that socrates exists (a proposition that exists and is 
true in exactly those worlds in which socrates exists, and exists and is false in 
all other worlds11) or the proposition that socrates could exist (a proposition that 
exists and is true in all worlds). If there are such propositions as the proposition 
that socrates exists and the proposition that socrates could exist, then the inhab-
itants of a world in which socrates does not exist can say of the former that it is 
possibly true or say of the latter that it is true—or can simply assert the latter12. 
(again, there will be problems about how people could possibly have “referen-
tial access” or “cognitive access” to such propositions in worlds in which their 
subject-terms do not exist—but those problems are no worse than the problem 
the possibilists face in the matter of referential access to particular nonexistent 
individuals.) 
here endeth the précis. 
10  they can, that is, if they can manage to refer to it. that might indeed be difficult or im-
possible, for it is hard to see how one could refer to socrateity if socrateity existed but was un-
instantiated. but if that is a problem for existentialists, it is not a problem that they alone face: 
it is also a problem for possibilists—that is, for those who affirm the thesis that there are things 
that might exist (or might have existed) but do not in fact exist. More exactly, possibilists 
face a very similar problem, a problem that is “parallel to” or “analogous to” this problem, for 
possibilists will find it difficult to suppose that anyone is able refer to any given possible but 
nonexistent person. they will therefore find it difficult to suppose that any inhabitant of a 
world in which socrates does not exist (but might have existed) is able to refer to socrates. 
11  a serious existentialist must hold that propositions are necessarily existent.
12  We should, by the way, note that the proposition that socrates exists is the proposition 
that socrates exists only in those worlds in which it’s true (i.e., in which socrates exists). It of 
course exists in worlds in which it’s false (“of course” because it couldn’t be false in a world 
in which it didn’t exist—or so serious existentialists say) but in those worlds it doesn’t have 
the property “being the proposition that socrates exists.” (Cf. our earlier point about socrate-
ity and “could be instantiated by and only by socrates.”) In worlds in which the proposition 
that socrates exists does not have the property “being the proposition that socrates exists,” 
however, both the proposition and the property exist, and are related as follows: the former 
could have the latter, and it’s the only proposition that could have that property. (and this 
should make anyone’s head spin: in those worlds, that property—although it exists—isn’t the 
property of being the proposition that socrates exists.) 
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II
this was prologue. now the play. the “‘actual’-free” précis of plantinga’s theory 
was presented simply to provide a context for the following question:
how would one argue for the following thesis: a person who accepts all the above 
definitions and statements—the definitions and statements set out in the précis—is 
a mere proxy existentialist? (What, in point of fact, does the charge, “you’re a proxy 
existentialist” even mean?) 
It seems to me that the following two propositions are self-evidently true:
there is no way to argue for that thesis.
the charge “you’re a proxy existentialist” is meaningless. 
(these two propositions are, of course, closely connected: if a thesis is meaning-
less, there is no way to argue for it.) at any rate, I hope that they are self-evident, 
because I have no argument for either of them. If they are true, I contend, they 
constitute a strong argument for the following evaluation of bennett’s (2006) 
criticisms of plantinga in “proxy ‘actualism’”:
these criticisms depend essentially on a chapter of historical accidents—(verbal 
accidents): 
• Early informal discussions of the semantics of quantified modal logic (and the 
objects that made up its universe of discourse) used the terms ‘non-actual ob-
ject’ and ‘merely possible object’ to mean ‘object that exists only in non-actual 
worlds’.
• It was assumed in these discussions that an object that exists in some non-actual 
world w (and not in the actual world) and the world w itself were “non-actual” (or 
“merely possible”) in the same sense.
• at some point (c. 1980), the term ‘actualism’ began to be used as a name for the 
thesis that there are no non-actual/merely possible objects (robert m. adams 
was probably the first philosopher to use the word in that sense13). at about the 
13  here is an illuminating historical note, kindly supplied by professor adams:
“I did say, »actualism is the doctrine that there are no things that do not exist in the actual 
world« (adams 1981, 7).  as far as I know, I may have been the first person to define ‘actual-
ism’ in that way.  and whether I was or not, that was the first place in which I did so.  as I 
think you know, I now regard it as a mistake (indeed, an aberration) that I did so.  I had given 
a more careful definition previously: »actualism, with respect to possible worlds, is the view 
that if there are any true statements in which there are said to be non-actual possible worlds, 
they must be reducible to statements in which the only things there are said to be are things 
which there are in the actual world and which are not identical with non-actual possibles.« on 
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same time, the term ‘possibilism’ came into use as a name for the thesis that 
there are non-actual/merely possible objects.
If, instead of the irrational terminological jumble14 these accidents left us with, 
philosophers discussing quantified modal logic and the ontological problems 
it posed had resolutely applied ‘actual’ and ‘non-actual’ and ‘merely possible’ 
only to abstract objects (such as possible worlds) and, instead of, e.g., ‘non-actual 
pig’/‘merely possible pig’ had said ‘pig that does not exist but could have existed’ 
and had used ‘existentialism’ instead of ‘actualism’, and, instead of ‘possibilism’, 
some term like ‘anti-existentialism’ or ‘neo-Meinongian possibilism’15, then
(a) the real metaphysical and ontological problems posed by quantified modal 
logic (and the informal modal discourse of which quantified modal logic is a regi-
mentation) would be exactly as they in fact are,
and
(b) the verbal confusions that have resulted from the above-listed historical acci-
dents—and the unreal metaphysical and ontological problems that have resulted 
from the confusions—would never have existed.
Appendix: The relation between concrete objects and their essences
bennett (2006, 287) says that she doesn’t see much difference between an ob-
ject and its individual essence:
this understanding, it is only »if the notion of possible worlds is to be regarded as primitive,« 
that »the actualist will not agree that there are nonactual possible worlds« (adams 1974, 224). 
D. C. Williams, in his (1959) article »Mind as a Matter of Fact« had used the word ‘actualism’ 
before I did, in a related sense, but I think not exactly the same as my sense in either of those 
essays.”
14  The question of the role played by David lewis’s “genuine modal realism” (lewis’s 
statements of genuine modal realism involve a wholly idiosyncratic use of ‘actual’) in creating 
this jumble raises some very complicated issues. i will not discuss lewis’s view here.
15  “neo-Meinongians” (terence parsons, for example), unlike Meinong himself and other 
paleo-Meinongians, do not hold that, e.g. a nonexistent pig has no sort of being whatever: 
they think that there are nonexistent pigs. but neo-Meinongians affirm the being of not only 
nonexistent pigs but impossible pigs, pigs that are nonexistent precisely because they have in-
consistent (or incomplete) sets of properties. by a neo-Meinongian possibilist, I mean someone 
who affirms the being of nonexistent things, but only of such nonexistents that have complete 
and consistent sets of properties.
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perhaps there is a lot of ontological difference between things like the Eiffel tow-
er and properties like being made of metal. bu… there is not that much ontological 
difference between things like the Eiffel tower and properties like being the Eiffel 
Tower.
I think that this statement has to be the result of a confusion of some sort. the 
Eiffel tower is a concrete thing, a physical object, an artifact, an edifice, a 
structure. you can poke it with a stick. the property being the Eiffel Tower is an 
abstract object, and it is as immune to stick-poking as a proposition or a com-
plex number or the middle of next week. and not only can physical objects be 
poked, but they can also fail to exist—whereas abstract objects exist in all pos-
sible worlds (or so we platonists say). perhaps the confusion has something to do 
with the fact that ‘the property being the Eiffel Tower’, although it is the name of a 
property, an abstract object, is formed from a proper name of the concrete object 
that instantiates it. let’s look at a case of an individual essence that isn’t of that 
sort—an essence that is not what I have called a primary essence. 
I could, in principle, consider a non-primary essence of the Eiffel tower, but 
to do that would place unwise demands on the patience of my readers, owing to 
the structural complexity of the Eiffel tower. It will save us all a lot of time if 
i consider a non-primary essence of a much simpler artifact. let us say: a table 
formed by placing a board on a stump16. Which properties of an artifact one sup-
poses are essential to it—and, therefore, which of its properties one supposes are 
among its individual essences—will depend on one’s metaphysics of artifacts. 
(and one’s metaphysics of artifacts will presumably depend in its turn on one’s 
general metaphysics of composite material objects). My own metaphysics of ar-
tifacts is not going to be of much use in this case, since it can be summed up in 
the statement that there are none. I’ll therefore invent a metaphysics of artifacts 
that will imply the existence of both my simple table and the Eiffel tower. I’ll 
“construct” a property that anyone who accepted my imaginary metaphysics 
of artifacts should concede was an essence (and a non-primary essence) of the 
table. I think that this property I shall construct will suffice for an illustrative ex-
ample of a non-primary essence of an artifact, despite the fact that this property 
is an essence of the table only given a certain metaphysics of artifacts that few if 
any philosophers would accept.
16  “let us picture to ourselves a very simple table, improvised from a stump and a board. 
now one might have constructed a very similar table by using the same stump and a different 
board, or by using the same board and a different stump. but the only way of constructing 
precisely that table is to use that particular stump and that particular board. It would seem, 
therefore, that that particular table is necessarily made up of that particular stump and that 
particular board” (Chisholm 1973, 583).
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our imaginary metaphysics of artifacts consists in the logical consequences of 
two assumptions.
assume, first, that Contact is the correct answer to the special Composition 
Question17:
Contact
necessarily: for all y the xs compose y if and only if no two of the xs overlap spatially 
and any two of the xs are in ancestral contact.
(Where ‘x and y are in ancestral contact’ expresses the ancestral of the relation 
expressed by ‘x and y are in contact’.) 
assume, secondly, that the following thesis about the modal status of the rela-
tion between an artifact and certain of its parts is true: 
strong artifactual Composition
necessarily: If an artifact x is a fusion of certain non-overlapping artifact-parts the 
ys, and if the ys are arranged in manner M, then, (i) in every world in which x exists, 
x is a fusion of the ys arranged in manner M and (ii) anything in any world that is a 
fusion of the ys arranged in manner M is x. 
I explain the terms of art that occur in this statement of strong artifactual Com-
position as follows:
(a) an artifact-part of an artifact is any part of that artifact that was intentionally 
manipulated in the course of the construction of the artifact by its maker(s). 
the statement of strong artifactual Composition presupposes that for every 
“artifact” there are non-overlapping artifact-parts, the ys, such that that artifact 
is a fusion of the ys—that is: the ys are all parts of that artifact and every part of 
the artifact overlaps some of the ys. (It follows from this assumption that neither 
a statue cast from molten bronze nor a statue made by chipping away at a block 
of marble is an “artifact”. let’s assume that in the present discussion ‘artifact’ 
is a term of art, and that it applies only to things that were put together by a 
procedure that involved their “assembly” out of smaller, pre-existent objects. 
our table is an artifact in this sense, and I see no objection to supposing that the 
Eiffel tower is as well.)
17  see van Inwagen (1990) §§2 and 3. the ys compose x (at t) just in the case x is a fusion or 
mereological sum of the ys (at t) and no two of the ys overlap (mereologically). ‘y is composed 
of the xs’ is a stylistic variant on ‘the xs compose y’.
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(b) to specify the manner in which the members of a certain collection of non-
overlapping artifact-parts are arranged is to specify which of them are in contact 
with one another, and at what points and regions on their surfaces.) 
now let a Chisholm Table be a table that has been formed by placing a board 
on a stump. (Contact implies that placing a board on a stump will bring a fusion 
of the board and the stump into existence.) suppose we have a Chisholm table 
before us. let ‘mensa’ be a proper name of the table, ‘Tabula’ a proper name of 
the board, and ‘Truncus’ a proper name of the stump. let ‘a’ be a proper name 
of the part of the surface of tabula that is in contact with truncus, and let ‘b’ 
be a proper name of the part of the surface of truncus that is in contact with 
tabula.
Mensa has the following property (truncotabularity): 
being a thing x such that tabula is a part of x and truncus is a part of x and every 
part of x overlaps either tabula or truncus and a is the part of the surface of 
tabula that is in contact with truncus and b is the part of the surface of truncus 
that is in contact with tabula.
strong artifactual Composition implies that truncotabularity is an individual es-
sence of Mensa. (We could in principle write out the name of an analogous 
essence of the Eiffel tower. It would be rather long, of course.) now consider 
a world (“nomensa”) in which tabula and truncus both exist (and have the 
intrinsic properties they have in fact) and Mensa does not exist.18 Inhabit-
ants of nomensa have the semantical resources to assert that it is possible 
for Mensa to exist, and they have these resources despite the fact that in no-
mensa Mensa is not “there” to have possible existence ascribed to it—for they 
are able to refer to truncotabularity (they can refer to it by using the offset 
expression above) and to predicate possible instantiation of that property19. 
that is to say, they can assert the possible existence of Mensa by saying that 
truncotabularity (which is necessarily coextensive with the property that we 
in the obtentional world call Mensahood or Mensaity or the property of being 
identical with Mensa) was possibly instantiated—that is, was possibly a prop-
erty that something had. 
18  some of these worlds are very “close” to the obtentional world; consider, for example, 
a world in which—although they are never in contact (or are never in contact in the exactly 
the way in which they are in contact in the obtentional world)—tabula and truncus are near 
each other and it would be an easy matter for someone to place tabula on truncus in exactly 
the manner in which tabula is placed on truncus in the obtentional world.
19  In that respect, truncotabularity is unlike socrateity or any of socrates’ other essences, 
which, it would seem, human beings are unable to refer to in worlds in which socrates does 
not exist.
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one way to assert the possible existence of Mensa in nomensa, therefore, 
is to assert of a certain individual essence (an essence that in worlds in which 
Mensa exists is an individual essence of Mensa) that it is possibly instantiated.20 
thomas Jager’s (1982) “actualist” semantics for quantified modal logic exploits 
this fact.21 In an obvious sense, “Jager semantics” does utilize uninstantiated 
essences as replacements or proxies for “non-actual” objects. and “non-actual” 
objects certainly require replacements, owing to the fact that ‘non-actual object’ 
is either meaningless or means ‘(possibly existent but) nonexistent object’—and 
there are no (and could not possibly be any) nonexistent objects. there is there-
fore an obvious sense in which the property being identical with the Eiffel Tower 
“does duty for” the Eiffel tower in Jager semantics: the modal ontology that the 
semantics presupposes does not affirm that, although the Eiffel tower is (that 
is, has being) in all possible worlds, it is existent in some of them and nonexist-
ent in all the others; it affirms, rather, that, although the property being identical 
with the Eiffel Tower is (and exists) in all possible worlds, it is instantiated in some 
of them and uninstantiated in all the others.
but why would someone, upon reflecting on a semantics in which uninstanti-
ated essences do duty for nonexistent objects, react to it by saying, “there is 
not that much ontological difference between things like the Eiffel tower and 
properties like being the Eiffel Tower?” If that statement were true, there would 
not be that much ontological difference between Mensa and the property being 
Mensa (“Mensaity” for short). that is, there would not be that much ontologi-
cal difference between Mensa and the primary essence that is necessarily co-
instantiated with truncotabularity. and can’t one refute that thesis simply by 
pointing out that while hardly any possible worlds contain Mensa, Mensaity is 
present in all of them?—and that, therefore, in a world in which Mensa is not 
present to have possible existence or possible location in alabama predicated of 
it, Mensaity is present to have possible instantiation or possible co-instantiation 
with “being located in alabama” predicated of it? (of course, that’s not the only 
important ontological difference between Mensa and Mensaity. after all, Mensa 
is a concrete physical thing, and Mensaity is an abstract object. and one can set 
20  It is perhaps worth noting that there are other ways to assert the possible existence of 
Mensa in nomensa than by ascribing possible instantiation to an essence (or possible truth 
to a proposition like ‘a truncotabular thing exists’). For example, an inhabitant of nomensa 
might assert the possible existence of Mensa simply by saying “It is possible to place tabula 
on truncus in such a way that a is the part of the surface of tabula that is in contact with 
truncus and b is the part of the surface of truncus that is in contact with tabula.” If Con-
tact and strong artifactual Composition are both true, that sentence expresses a proposition 
that is necessarily equivalent to the proposition that the sentence ‘Mensa possibly exists’ 
expresses in the obtentional world. 
21  see also plantinga (1974, 123–132).
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things down on concrete physical things and one can’t set things down on ab-
stract objects: If you want to have a picnic, and the closest thing to a picnic table 
available to you is Mensaity, you’re out of luck.)22
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Against Sainsbury’s Irrealism 
About Fictional Characters: Harry Potter 
as an Abstract Artifact
our commonsense ontology includes ordinary objects like cups, saucers, tea 
kettles and jars of honey; buildings like the big ben; people alive today, like the 
novelist J.k. rowling. We consider them part of our reality. We are common-
sense realists about objects like cups, saucers, the big ben and J.k. rowling. on 
the face of it, this is a fairly strong reason to include such objects in the ontol-
ogy we posit. What about fictional characters like harry potter? our intuitions 
pull us in opposite directions. on the one hand, clearly, harry potter—unlike 
the big ben—doesn’t exist, for if we inventoried the objects and people exist-
ing today (or that ever existed), harry potter wouldn’t be among them. on the 
other hand, we want to say the character didn’t exist prior to the 1990s, before 
J. k. rowling thought up the novels, but through her imagination and autho-
rial intent to create a fictional world filled with fictional heroes and villains, she 
brought harry, Dumbledore and a host of other fictional characters into existence. 
In other words, at first blush, intuitions about authorial creation support includ-
ing fictional characters in our reality, while our commonsense ontology speaks 
against realism about fictional characters. 
In this paper, I will explore arguments for and against one form of realism 
about fictional characters: abstract artifact theory about fictional characters (‘ar-
tifactualism’ for short), the view according to which fictional characters are part 
of our reality, but (unlike concrete entities like the big ben and J. k. rowling), 
they are abstract objects created by humans, akin to the institution of marriage 
and the game of soccer. I shall defend this view against an objection that Mark 
sainsbury (2010) considers decisive against artifactualism: “When we think 
about fictional entities, we do not think of them as abstract. authors, who 
ought to know, would fiercely resist the suggestion that they are abstract. ab-
stract artifact theory entails that producers and consumers of fiction are sunk 
in error” (111). In other words, artifactualism attributes to people who produce 
and process sentences and thoughts about harry potter massive error, indeed, 
a category mistake about what kind of thing harry potter is. For an abstract 
object (such as the institution of marriage) isn’t the sort of thing that can wear 
84 CurrEnt IssuEs In MEtaphysICs 
glasses, ride a double-decker bus, attend school. I shall call this the category-
mistake objection. 
In section 1, I will distinguish artifactualism from various other forms of real-
ism about fictional characters, and from the position of irrealism about the likes 
of harry potter, a view according to which fictional characters don’t exist; only 
the works of fiction portraying them do. In section 2, I will explore one general 
and powerful argument for favoring artifactualism over other realist alternatives: 
it can successfully account for authors creating fictional characters. In section 3, 
I will consider and deflect the category-mistake objection, which, according to 
sainsbury, gives an edge to irrealism over artifactualism. artifactualism, I shall 
conclude (in section 4), remains a tenable contender. 
1. realisT anD irrealisT PosiTions abouT Harry PoTTer
We may, along with Mark sainsbury (2010, 44–114), distinguish three realist al-
ternatives about fictional characters: there really are such things just as there are 
ordinary concrete objects occupying space and time; but unlike those ordinary 
objects like cups, saucers and the big ben, …
fictional characters • don’t exist, according to Meinongianism about fictional 
characters;1 
fictional characters • are not actual but merely possible, according to 
nonactualism;2 and 
fictional characters • are not concrete but abstract, created by the activities of 
authors according to artifactualism.3
1  For brevity’s sake, I’ll suppress the qualification ‘about fictional characters’ and will 
simply talk of realism, irrealism, Meinongianism, nonactualism, artifactualism, platonism. 
Whenever these labels appear unqualified, they are shorthand for theories about fictional 
characters.
parsons (1980) is a contemporary proponent of alexius Meinong’s (1904) eponymous the-
ory. 
2  lewis (1978) put forth such a view. This position is sometimes called possibilism about 
fictional characters. see also kripke’s earlier (1963) view about sherlock Holmes.
3  kripke (1973), searle (1974/1979), van inwagen (1977), Fine (1982), schiffer (1996), 
salmon (1998), thomasson (1999) are prominent proponents who hold that authors’ creative 
process of writing novels, stories, etc. creates fictional characters. this position is sometimes 
called creationism about fictional characters. 
there is a position in logical space for holding that fictional characters are abstract but 
exist timelessly, and authors don’t create but discover them—we might call such a view pla-
tonism about fictional characters. zalta’s (1983) unorthodox neo-Meinongian proposal can be 
considered an instance of such an account. the only kind of abstract-object theory I will con-
sider in this paper is artifactualism, given the overwhelming popularity and attention that this 
position has been enjoying (compared to platonism), as well as the advantages that I think it 
has over rival theories (platonism included) precisely because it treats fictional characters as 
human-created objects. 
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one of the chief motivations for Meinongianism is this: plausibly, there are 
many things that don’t exist, things that, while nonexistent, are the objects of 
our thought and imagination. harry potter is one of them, as is the batch of 
vanilla pudding I considered cooking up this afternoon (from a specific packet 
of pudding and batch of milk and sugar), but never got around to it. a similar 
motivation drives the nonactualist position: the range of things that are possible 
extends beyond things that are actual: the pudding I might have cooked this 
afternoon is a nonactual, merely possible object; as is harry potter. 
the artifactualist position raises the intricate issue of deciding what exactly 
the abstract/concrete distinction consists in. The assumption so far has been that 
abstract objects (unlike concrete ones) don’t occupy space and time. another 
option is that abstract objects (unlike concrete ones) lack causal powers. a third 
option is to identify paradigmatic examples of concrete and of abstract objects 
in order to illuminate the distinction.4 I won’t dwell on these options here, be-
cause the ways in which the abstract/concrete distinction is traditionally drawn 
are called into question precisely in the light of abstract object created by human 
activity, abstract artifacts, that is—for example, the institution of marriage and 
the game of chess.5 
Instead of defining the categories of abstract versus concrete, I will there-
fore take as my point of departure a broad and fairly uncontroversial range of 
examples for both concrete and abstract objects. Concrete objects clearly in-
clude things like cups, saucers, actual batches of pudding, the big ben, J. k. 
rowling. Many of those who posit abstract objects count among them numbers, 
sets, propositions and properties like being tall and being human. those who 
consider these abstract objects agree that typically,6 they are timelessly existing 
abstract objects that are mind-independent in the following sense: their existence at 
a time t is independent of any mental activity at t. 
4  For an overview of these and other ways of drawing the abstract/concrete distinction, see 
rosen (2012). 
5  see rosen (2012) and Fine (1982, 130–131) motivating the claim that there should be 
room for abstract objects that come into existence contingently: 
…what underlies the platonist’s position is a certain ontological prejudice. … These 
philosophers suppose … that certain features should go together, so that the same enti-
ties will be material, will exist in space and time, will exist contingently, etc., and the 
same entities will be immaterial, not exist in space and time, be necessarily existent, 
etc. now although paradigmatic cases of concrete and abstract objects may have exactly 
the features from one or other of these groups, it must be recognized that there are 
objects of intermediate status that share features from both.
6  barring exceptions like the singleton set of my red mental image upon spotting a straw-
berry. there are various ways to go on the status of such sets: we could conclude that not all 
sets are abstract after all or that the notion of mind-independence at work should be revised 
to allow such sets to be abstract (see rosen 2012).  
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there is, however, another type of abstract object one might posit: abstract 
artifacts. notice that an abstract artifact like the game of chess does have tem-
poral features, after all: the game of chess didn’t exist before 1000 a.D. and has 
been in existence for several centuries (but beyond that, there is disagreement). 
nonetheless, an abstract artifact would still be mind-independent in the above 
sense: the game of chess can exist at a time without anyone having any chess-
related mental activity at that time. It’s worth giving a variety of examples of 
abstract artifacts:
the games of soccer and chess; the chess move of castling;• 
the institution of marriage and the office of prime minister; • 
religions like anglicanism or buddhism; • 
traditions like Mardi gras and Easter celebrations; • 
more specific traditions like the new orleans Mardi gras festival and the • 
Village halloween parade in new york City;
the tradition of the Easter bunny and its australian marsupial counterpart, • 
the Easter bilby;
recipes for preparing treacle pudding and beef Wellington;• 
the letters of the alphabet (‘a’, ‘z’, etc.);• 
brands like twinings, twix and Mini Cooper;• 
words and names of a language, including fairly recent additions like ‘neti-• 
quette’ (rules governing polite behavior in interactions on the internet) and 
‘cot potato’ (for a small child spending a lot of time in front of the tV set, 
that is, a very young couch potato); also the first name ‘Dweezil’ for boys, 
coined by Frank zappa; 
musical works like Mozart’s serenade • A Little Night Music and opera The 
Magic Flute;
literary works like the seven Harry Potter novels written by J. k. rowling.• 
We thus have a long and varied list of candidates for abstract social and cul-
tural (legal, artistic, religious, linguistic etc.) artifacts among which it is natural 
to make room for fictional characters like harry potter also—the defender of 
artifactualism suggests. 
alternatively, a fourth option is to forgo realism about fictional characters, 
opting for irrealism, which denies all forms of ontological commitment to fic-
tional entities.7 Irrealism proposes to analyze sentences like (1)-(8) below with 
the help of an ontology that is committed only to the existence of works of fic-
tion: novels, films, and so on: 
7  sainsbury (2010) favors this view, as does Walton (1990).
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(1) harry potter doesn’t exist. 
(2) “harry had a thin face, knobbly knees, black hair, bright green eyes. he wore 
round glasses held together with a lot of scotch tape…”8 
(3) “From his first days at hogwarts, the young, green-eyed boy bore the bur-
den of his destiny as a leader, coping with the expectations and duties of his 
role…”9 
(4) harry potter is a fictional character.
(5) Harry Potter was created by J.k. rowling.
(6) stephen king thinks about Harry Potter.10
(7) harry potter is more famous than sparrowhawk (the wizard of Earthsea).11
(8) harry potter is not as reckless as sparrowhawk. 
(I have included (1) here in order to have a complete list of the types of sen-
tences that the various theories about fictional characters have to account for. of 
course, capturing the truth of (1) is easy for an irrealist and tricky for realists. I 
won’t discuss realists’ proposals for analyzing (1) in this paper.) 
(2)-(8), when taken at face value, seem to accrue ontological commitment to 
characters from fiction, and therefore provide prima facie evidence for one or an-
other of the realist positions. It is well to note that (2), (3) and (8) form a separate 
group on this list: it isn’t literally true that harry potter had knobbly knees, wore 
glasses etc.; it’s true according to the harry potter fiction, but if we enumerate 
all those who wear glasses, stephen king and the rest, Harry wouldn’t be on the 
list. (2) is quoted from one of the harry potter novels. (3) discusses the content 
of another harry potter novel; (8) compares the content of two works of fiction; 
we can call (2), (3) and (8) fiction-internal sentences put forth by authors, read-
ers (including critics). as before, we can say that it isn’t literally true that harry 
potter is a young green-eyed boy who bore the burden of his destiny as a leader. 
and it isn’t literally true that sparrowhawk is more reckless than potter. It is 
therefore unclear just how great a challenge (2), (3) and (8) pose for irrealism. 
the irrealist might argue that though each is literally false, they can be replaced, 
respectively, by the true (2’), (3’) and (8’), hence their true ring:
8  From Volume 1: Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone, page 20.
9  The literary critic michiko kakutami wrote this in her review of volume 7 in The New 
york Times, “For Harry Potter, Good old-fashioned closure”, 07/04/2007.
10  stephen king has been a major fan of Harry Potter and a defender of the Harry Potter 
series against criticism from literary theorists.
11  ursula k. le Guin began writing her now-classic series of fantasy novels and short stories 
about Earthsea in the 1960s; they feature sparrowhawk, a young orphaned boy who discovers 
he has magic powers.  
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(2') according to the first harry potter novel, potter had a thin face, knobbly 
knees, black hair, bright green eyes, wore round glasses held together with 
scotch tape. 
(3') according to the seven harry potter novels, harry potter was a young, green-
eyed boy who, from his first days at hogwarts, bore the burden of his des-
tiny as a leader, coping with the expectations and duties of his role.
(8') according to the harry potter and Earthsea fiction series, potter is not as 
reckless as sparrowhawk. 
(4)–(7) are more complicated, however: they aren’t just true according to a body 
of fiction; they appear to be literally true sentences that authors, readers and 
critics might assert about fictional characters features in fictional works, akin to 
statements like ‘stephen king wears glasses’, and ‘stephen king prefers base-
ball to soccer’. We can call (4)–(7) fiction-external sentences put forth by authors, 
readers and critics.
the success of irrealism therefore hinges on how compelling, systematic, and 
general its non-face-value treatment of the various problem sentences is, es-
pecially the literally true (4)–(7).12 the irrealist might analyze these in turn as 
follows:13
(4') there exists a body of fiction according to which harry potter is a specific 
character. 
(5') J.k. rowling wrote a body of fiction according to which Harry Potter is a 
specific character.
(6') For some property P, stephen king entertains a propositional attitude with 
the content that harry potter has P.14
(7') More people think about harry potter than about sparrowhawk.
We can analyze ‘think about’ further based on (6'):
(7'') there are more people who entertain propositional attitudes with the con-
tent that harry potter has P for some property P, than there are people who 
entertain propositional attitudes with the content that sparrowhawk has Q 
for some property Q.15
12  van Inwagen (for example, 1977, 2000) argues that there is no systematic way to provide 
irrealist paraphrases for the problem sentences (4)–(7). For ways that an irrealist might re-
spond, see brock (2002), Caplan (2004).
13  see sainsbury (2010, 115–151); for some of these examples, his preferred analysis is dif-
ferent than the one listed here.
14  I follow sainsbury in assuming that an irrealist can readily account for a name like ‘harry 
potter’ occurring in a propositional attitude context. 
15  the properties P and Q may vary from one person to the next. 
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so far, we have considered four proposals about the nature of fictional charac-
ters: irrealism, and three realist positions—Meinongianism, nonactualism and 
artifactualism. of these, the nonactualist position relies on a notion of possibility 
and actuality, which are usually cashed out by reference to possible worlds and 
the actual world; to understand this position better, it is crucial to enumerate 
briefly the various stances one might adopt with respect to the nature of possible 
worlds. according to the nonactualist, harry potter is a merely possible object 
who has a thin face, round glasses, knobbly knees, etc.; so (1) is analyzed as: 
(2") there is a nonactual possible world in which harry potter has a thin face, 
knobbly knees, black hair, bright green eyes, wears round glasses held together 
with scotch tape.
sainsbury points out that nonactualism incurs a commitment about the meta-
physics of possible worlds. “nonactualists wish to locate [fictional] objects in 
possible worlds; so they need to be realists about possible worlds” (sainsbury 
2010, 74). there are two major classes of realist views on offer about the meta-
physics of possible worlds: 
extreme realism about possible worlds, • pw-realism for short, has it that the 
actual world is one among a plurality of possible worlds that are causally 
and spatiotemporally isolated from one another.16 this view takes (2") at 
face value.17 
ersatz realism about possible worlds, • pw-ersatzism for short, has it that a 
possible world is abstract, for example, a maximally consistent set of propo-
sitions representing a way the world could be;18 this yields the following 
analysis of (2): 
(2"') there is something abstract, a set of (maximally consistent) propositions 
representing harry potter as having a thin face, knobbly knees, black hair, bright 
green eyes, wearing round glasses held together with scotch tape.
16  For a long time, lewis (1973, 1986) remained the lone proponent of pw-realism. 
17  there is a problem, however (sainsbury 2010, 85–87): in the novels, harry potter’s isn’t 
given a complete description, down to his last detail about sock color; potter is thus incom-
plete. but all possible objects are complete (they have the same ontological status we do, it’s 
just that some of them are nonactual, inhabiting merely possible worlds). one of the more 
tenable options for the nonactualist is to relate the incomplete harry potter to various pos-
sible objects—potter-surrogates—that have all the properties that the novels ascribe to pot-
ter, but are complete (down to the last detail about sock color). given that on this option, the 
nonactualist has to quantify over potter-surrogates to account for (2), she cannot take (2") at 
face value in the end. 
18  pw-ersatzism has had many proponents. adams (1974) held this particular, proposition-
based version of pw-ersatzism. 
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sainsbury (2010, 222, fn. 8) points out that pw-ersatzism collapses into a view 
according to which fictional characters are abstract objects (in our case: a repre-
sentation comprising propositions about harry potter, for example). “For then 
the true metaphysical nature of a supposedly nonactual fictional character is 
actual”: an actual set of propositions. It is only in conjunction with pw-realism 
that nonactualism offers a distinct alternative to a theory like artifactualism, ac-
cording to which harry potter is abstract.
nonactualism therefore comes in a package bundled with pw-realism, a con-
troversial proposal. In addition, we are considering two other realist contend-
ers—Meinongianism and artifactualism. analyzing negative existential claims 
like (1) poses a challenge to all of these views. accounting for (2)–(8) poses 
various degrees of difficulty to the realist contenders. let us now turn to how 
much weight (5) carries, and more generally, how important it is to maintain, as 
artifactualism does, that authors create fictional characters.
2. THe imPorTance oF auTHorial creaTion
Why insist that authors create fictional characters? It does seem natural to 
say (5):
(5) Harry Potter was created by J. k. rowling. 
artifactualism, positing Harry Potter as an artifact created by J. k. rowling, 
takes (5) at face value. but we have already seen that this is not our only option; 
we could also accept an irrealist analysis of (5) that doesn’t take it at face value: 
“J. k. rowling wrote a body of fiction in which Harry Potter is a specific char-
acter”. Quite independently of irrealism, several philosophers have had serious 
qualms about taking (5) at face value: brock (2010, 338) sets out to “explain why 
creationism about fictional characters [the view that fictional characters exist by 
being created by their author(s)] is an abject failure. It suffers from the same 
problem as theological creationism: the purported explanation is more mysteri-
ous than the data it seeks to explain” because it cannot offer a satisfactory ac-
count of the spatial and temporal dimensions of fictional characters, for example, 
their moment of creation. yagisawa (2001, 154) argues that the most influential 
creationist views (by searle and van Inwagen) “are ultimately unsuccessful in 
establishing creationism”; more generally, he thinks no view on which fictional 
characters exist can do justice to our intuition that a claim like “harry potter 
doesn’t exist” is true and is entailed by the true “harry potter is a fictional char-
acter”. In the light of such doubts about creationism, it is worth homing in on 
an argument for artifactualism (a form of creationism), showing that it is the best 
zsóFia zvolenszky: aGainsT sainsbury’s irrealism abouT FicTional cHaracTers  91
form of realism one could adopt precisely because it incorporates authorial creation.19 
the goal of this section is to expound such an argument.
how might the various forms of realism handle (5)? on this point, artifactual-
ism shows a clear edge relative to its two rivals. a negligible point of advantage 
is that according to neither rival theories is potter created—going from nonexist-
ent to existent. according to the Meinongian, potter isn’t created—brought into 
existence—because he doesn’t exist (he just is). and according to the nonac-
tualist, potter had existed all along as a merely possible object and continues 
to exist as a merely possible object after the novels are written. according to 
sainsbury (2010, 61–63, 82–85), the real advantage of artifactualism concerns 
its response to the so-called selection problem: upon introducing the name ‘harry 
Potter’ in her novel, how does J.k. rowling manage to select one rather than 
another among the countless candidate objects? according to Meinongianism, 
there are countless nonexistent candidates; according to nonactualism, there are 
countless merely possible, nonactual candidates. sainsbury (2010, 63) doesn’t 
see “how a Meinongian can offer any sensible account of how an author’s or 
reader’s thoughts are supposed to engage with one rather than another nonexist-
ent entity”. We are about to see that a more decisive objection emerges against 
the Meinongian once we consider the difficulties that the nonactualist encoun-
ters when it comes to the selection problem and other problems. 
In the “addenda” to his “naming and necessity” lectures, kripke (1972, 
156–7) motivates two theses for expressions like ‘unicorn’ and ‘harry potter’:
the • metaphysical thesis: there is no basis for counting any merely possible 
object as harry potter, sherlock holmes, a unicorn, etc. 
the • epistemological thesis: there is no basis for counting any actual object as 
harry potter, sherlock holmes, a unicorn, etc. 
in the metaphysical thesis, kripke’s target seems to be the nonactualist. at the 
end of this section, we will see, however, that both theses bear on Meinong-
ianism also. along the way, we will also see that the two arguments are at root 
intimately connected. 
behind the metaphysical thesis is what we might call the insufficient-specificity 
problem.20 the harry potter novels specify many details about harry; but they 
19  an argument for fictional characters as objects created by people is noteworthy in the 
light of brock’s (2010, 340–342) criticism. he calls this the Fundamental thesis: “Fictional 
characters, to the extent that there are any, are genuinely created by the authors of the works 
in which their names (or designating descriptions) first appear.” brock then remarks that “ar-
guments in support of the fundamental thesis are almost completely lacking”. In this section, 
I set out to produce precisely this sort of argument. 
20  kaplan also emphasizes insufficient specificity as an obstacle to naming nonexistents 
(1973, 506; 1989, 609).
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also leave a lot of other details unspecified, for example, which of various paren-
tal cells harry came from. Due to such lack of specificity in the novels, we have 
no basis for deciding between two distinct merely possible candidates (they 
originate from distinct sperms, say) that are just like harry is described in the 
novels, which of them is harry potter. notice that it is in part due to insufficient 
specificity in the novels that sainsbury’s selection problem arises—for the Mei-
nongian as well as the nonactualist. 
the epistemological thesis turns out to generate an even deeper problem 
for the nonactualist, one that we shall see (at the end of this section) affects the 
Meinongian also. behind the epistemological thesis is what we might call the 
coincidental-resemblance problem, which kripke discusses in connection with the 
mythical species of unicorn: 
…the mere discovery of animals with the properties attributed to unicorns in the 
myth would be no means to show that these were the animals the myth was about: 
perhaps the myth was spun out of whole cloth and the fact that animals with the 
same appearance actually existed was mere coincidence. In that case, we cannot 
say that the unicorns of the myth really existed; we must also establish a histori-
cal connection that shows that the myth is about these animals. (kripke 1972, 157, 
emphasis in the original)
kripke is making two points here: even if we find animals qualitatively like the 
unicorns of the myth, that wouldn’t justify counting them as unicorns given 
(i) the lack of historical connection between the newly found species and the 
use of the expression ‘unicorn’; and given that (ii) the unicorn myth was “spun 
out of whole cloth”, not created in the right way, to make the term apply to 
the newly found species. the upshot of (i) and (ii): we would have no more 
than mere qualitative coincidence between unicorns as described in the myth 
and the actual species discovered. and for a proper name, reference takes more 
than coincidental resemblance, so we don’t have any candidate actual objects to 
count as unicorns.21
In the case of the expression ‘unicorn’, the coincidental-resemblance prob-
lem thus arises as a result of two distinct problems: (i) historical unconnectedness 
and (ii) unsuited mode of introduction. pure myth-making mode and pure fiction-
writing mode both give rise to expressions that aren’t introduced in the right 
way to refer to actual objects. It is natural to expect the intentions and beliefs of 
language users to be highly relevant in determining the mode in which they 
introduce expressions of their language. on this point, it is customary to note a 
key difference between myth and fiction (which I will take for granted for the 
purposes of this paper): 
21  kaplan quotes Harry Deutsch: “reference is no coincidence” (kaplan 1989: 608).
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the difference between authors and myth-makers is one of propositional attitude: 
authors make-believe their works of fiction, whereas myth-makers do not make-be-
lieve their myths; rather, they genuinely believe their myths. (Caplan 2004, 334, 
emphasis in the original)22
according to this, those who created the myth of the unicorn had unicorn-re-
lated beliefs (not just pretended beliefs). still kripke does raise the issue of an 
unsuited mode of introduction: myth-spinning. right after the passage above, 
kripke (1972, 157–158) repeats the same point with respect to ‘sherlock Hol-
mes’ also: “it is theoretically possible though in practice fantastically unlikely, 
that Doyle was writing pure fiction with only coincidental resemblance to [an] 
actual man”. a crucial consideration emerges from these fleeting remarks about 
unicorns and sherlock Holmes: given (ii) the way the myth/fiction was created, 
and (i) the fact that we encounter historical unconnectedness, the result is that 
we find no more than coincidental resemblance to actual objects. 
the unsuited-mode problem would arise even if we had at hand a myth or a 
novel specifying mythical beings/characters completely, down to the last bit of 
information about sock color and origin (it would be mind-numbing to read such 
a novel).23 so even in special cases of names from complete fictions in which 
the metaphysical thesis is circumvented, the epistemological thesis would still 
present problems. (given the focus of this paper, in what follows, I will focus 
on characters from fiction, setting myths and mythical beings to the side; the 
points I make about the various problems can be generalized to names from 
myths also.)
both theses and all the problems considered so far have taken it for granted 
that the candidate objects to count as harry potter are concrete, spatiotemporal 
objects. It is therefore well to keep this qualification in mind. For example, for 
(ii) we get: the fiction-writing mode in which the expression ‘harry potter’ had 
been introduced into the language is unsuited for the name to refer to an actual 
concrete, spatiotemporal object. For (i) we get: actual, concrete, spatiotemporal 
objects as potential referents for the name are historically unconnected to the 
introduction and subsequent use of ‘harry potter’. 
It’s crucial to note that of the two problems (i) and (ii), unsuited mode of in-
troduction is the more fundamental one, explaining historical unconnectedness 
of the relevant sort: for all we know, there could be an actual person who provided 
inspiration for rowling’s harry potter; this would make for a historical connec-
tion between rowling’s use of the name and the actual boy. but it wouldn’t be 
the reference-determining kind of historical connection we’re interested in, the sort 
of historical connection that would circumvent the coincidental-resemblance 
22  see also salmon 1998; braun 2005.
23  kaplan (1989, 609) makes this point.
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problem by determining the reference of ‘harry potter’. rowling’s authorial 
intentions, her fiction-writing mode precludes historical connections that are 
reference-fixing.24 kripke (1972, 92) also gives an example of an irrelevant kind 
of causal/historical connection: the “causal chain from our use of the term ‘santa 
Claus’ to a certain historical saint”; despite such a link, children, when they use 
the name ‘santa Claus’ “by this time probably do not refer to that saint”.
being an actual person who is the spitting image of harry potter as he is de-
scribed in the rowling novels would make for no more than coincidental resem-
blance to Harry Potter. Here is why: J. k. rowling’s intention was to introduce 
the name ‘harry potter’ for a fictional character rather than an actual person who 
fits a certain set of descriptions. and for a name to refer to an actual person takes 
more than coincidental resemblance; reference is shaped (i) in part by causal-
historical connections between uses of the name and an object (whether that 
be a concrete or an abstract object), and (ii) in part by the mode of introduction. 
given that (ii) rowling’s intention was to create a fictional character rather than 
refer to a flesh-and-blood person with introducing ‘harry potter’, (i) the name 
‘harry potter’ was never historically linked (in the relevant way) to an actual 
orphaned boy wearing glasses, with a z-shaped scar on his forehead, growing up 
in suburban England learning wizardry in a boarding school, and so on, and the 
name cannot refer to any actual concrete boy with spatiotemporal dimensions. 
not only is the unsuited-mode problem more fundamental than (i); it is also 
more general. notice that it readily generalizes to concrete, spatiotemporal ob-
jects of all sorts, merely possible ones included; this way, we get: 
the unsuited-mode problem generalized: the fiction-writing mode of introducing proper 
names into the language is unsuited for them to have as their reference concrete, 
spatiotemporal objects, whether they be actual or merely possible. 
It is well to generalize in the same way the coincidental-resemblance problem 
also: 
The coincidental-resemblance problem generalized: there is no more than mere qualita-
tive coincidence between concrete, spatiotemporal objects (whether they be actual 
or merely possible) and fictional characters as described in works of fiction. 
24  notice that I am assuming here that authors have the final word on whether they are 
introducing a name for a historical figure or a fictional character. suppose that tolstoy, upon 
asked about napoleon in his War and Peace were to have sincerely said: “I intended the figure 
of napoleon in War and Peace to be a fictional character; I drew a great deal of inspiration from 
the French military leader, but still, resemblance between the character and the historical fig-
ure is pure coincidence”. In this imagined scenario, the position I am assuming is that tolstoy 
would have introduced ‘napoleon’ in War and Peace in fiction-writing mode, so the reference 
of the name would not have been the historical figure, and historical connections to the first 
Emperor of the French would not have been of the relevant, reference-fixing sort. 
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therefore, as we dig deeper, the pair of problems behind the epistemological 
thesis turn out to target nonactualism. 
as before, in the case of ‘harry potter’, the unsuited-mode problem gener-
alized underlies the generalized coincidental-resemblance problem. and both 
apply to the metaphysical thesis also: the generalized unsuited-mode problem 
provides the following additional reason for holding the metaphysical thesis. 
If the character of harry potter is not fully specified in the novels, then what 
grounds do we have at all for choosing between two distinct merely possible 
concrete, spatiotemporal objects which to count as harry potter when, given J. 
k. rowling’s fiction-writing mode of introducing ‘Harry Potter’, it would be a 
matter of sheer coincidental resemblance for the name to refer to either of those 
candidate objects? With respect to names from fiction, the unsuited-mode problem (and 
in its wake, the coincidental resemblance problem) therefore raises a key issue underlying 
both the metaphysical and the epistemological theses discussed by Kripke; this is a strik-
ing detail to bring to the surface given that kripke mentions the unsuited-mode 
problem in passing only (saying no more than the two half-sentences quoted 
above), devoting far more attention to the metaphysical thesis. 
Just how bizarre the idea of reference based on coincidental resemblance 
is—the conception of reference for ‘harry potter’ to which the nonactualist 
is committed—can be brought out based on considerations about nonfictional 
names that fail to refer. The French astronomer le verrier put forth a hypoth-
esis about the existence of an intra-Mercurial planet which he named ‘Vulcan’, 
to explain perturbations in the orbit of Mercury. there were various independ-
ent sightings mistakenly believed to be of Vulcan before enthusiasm dwindled; 
by 1916, Einstein’s general theory of relativity confirmed that the perturbations 
were produced by the gravitational field of the sun; there was no intra-Mercurial 
planet at all; the Vulcan-hypothesis was refuted; ‘Vulcan’ turned out not to refer 
to anything.  
What about a counterfactual situation in which the Vulcan-hypothesis is a 
success story? Imagine a counterfactual scenario with the laws of physics slightly 
different, and there being an intra-Mercurial planet affecting the orbit of Mer-
cury; le verrier puts forth his hypothesis; there are sightings converging on the 
planet, which comes to be called ‘vulcan’, the name featured in le verrier’s 
prior hypothesis. but that is not our term ‘Vulcan’ that comes to name the coun-
terfactual planet, but a different one. It is preposterous to think that in coining 
the name in the actual world, le verrier managed to name that counterfactual 
object even though his naming attempt failed in the actual world. ‘Vulcan’ might have 
been a success story just as ‘london’ might have been introduced as a name for 
a river instead of a city; but all that is irrelevant to how and whether these strings, 
as parts of our language, were introduced and subsequently used.25 le verrier 
25  see kripke (1971, 145; 1972, 77, 102–3, especially fn. 51).
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strove to name an actual concrete, spatiotemporal object; due to his failure to do 
so, he didn’t by coincidence name a nonactual concrete, spatiotemporal object (as 
the nonactualist would have it); doing so was no part of his intention. so ‘Vulcan’ 
doesn’t refer to any concrete objects in any counterfactual situations. kaplan 
(1973, 506–508) makes this point eloquently with respect to a fictional name 
like ‘pegasus’. but what is far more interesting is that the point holds for ‘Vul-
can’! We can say the following about this name, as well as other proper names 
intended for concrete objects or for fictional characters:26 if it cannot make it here, 
it cannot make it anywhere. If the name doesn’t refer to a concrete, spatiotemporal 
object here, in the actual world, it doesn’t refer to such an object in other pos-
sible worlds either. elsewhere (zvolenszky 2007), i call this the inverse-Sinatra 
principle for proper names.27 
the inverse sinatra principle is quite general, covering names like ‘Vulcan’, 
‘pegasus’, and ‘harry potter’. and the reason why these names cannot make it 
anywhere given that they cannot make it here (in the actual world), is because 
nonactual concrete objects are, at best, coincidentally similar to the descriptions 
given for Vulcan, pegasus and harry potter. We thus have a nonfictional variant 
of the coincidental resemblance problem: there is no more than mere qualita-
tive coincidence between merely possible concrete, spatiotemporal objects and 
nonreferring names featured in failed hypotheses. 
notice that ‘Vulcan’ and ‘harry potter’ differ in one crucial detail: for the 
case of ‘vulcan’, the unsuited-mode objection doesn’t arise. le verrier’s inten-
tion had been to introduce ‘Vulcan’ for a concrete, spatiotemporal object; so a 
historical connection, if there had been one, linking uses of the name to an ac-
tual concrete object, could have served to fix the reference of ‘Vulcan’, circum-
venting coincidental-resemblance-related qualms. a historical connection can 
be secured in the actual world only—there is absolutely no historical connec-
tion between our use of ‘Vulcan’ and a merely possible concrete, spatiotemporal 
object. and in the absence of an actual historical connection, qualms about co-
incidental resemblance do arise, leading to the metaphysical thesis about ‘Vul-
can’: if the specification of Vulcan isn’t complete, allowing that several distinct 
merely possible concrete objects fit the specification equally, then we have no 
basis for counting any one of them as Vulcan. (notice that here, as before, my 
argument leading to the metaphysical thesis for Vulcan was crucially linked to 
considerations about coincidental resemblance and historical unconnectedness, 
26  Even an irrealist about fictional characters can, based on the considerations about Vulcan 
and unicorns above, accept the inverse-sinatra principle. 
27  Frank sinatra sang about new york City: “If I can make it there, I’ll make it any-
where”. 
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which were originally identified behind the other thesis—the epistemological 
one. With respect to ‘Vulcan’, too, we see that the two theses are intimately 
connected.) 
the foregoing observation allows us to highlight a more general point of 
advantage for the artifactualist position over both Meinongianism and nonac-
tualism. 
according to artifactualism, harry potter is an actual object; it’s just that 
unlike concrete objects like the big ben, harry potter is abstract. yet the fact 
that he is an actual artifact makes room for a certain kind of causal-historical 
dependence on the physical world: in the 1990s, J. k. rowling’s creative ac-
tivities bring it about that potter is an actual (rather than a merely possible) 
abstract object. the sort of dependence in place allows harry potter qua ab-
stract artifact to be the kind of referent for rowling’s name ‘harry potter’ with 
respect to which issues having to do with historical unconnectedness and, in 
turn, coincidental resemblance, and, in turn, the epistemological thesis, do 
not arise. (notice that before, we noted that for names of fictional characters, 
no historical connection to concrete, spatiotemporal objects is of the relevant, 
reference-fixing sort. Meanwhile, the point made here is that for the artifac-
tualist, a historical connection to an abstract artifact is precisely what fixes the 
reference of ‘harry potter’.)
by contrast, alternative realist accounts that make harry potter a concrete 
object whose existence does not causally depend on us either because the object 
is nonexistent (according to Meinongianism) or because it is nonactual (accord-
ing to nonactualism), face a challenge. First, these theorists have to explain why 
those objects are candidates of the right ontological status to count as the refer-
ents of ‘harry potter’. as we have already seen, on this point, the nonactualist 
founders already. the Meinongian can get past this hurdle: he may suggest that 
his nonexistents are objects of thought and hence have just the right sort of on-
tological status to be suitable targets of authors’ intended reference. but on the 
next hurdle the Meinongian stumbles: if his nonexistent objects are of a suitable 
sort as objects of fiction-writing, what historical connection is there to account 
for rowling’s ‘harry potter’ referring to one of countless nonexistent candidate 
objects (each equally faithful to the way potter is depicted in the novels but var-
ying in details left unspecified—about sock color, etc.)? the Meinongian cannot 
provide such a historical connection: causal-historical connection between his 
timelessly nonexistent objects and actual concreta (like authors) is extremely 
problematic, downright unintelligible even. and because of historical uncon-
nectedness, the Meinongian is confronted with qualms about having to work 
with no more than coincidental resemblance between harry potter as specified 
in the novels, and various qualitatively identical Meinongian nonexistents. and, 
on the one hand, coincidental resemblance does not suffice for reference, ac-
cording to the epistemological thesis; and, on the other hand, with insufficiently 
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specified characters like harry potter, coincidental resemblance leaves room for 
the metaphysical thesis (and also the selection problem) to arise.28 
once fleshed out, kripke’s (1972) fleeting remarks about fictional characters 
can be summarized as follows: qualitative resemblance is insufficient to deter-
mine the reference of a proper name; a causal-historical connection between 
names and their referents is necessary to determine to whom or to what proper 
names refer. For names of actual objects like ‘J.k. rowling’ and ‘london’, this 
overarching lesson transparently emerges from the second lecture of Naming and 
Necessity. it is considerably less transparent that kripke reiterates the very same 
lesson for names of fictional characters. of the forms of realism considered, arti-
factualism is the only one that can heed this lesson.
3. DeFlecTinG THe caTeGory-misTake obJecTion
sainsbury, an advocate of irrealism, agrees with the conclusion of the previous 
chapter: among realist contenders, artifactualism has the edge. unlike yagisawa 
(2001), he doesn’t think that the major challenge artifactualists face concerns 
accounting for the truth of negative existential claims like “harry potter doesn’t 
exist”. Instead, sainsbury (2010, 111) writes: 
i see the problems for abstract artifact theory lying elsewhere… They have the 
form: on abstract artifact theories, fictional characters just are not the kinds of 
things we want them to be. We want them to be as they are said to be in the sto-
ries, to be detectives and to play the violin, but they are said to be something of an 
entirely different kind. 
…
Fictional characters do not have the properties they are ascribed during their crea-
tion. this is mysterious: Conan Doyle stipulates that holmes wears a deerstalker, 
there is such an entity as holmes, yet that entity does not end up having (i.e. ex-
emplifying) the property of wearing a deerstalker. he does end up having (exem-
plifying) a genuine property, that of encoding wearing a deerstalker, but this is not 
28  this line of argument brings to the fore why the only abstract-theory contender we con-
sidered for fictional characters was artifactualism: it is the only view according to which harry 
potter is created and hence historically linked to goings on in the actual world. platonism, 
a theory according to which harry potter is a timelessly existing abstract object (akin to num-
bers, sets), would, like Meinongianism and nonactualism, run into problems with historical 
unconnectedness and hence coincidental resemblance, and, in their wake, the metaphysical 
and epistemological theses. For an attempt to combine the advantages of artifactualism and 
meinongianism, see zalta’s (2000, 2006). 
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a property that’s intellectually accessible to most authors. people can, of course, 
fail to understand what they are doing, but it’s surprising to be told that so many 
authors, perhaps all, fail so often and so seriously. 
sainsbury is here relying on a distinction between exemplifying and encoding 
originally suggested by Meinong’s student Mally (1912): a concrete object like 
J.k. rowling doesn’t encode any properties; but she does exemplify being british 
and fails to exemplify wearing glasses. Meanwhile, harry potter encodes wearing 
glasses and being british, but exemplifies neither of these properties. he does, 
however, exemplify being abstract and being a fictional character. 
part of sainsbury’s objection then is that according to artifactualism, fictional 
characters are of the wrong ontological category—abstract rather than concrete—
to exemplify the sorts of properties ascribed to them by the authors who create 
them. I call this the category-mistake objection. a consequence of the category-mis-
take objection is that artifactualism attributes massive error to those who create, 
read and discuss fictional characters. 
My aim is to show that the strategy behind the category-mistake objection, 
if it were to work, would show far too much with respect to a broad range of 
metaphysical debates. the strategy is therefore objectionable. I will formulate 
three arguments to show that the category-mistake strategy does not withstand 
scrutiny.
My first argument is about the metaphysics of possible worlds. In section 1, 
we distinguished two positions in the debate about the nature of possible worlds: 
realism versus ersatzism about possible worlds (pw-realism and pw-ersatzism). 
according to pw-ersatzism, possible worlds are abstract, for example, maximally 
consistent sets of propositions representing ways the world could be. and mere-
ly possible individuals are likewise abstract (as sainsbury acknowledges): repre-
sentations comprising propositions about the individual. now, when I consider 
a counterfactual scenario in which I dye my hair green today, I am ascribing to 
myself the property of having green hair, or so it seems to me when I reflect on 
my mental episode. yet the category mistake objection could be raised here: 
according to pw-ersatzism, possible objects are of the wrong ontological catego-
ry—abstract rather than concrete—to exemplify the sorts of properties ascribed 
to them by those who entertain counterfactual scenarios. this objection would 
apply to all forms of pw-ersatzism, regardless of whether they construe worlds in 
terms of states of affairs, universals or sentences. on all these versions, possible 
objects are the wrong kinds of things to be ascribed the properties we ordinarily 
ascribe to them. anyone who thinks pw-ersatzism cannot be dismissed quite so 
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quickly has reason to consider the strategy behind the category-mistake objec-
tion (as targeting artifactualism as well as pw-ersatzism) specious.29
another point casts further doubt on the category-mistake strategy. the cat-
egory-mistake objection against pw-ersatzism, if it were to work, would seem 
to leave the rather controversial position of pw-realism, famous for eliciting in-
credulous stares (lewis 1973, 86), as the only realist account of possible worlds. 
according to pw-realism, the actual world is one among a plurality of possible 
worlds that are causally and spatiotemporally isolated from one another. a mo-
ment’s further thought reveals that an objection closely related to the category-
mistake objection affects pw-realism also. If an ordinary speaker were asked 
if she thought there are countless merely possible worlds and countless mere-
ly possible objects, and if she thought such things have the same ontological 
status as the actual world and actual objects, respectively, she would answer 
in the negative to both questions. hence the incredulous stare that confronts 
pw-realism. yet, contrary to people’s intuitions, pw-realism posits that possible 
worlds have the same ontological status as that enjoyed by the actual world, and 
possible concrete objects have the same ontological status enjoyed by actual 
concrete objects. Call this the mistaken-ontological-status objection to pw-realism. 
It is unclear why this objection should have any less force than the category-
mistake objection against pw-ersatzism. but if that objection were effective 
against pw-ersatzism while the mistaken-ontological-status objection were ef-
fective against pw-realism, then irrealist accounts of possible worlds would be 
left as the only alternatives standing. this conclusion seems much too quickly 
and easily obtained for irrealists about possible worlds (including sainsbury). 
the pair of objections seem, from the outset, to rig the stakes against all forms 
of realism about possible worlds. anyone who thinks that realism about possible 
worlds cannot be dismissed quite so easily has reason to consider at least one of 
the two objections specious. until the irrealist about possible worlds provides 
special reasons that discredit the mistaken-ontological-category objection, both 
objections remain suspect.
My second argument is intended to show that for someone who finds a form 
of pw-ersatzism (a not unpopular view about the metaphysics of possible worlds) 
independently plausible, there is little reason to resist admitting fictional charac-
ters as abstract objects, the category-mistake objection notwithstanding. here is 
29  an argument from authority (whatever its merits might be): interestingly, while lewis 
(1986) carefully considered a long list of arguments against pw-ersatzism, he did not address 
the category-mistake objection against it. 
of course, one person’s modus tollens is another modus ponens; I have motivated the follow-
ing conditional: if the category-mistake objection is effective against artifactualism, then it is 
effective against pw-ersatzism. I have taken the modus tollens direction and concluded that 
the objection is ineffective against artifactualism. someone else might take the modus ponens 
direction and conclude that the objection is a new and effective one against pw-ersatzism. 
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why. Imagine a certain spool of yarn I knit into a sock: sock1, based on a specific 
set of knitting instructions. Imagine another specific, actual spool of the same 
yarn that I could have used to knit a qualitatively identical (or very similar) pair 
to sock1: sock2. as things stand, I never got around to knitting sock2. so sock2 
doesn’t exist, but it might have.30 according to the pw-ersatzist, sock2 is ab-
stract: we might take it to correspond to a set of propositions representing sock2 
as having a certain color, shape, size, pattern, person knitting it; the proposition 
set can then be said to encode color, shape, knitter, etc., and exemplify being 
abstract and consisting of propositions. this set of propositions actually exists; 
but the scenario it represents is unactualized (because I never get around to 
knitting sock2). now consider the fictional sock that is featured at the end of 
the second harry potter novel: harry pulls off one of his “slimy, filthy” socks, 
tricking lucius malfoy into unwittingly giving it to his long-suffering house 
elf, Dobby, thereby releasing Dobby from serving the Malfoy family (house 
elves are freed when their masters give them an article of clothing). J.k. rowl-
ing doesn’t give this sock a name, but for easy reference, let’s call it Dobbysock. 
according to artifactualism, J.k. rowling created Dobbysock; she specified it 
as having been worn by harry potter, as being slimy and filthy, but she didn’t 
say what color it was. Whatever form of pw-ersatzism we might opt for, we can 
go the same way with Dobbysock; for example, we can take Dobbysock to cor-
respond to a set of propositions representing it as being filthy, slimy, etc.; this 
set of propositions encodes Dobbysock as being filthy, slimy, etc. (in the second 
harry potter novel); and the same set exemplifies being rowling’s creation, a 
fictional character, a famous fictional character even. We must realize that by 
taking these parallel approaches to sock2 and Dobbysock, there isn’t that great 
a difference in the nature of the merely possible sock2 and the artifact Dobbys-
ock: both correspond to sets of propositions representing socks, encoding cer-
tain properties (like being a sock) and exemplifying others (like being abstract, 
containing propositions). one noteworthy difference is that the first set encodes 
being created by me (the knitter), while the second set exemplifies being cre-
ated by J.k. rowling. but this is a difference we expect, and the similarities are 
otherwise striking. For a pw-ersatzist, with merely possible objects on board, it 
would be ad hoc to resist what is mostly parallel treatment for fictional characters: 
a form of artifactualism. given how costly such an ad hoc move would be, the 
pw-ersatzist should embrace artifactualism and not worry about the category-
mistake objection. 
It is well to address three worries at this point. First, there is a crucial dif-
ference between sock2 and Dobbysock according to someone who combines 
30  notice that ‘sock2’ is a special name to which the inverse sinatra principle discussed in 
section 2 does not apply. and that’s all well: ‘sock2’ doesn’t make it here but makes it in the 
possible worlds in which it gets knit.  
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pw-ersatzism and artifactualism: (on at least one plausible view of propositions), 
the proposition set for sock2 exists timelessly, as do the pw-ersatzist’s possible 
worlds; by contrast, Dobbysock is an artifact and hence not a timeless existent. 
Why should the pw-ersatzist be moved to admit the latter kind of beast then, an 
object that is unlike her possible worlds and objects? three reasons: (i) beyond 
this difference, there are crucial similarities between sock2 and Dobbysock, 
ones that make it plausible to treat both as abstract; (ii) operas, novels, the in-
stitution of marriage, etc. are overwhelmingly plausible candidates for abstract 
artifacts already; so the burden of providing a workable alternative is on those 
who want to deny that these are abstract artifacts; (iii) with operas and novels on 
board as abstract artifacts, between the platonist and artifactualist alternatives, 
the latter is a far more tenable choice. For the platonist view (mentioned in foot-
note 3 above)—according to which Dobbysock is a timelessly existing abstract 
object—is affected by the selection problem, insufficient specificity, unsuited 
mode of introduction and coincidental resemblance; problems (discussed in 
section 2) that artifactualism (singularly among realist contenders) avoids.
second, notice that in contrasting encoding and exemplifying above, I have 
talked about proposition sets encoding and exemplifying properties like being knit 
by me and created by J.k. rowling. Proposition sets represent ways the world 
might be; they are representational devices. and “[t]he distinction between en-
coding and exemplifying is one that is properly available for representational ve-
hicles, but that’s not what fictional characters are. they are what’s represented”, 
sainsbury (2010, 112) objects. the worry is that fictional characters qua abstract 
objects aren’t the right sorts of things to be representational devices and to be 
encoding properties. this worry is easily responded to: although possible worlds 
seem at first like really big particular objects, like all-encompassing, gigantic 
galaxies, the ersatz-realist does not balk at construing them as sets of proposi-
tions or as structural universals31. In the same way, the artifactualist should not 
worry about taking fictional characters to be sets of propositions (or as structural 
universals). that it is the proposition set about harry potter that encodes and 
exemplifies various properties is not a problem given that fictional characters 
correspond to such proposition sets. on the version of pw-ersatzism we are con-
sidering, “sock2 encodes shape, size, pattern and exemplifies being abstract” is 
loose talk for “the ‘sock2’ proposition set represents sock2, encoding shape, 
size, pattern, and exemplifying being abstract”. likewise, on the version of ar-
tifactualism we are considering, “Dobbysock encodes being filthy and slimy 
and exemplifies being abstract and created by J.k. rowling” is loose talk for 
“the ‘Dobbysock’ proposition set represents Dobbysock, encoding filthiness, 
31  a paradigmatic example of a structural universal is being a water molecule: for an object to 
instantiate this universal, it has to have the right kinds of parts in the right kind of arrange-
ment.
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sliminess, and exemplifying being abstract and created by J.k. rowling.” Per-
haps some of the pw-ersatzist’s alternatives are conceptually more satisfying in 
some way than proposition sets; but the point stands: whatever kind of abstract 
objects the pw-ersatzist might posit as her possible objects, she has good reason 
to extend her theory to some very similar beasts: fictional characters as abstract 
artifacts. and her choice of construal for these objects can then accommodate 
the encoding/exemplifying distinction in much the same way as the proposition 
set construal did.
a third worry arises: aren’t we multiplying abstract objects that are qualita-
tively identical to one another? Imagine a merely possible sock that is qualita-
tively identical to Dobbysock, as specified in the second harry potter novel, call 
it JustlikeDs. The ‘JustlikeDs’ proposition set encodes the same properties 
as the ‘Dobbysock’ proposition set encodes. the two sets exemplify some of 
the same properties: being abstract, being sets, consisting of propositions. now, 
isn’t it an extravagant proliferation of objects to hold that with JustlikeDs al-
ready in existence, J.k. rowling creates a qualitative duplicate, Dobbysock, 
upon conjuring up the second harry potter novel? We can see that this outcome 
is not worrisome at all if we reflect on some perfectly ordinary scenarios that are 
analogous. 
Consider another abstract object, say, Mozart’s opera The Magic Flute. Consid-
er the collection of musical chord sequences, timing, order, etc. for the various 
singers and instruments, which the total score of The Magic Flute comprises. this 
is a type, which is a paradigmatic instance of an abstract object that can have spe-
cific performances of the opera as its tokens. now, The Magic Flute qua abstract 
type was created by mozart. but now consider a type—call it JustlikemF—of 
chord sequences, instructions, various specifications qualitatively just like the 
score of The Magic Flute. If we take sets, properties and propositions to be time-
lessly existing abstract objects (a widely held position), then clearly, a type such 
as JustlikemF should be regarded as an abstract object, plausibly, a timelessly 
existing one. but then when Mozart came along, he ended up proliferating qual-
itatively identical types by writing the score of The Magic Flute, in addition to 
the timelessly existing JustlikemF. Proliferation of this sort is inevitable, yet it 
isn’t taken as cause for concern for those who posit types as abstract, and musical 
pieces as types created by composers. 
Consider a similar example: the swiftly created and enacted new hungarian 
constitution (“Fundamental law” it’s called) didn’t always exist; it came into 
existence in 2011 only, when it was drafted; indeed, beforehand, many consid-
ered it unfathomable that an object like the Fundamental law should ever be 
created; but it was. The Fundamental law is a type that can have instances: 
printed and electronic copies, a reading event of the text. the Fundamental 
law didn’t exist before the current government came into power, but it exists 
now. yet a qualitatively identical type, an ordered sequence of propositions, is 
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plausibly an abstract object that existed well before 2011, if not timelessly32. 
proliferation of this sort is inevitable if we want to maintain that the Funda-
mental law is an artifact created in the recent past while types are abstract also. 
and if proliferation is no cause for concern here, it isn’t worrisome in the case of 
Dobbysock and JustlikeDs either. 
Consider a third example: words being added to the English vocabulary. For 
example, a fairly recent addition to the English language is the expression ‘cot 
potato’, meaning a very young child who spends a lot of time watching televi-
sion. the expression type ‘cot potato’ can have hand-written, typed, electronic, 
spoken, mouthed or signed tokens. linguists tend to take for granted that ex-
pression types are abstract objects, specifically, abstract artifacts that didn’t al-
ways exist. but (relative to ‘cot potato’) a qualitatively identical phonological 
type, orthographic type, and semantic type qua abstract types have been around 
for much longer,33 so with the addition of new words like ‘cot potato’ to the 
English language, we get a the very same kind of proliferation that Dobbysock 
and JustlikeDs had presented; and this sort of word proliferation is rampant: 
for any expression type of any language, there is a qualitative duplicate that is 
an antecedently existing abstract object. If that isn’t worrisome, nor is the case 
of Dobbysock and JustlikeDs.
the upshot of these examples is that proliferation of qualitative duplicates 
is inevitable for abstract artifacts across the board. If (like many theorists) we 
still want our ontology to make room for works of art, social and legal institu-
tions, games, words within a language, traditions, festivals, religions as abstract 
artifacts, then we should have no qualms about including fictional characters on 
the list. and overall, the upshot of my second argument has been that for pw-
ersatzists, resisting artifactualism would be an ad hoc move.
My third argument is that the category-mistake objection can be extended to 
a broad range of objects that are commonly regarded as abstract artifacts. If we 
don’t balk at the objection there, we should pay no head to it with respect to 
artifactualism either. Were those who were coming up with and modifying the 
rules of chess thinking of themselves as creating something abstract? Were the 
writers of the Fundamental law of Hungary thinking of themselves as creating 
something abstract? Was Mozart, when composing The Magic Flute? Were those 
who coined the term ‘cot potato’? If these people were interviewed, they would 
32  Whether or not we take the ordered sequence of propositions to exist timelessly depends 
in part on our view of propositions, an issue on which I’d like to maintain neutrality. Either 
way, the qualitatively identical type enjoys prior existence relative to the Fundamental law.
33  I avoid talking about timelessly existing types here for the sake of neutrality on various 
matters. I want to leave open the possibility that the orthographic type ’cot potato’ doesn’t 
exist timelessly because it didn’t exist prior to the English orthographic system coming into 
existence. likewise, i want to leave open the possibility that the semantic type ’cot potato’ 
doesn’t exist timelessly because it didn’t exist prior to the existence of television sets. 
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likely be baffled by the idea that they were aiming at creating abstract objects. 
yet regarding the game of chess, the Fundamental law, The Magic Flute, and 
words of English as abstract artifacts is a plausible option, more plausible than its 
alternatives, and one that many consider platitudinous. then why worry about 
the category-mistake objection against artifactualism? 34 
a defender of the category-mistake objection can make a comeback: all the 
abstract artifacts considered here are types capable of having concrete, spatio-
temporal instances such as specific games of chess, copies of the Fundamental 
law, performances of The Magic Flute, utterances of ‘cot potato’. the creators of 
these abstract artifacts were specifying conditions for the instances of the types they were 
creating. but there is a crucial disanalogy between the type-like abstract artifacts 
just considered and fictional characters qua abstract artifacts: the latter are not 
the kinds of things capable of having instances. hence the application of the 
category-mistake objection to the latter.
the artifactualist can respond to this in three ways. granted: types can have 
instances. but it is not so outlandish to think of fictional characters as having 
something a bit like instances: for example, an opera singer singing papagena 
in The Magic Flute plays papagena; though admittedly, she isn’t papagena. In the 
harry potter movies, there were several actors playing professor Dumbledore; 
though admittedly, none of them was Dumbledore. We might insist, however 
that the opera singer and the actors are—within the fiction—instances of the 
characters they play, so the disanalogy isn’t as great as the defender of the cate-
gory-mistake objection makes out.
a second and more substantial line of response from the artifactualist: consider, 
again, merely possible objects like sock2, which are plausibly construed within 
a pw-ersatzist framework as, for example, a set of propositions. this proposition 
set can be instantiated in a sense: it can be actualized—it is actualized when I 
end up knitting sock2. We can think in terms of this model of actualization for 
fictional characters like Dobbysock qua abstract artifact also. It is just that for 
reasons explained in section 2, fictional characters are forever unactualized, in-
deed, unactualizable. the inverse sinatra principle sums up a crucial feature of 
names, fictional names included: if they don’t make it here, they don’t make it 
anywhere; that is, if they don’t refer to concrete, spatiotemporal objects in the 
actual world, then they don’t do so with respect to other possible worlds either. 
Fictional characters by their very nature are barred from being actualized. but 
34  I am symphathetic to thomasson’s (1999; 2009, 16) point “that those who accept the ex-
istence of such ordinary social and cultural objects as laws, marriages, symphonies, and works 
of literature themselves are apparently already committed to the existence of created ab-
stracta, so that no special problems arise in accepting created abstracta to account for fictional 
characters”, and “it is not obviously more parsimonious to do without fictional characters if we 
must posit abstract artifacts in some other arena, e.g. to make sense of our talk about novels, 
symphonies, laws of state, and the like.”
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this is a feature of theirs due to considerations about coincidental resemblance 
being insufficient for reference. this feature does not make for a decisive point 
of disanalogy between them and merely possible individuals. so granted, there 
is a special reason why in one sense, fictional characters qua abstract objects 
aren’t ever instantiated (that is, actualized); but that need not make them radi-
cally different from types. 
third, consider the tradition of the Easter rabbit and its australian marsupial 
variant, the Easter bilby. What exactly might be concrete, spatiotemporal in-
stances of these traditions—events involving nest-making, egg-painting, candy-
hiding, candy-hunting?—is somewhat puzzling. so fictional characters aren’t 
the only abstract artifacts for which it isn’t straightforward what their instances 
might be. but saying that the tradition of the Easter bunny is therefore not an 
abstract artifact while the other instantiable types are, invites the challenge for 
the defender of the category-mistake objection: on what basis will she count 
among her abstract artifacts the tradition of the Village halloween parade in 
new york City and Mardi gras festivals, but exclude the tradition of the Easter 
bilby?
the upshot of the third argument is that the difference between types and 
fictional characters qua abstract artifacts isn’t as great as it initially appears. yet 
the category-mistake objection applies to a broad and varied range of types: the 
game of chess, The Magic Flute, words. If the objection is ineffective there, we 
have little reason to worry about it when it comes to fictional characters con-
ceived as abstract artifacts.35 
4. conclusion
My aim in this paper has been to motivate taking at face value claims about fic-
tional characters being created by their authors. this requires a form of realism 
about fictional characters: they are supposed to exist once created. among the 
contending realist theories about fictional characters that sainsbury (2010) con-
sidered, artifactualism, which takes harry potter to be an abstract artifact, is the 
only one according to which fictional characters are created. based on kripke’s 
35  notice that the third argument is not defeated by those who contest the abstract artifact 
status of one or another among the various candidates I have enumerated. as long as these 
philosophers are moved to grant abstract artifact status to some of the examples mentioned—
operas, novels, words or the game of chess—the third argument affects them already. Mean-
while, for philosophers holding that none of the items listed in section 1 as abstract artifacts 
are in fact such (because they suggest, say, that these aren’t abstract, after all), the burden of 
proof is on them to explain how operas, novels, words, etc. are nonabstract.
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(1972) brief considerations about expressions like ‘unicorn’ and ‘sherlock hol-
mes’, I constructed a general argument showing that artifactualism is superior 
to its realist rivals. sainsbury accepts this conclusion, yet argues that one should 
ultimately reject realism about fictional characters because artifactualism faces 
insurmountable difficulties due to the category-mistake objection. I gave three 
arguments showing that the category-mistake objection is problematic because 
if it were to work, it would show too much: first, it would show ersatzism about 
possible worlds to be a nonstarter; second, it would prevent the ersatzist from 
taking on board fictional characters as abstract artifacts, an ad hoc move for her; 
and third, it would cast doubt on the abstract artifact status of a broad range of 
social and cultural artifacts like the game of chess, words of English, bodies of 
law, novels and operas. Pace sainsbury, artifactualism about fictional characters 
remains unscathed by the category-mistake objection. 
In the process of disarming the category-mistake objection, I aimed also to 
demystify what Harry Potter as an abstract artifact might be. let me close with 
two further demystifying considerations. brock (2010) deems a position like ar-
tifactualism “an abject failure” because it cannot offer a satisfactory account of 
the spatial and temporal dimensions of fictional characters, for example, their 
moment of creation. this line of attack ignores that quintessential examples of 
abstract artifacts like the institution of marriage and the game of chess are just as 
difficult to locate in space and time as harry potter is. In particular, when each 
came into existence is a thorny question: there is extensive debate as to which 
stage of rules for a board game to count as the birth of chess—the 15th century, 
the 17th, or the 19th? Most likely, no agreement will be reached on this issue; but 
that hardly casts doubt on the abstract artifact status of the game of chess. nor 
has brock given us reason to doubt the abstract artifact status of harry potter. 
Consider a related point about criteria for individuating abstract artifacts: does 
a board game very much like contemporary chess but with different rules about 
stalemate count as chess at an earlier stage? How much meaning change and/or 
pronunciation change can a word of English undergo and still remain the same 
word? Can the institution of marriage be modified such that the two parties may 
be of the same sex? the considerations that could decide such questions seem 
unclear and arbitrary. yet the lack of clear answers doesn’t call into question the 
abstract artifact status of the game of chess, words of English and the institution 
of marriage. abstract artifacts can and do change over time as humans shape 
and modify them. In the light of this, it is only expected that harry potter qua 
abstract artifact may change as the film adaptations fill in details (for example, 
the sock harry sneaks to Dobby is black) or contradict the original novels (for 
example, in the novel, as harry gets ready to trick Dobby’s master into giving 
Dobby a sock, harry hides the diary of tom riddle inside the sock, while in the 
movie, he hides the sock inside the diary). or maybe the harry of the novel is 
a distinct artifact than the harry of the movies? again a clear and nonarbitrary 
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answer seems doubtful. but those who, upon encountering comparable issues 
with quintessential abstract artifacts like words of English and the institution of 
marriage did not speak up, should make peace with harry potter as an abstract 
artifact.36 
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